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Abstract 
Case study analysis of the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), which 
particularly impacted Christchurch City, New Zealand, has highlighted the value of practical, 
standardised and coordinated post-earthquake geotechnical response guidelines for 
earthquake-induced landslides in urban areas. The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, the second 
largest magnitude event in the CES, initiated a series of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess 
failures around the Port Hills which severely impacted the south-eastern part of Christchurch. 
The extensive slope failure induced by the 22
nd
 February 200 earthquake was unprecedented; 
and ground motions experienced significantly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard 
model for Canterbury.  
Earthquake-induced landslides initiated by the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake posed risk to 
life safety, and caused widespread damage to dwellings and critical infrastructure. In the 
immediate aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical community 
responded by deploying into the Port Hills to conduct assessment of slope failure hazards and 
life safety risk. Coordination within the voluntary geotechnical response group evolved 
rapidly within the first week post-earthquake. The lack of pre-event planning to guide 
coordinated geotechnical response hindered the execution of timely and transparent 
management of life safety risk from coseismic landslides in the initial week after the 
earthquake. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal, management and operational 
organisations involved in the geotechnical response during the CES. Analysis of interview 
dialogue highlighted the temporal evolution of priorities and tasks during emergency 
response to coseismic slope failure, which was further developed into a phased conceptual 
model to inform future geotechnical response. Review of geotechnical responses to selected 
historical earthquakes (Northridge, 1994; Chi-Chi, 1999; Wenchuan, 2008) has enabled 
comparison between international practice and local response strategies, and has emphasised 
the value of pre-earthquake preparation, indicating the importance of integration of 
geotechnical response within national emergency management plans. Furthermore, analysis 
of the CES and international earthquakes has informed pragmatic recommendations for future 
response to coseismic slope failure.  
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Recommendations for future response to earthquake-induced landslides presented in this 
thesis include: the integration of post-earthquake geotechnical response with national Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management; pre-earthquake development of an adaptive 
management structure and standard slope assessment format for geotechnical response; and 
emergency management training for geotechnical professionals. Post-earthquake response 
recommendations include the development of geographic sectors within the area impacted by 
coseismic slope failure, and the development of a GIS database for analysis and management 
of data collected during ground reconnaissance. Recommendations provided in this thesis aim 
to inform development of national guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-
induced landslides in New Zealand, and prompt debate concerning international best practice.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Context 
Earthquake-induced slope failures can be catastrophic secondary hazards which contribute to 
the destruction and damage produced during and after an earthquake. Slope failures can 
include falls, slides, flows and complex movements which can be destructive and disruptive 
to critical infrastructure (e.g. energy and transportation routes, telecommunication, water and 
sewage reticulation, etc.), buildings and can present threats to life safety (Crozier and Glade 
2004; Hincks et al. 2013). The 2008 Mw 8.0 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan, China 
provides an example of the impact of coseismic slope failure to life safety, where over a 
quarter of the lives lost during the earthquake were attributed to earthquake-induced 
landslides (Cui et al. 2011). The degree of impact from earthquake-induced slope failure 
hazard is influenced by characteristics such the failure mechanism, the volume of material, 
the rate of failure, the size of area exposed to inundation or evacuation of material, and the 
management techniques implemented to control impact (Hincks et al. 2013). 
Management of risk from coseismic slope failures can be achieved pre-earthquake through 
hazard mapping and analysis, implementation of land use regulations, installation of 
engineering stabilisation and protection works, slope monitoring, early warning systems and 
community education (Crozier 2004; Hincks et al. 2013). Risk is defined as the measure of 
probability and severity of an adverse affect to life, health, property, or the environment 
(ISSMGE 2004). It is known from previous earthquakes that the impact from coseismic slope 
failures can be widespread, and if unplanned for can disrupt post-earthquake response and 
relief efforts. The MW 7.6 earthquake in Kashmir, Pakistan, in 2005 which caused extensive 
coseismic landsliding which disrupted relief aid provides an example that emphasises the 
necessity for management of earthquake-induced slope failures during emergency response 
(Peiris et al. 2006). Reviewed literature of earthquakes around the world, has indicated that 
there are no international guidelines outlining best practice for effective and efficient post 
disaster management of earthquake-induced slope failures. 
Many of the current strategies for landslide risk management have been developed as a pre-
disaster framework for thorough quantitative or qualitative assessment (Fell et al. 2005). Very 
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little research has examined how to best implement rapid qualitative risk assessment of 
coseismic slope failure post-earthquake when assessment is predominately reliant on field 
observations, and detailed information of the mechanisms of failure is lacking or non-
existent. Furthermore, rapid execution of post-earthquake risk management strategies are 
based on the assessment outcome which is typically focused on risk to life safety. 
In the aftermath of an earthquake the contribution of scientists and engineers in the evaluation 
of risk is important, however the interface between engineers and post-earthquake emergency 
management is often unclear (Brunsdon 2012). In some countries procedures have been 
developed for post-earthquake building assessments however, typically management of 
geotechnical response has not been as thoroughly addressed. Because of this, in the aftermath 
of an earthquake there can be a requirement for coordination to develop within the response 
from geotechnical professionals which can hinder the efficiency of emergency response and 
risk assessment. A framework has been developed by the Californian Applied Technology 
Council (ATC) which has addressed this issue by incorporating the assessment of slope 
failures with the execution of post-earthquake building safety evaluation (Applied 
Technology Council 1995). Similarly, guidelines for building safety evaluation have been 
developed in New Zealand by the New Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering. These 
guidelines provide recommendations for post-earthquake response by structure engineers and 
building inspectors but do not include a methodology for the assessment of secondary 
geological hazards such as slope failures (NZSEE 2009).  
The high level of seismic hazard and mountainous terrain of New Zealand highlights the 
requirement for a framework to guide assessment of post-earthquake risk to life safety from 
coseismic landslides. Between 1840 and 2002 New Zealand experienced at least 22 
earthquakes which resulted in widespread and damaging landsliding (Hancox et al. 2002). 
Recently, the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence added to this figure and further 
highlighted the susceptibility of urban areas of New Zealand to coseismic slope failure. 
Management of the geotechnical response during the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence (CES) indicates that the timely execution and effective coordination of risk 
assessment of coseismic slope failures may have been hindered by the lack of preformed 
guidelines for geotechnical response. Therefore, research is required to examine the response 
to coseismic slope failures during the CES in order to identify underlying issues that impeded 
the geotechnical response. 
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The response to slope failure that occurred during the CES provides a case study example of 
the requirements of post-earthquake geotechnical response. Comprehensive analysis of the 
CES provides insight into the fundamental priorities and tasks that relate to geotechnical 
response management and landslide risk management. Retrospective analysis of the post-
earthquake landslide response mechanisms during the CES can inform pre-earthquake 
planning to guide emergency response to future coseismic slope failure. This thesis examines 
the geotechnical response to the CES, and provides a comprehensive appraisal indicating 
methods for improving future emergency response to earthquake-induced landslides. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The goal of this research is to analyse and review the approach to post-earthquake risk 
assessment of landslides to inform recommendations for pre-earthquake geotechnical 
response planning. Several international earthquakes and the Canterbury earthquake sequence 
will be used as case studies to inform this analysis. 
The objectives for this research are: 
 Examine the post-earthquake geotechnical response and management of earthquake-
induced slope failure implemented during the 2010-2011 Christchurch earthquake 
sequence, 
 Develop a conceptual model of the information needs throughout time for emergency 
geotechnical response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, 
 Provide comparison between historical international earthquakes and the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence to identify similarities and differences between response 
strategies, 
 Develop a series of recommendations for geotechnical response to earthquakes-
induced landslides to inform future earthquake response planning and preparation. 
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1.3 Research Methodology 
The research methodology used in this thesis is a mixed-method approach with four main 
phases:  
1. A comprehensive literature review of major historical global earthquakes where 
secondary geotechnical hazards occurred in populated areas. This gave insight into the 
methods of geotechnical response to coseismic landslide hazards implemented by 
government organisations and geotechnical professionals internationally. 
Furthermore, the review of literature enabled common practice for geotechnical 
response to be identified.  
 
2. A series of interviews conducted with municipal, emergency management, and 
geotechnical professionals who were operationally involved with the geotechnical 
response that took place during the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. 
Participants were selected on the basis of their professional roles and participated in 
the research on a voluntary basis. Interviews were semi-structured and guided by a 
series of prepared questions, with the intention that additional questions may be added 
by the interviewer to elicit further enquiry as the interview progressed.  
 
3. An analysis of interviews was undertaken to identify recurrent themes and examine 
the temporal evolution of the geotechnical response to the 2010-2011 Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence. This timeline allowed review of the changes in roles and 
response requirements associated with management of landslide hazards. Through 
this, the geotechnical response the CES was compared to international earthquakes. 
 
4. Discussion regarding the analysis of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence case study 
and historical earthquakes reviewed in literature has informed a series of 
recommendations developed to guide future post-earthquake response and pre-event 
planning. 
Further detail on the research methodology is provided in Chapter Two. 
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1.4 The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
The initiating earthquake in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) occurred at 4:35am 
on the 4
th
 September 2010, with a magnitude MW 7.1. The earthquake was followed by a 
progression of aftershocks which propagated eastward from the initial rupture (Figure 1.1). 
Several of the aftershocks in the sequence initiated slope failures in the Port Hills, which are 
located south of Christchurch city and in 2008 had a population >58,000 people (NZ 
Parliment Library 2009). These aftershocks included the 22
nd
 February, 16
th
 April, 13
th
 June 
and 23
rd
 December 2011 earthquakes. Table 1.1 details comparisons between the geological 
aspects and casualties from each of these earthquakes. Figure 1.2 presents the progression of 
aftershocks >Mw 3.0 following the initiating event on the 4
th
 September 2010. In comparison 
to historical global earthquake sequences, the CES was not atypical, however the time (days, 
months, years) and distances (between epicentres) between major earthquakes events were 
generally a shorter than similar international examples (Litchfield and Berryman 2013). 
 
Figure 1.1: Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (GNS Science Ltd 2012) 
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Table 1.1: Earthquake comparisons (Modified from Berryman, 2012) 
 4
th
 September 
2012 
22
nd
 February 2011 13
th
 June 2011 23
rd
 December 
2011 
Magnitude MW 7.1 6.2 6.0 5.9 
Epicentre
1 
30 km W 10 km SE 10 km SE 10 km E 
Time
2 
04:36 12:51pm 14:20 15:18 
Max PGA
3 
0.6g (0.3g CBD) 2.2g (0.8g CBD) 2.2g (0.4g 
CBD) 
0.96g
4
 (0.25g CBD) 
Causalities 0 fatalities 185 fatalities, (5 fatalities 
related to slope failures, 
Dellow et al. 2011) 
0 fatalities 0 fatalities 
1. Epicentral distances are with respect to Christchurch central business district (CBD) 
2. Time is in New Zealand Standard time (NZST) in September 2010 and June 2011, and New Zealand Daylight 
Saving time in February and December 2011 
3. Maximum Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) in the city – may be horizontal or vertical 
4. This was the maximum PGA on 23 December in the earlier and slightly smaller MW 5.8 event 
 
The 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake was located on a previously unrecognised strike-slip 
fault, later named the Greendale fault, located approximately 30km west of Christchurch 
Central Business District (CBD). Surface displacement on the Greendale fault was primarily 
right-lateral strike slip with an average horizontal displacement of approximately 2.5m 
Figure 1.2: Time sequence from September 2010 to February 2012 of earthquakes located in Canterbury. Earthquakes 
located by GeoNet and plotted as a function of local Magnitude (ML); (Bannister and Gledhill 2012) 
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(Quigley et al. 2010). Ground motions throughout the central and eastern Christchurch 
region, including the Port Hills, broadly conformed to the 500-year routine seismic design 
spectra for the Christchurch urban area according to the New Zealand loading standard, 
NZ1170.5:2004 (Figure 1.3); (Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011). Ground acceleration reached 
0.3g (both in the horizontal and vertical directions) in central Christchurch, and reached 0.6g 
at Heathcote Valley School GeoNet ground motion station (HVSC) in the Port Hills 
(Bannister and Gledhill 2012).  
Although the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake exhibited the largest magnitude in the sequence, 
ground motions were significantly less than subsequent earthquakes and subsequently very 
little damage was observed in the Port Hills (Macfarlane and Yetton 2013). This indicates 
that the shaking intensity (ground motion) experienced at ground surface is of greater 
importance than that of the earthquake magnitude in regard to land damage in hilly terrain 
(Massey et al. 2012a). A state of local emergency was declared within Christchurch City, 
Selwyn and Waimakariri districts on the 4
th
 September 2010 hours after the earthquake and 
remained in place until the 16
th
 September 2010 (Berryman 2012). 
The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake was situated in close proximity to the Port Hills on a 
structure named the Port Hills fault and produced vertical ground accelerations at HVSC 
ranging from 0.4g to 2.2g, and horizontal ground accelerations ranging from 0.3 to 1.4g 
(Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011; Wood et al. 2011). The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake 
produced ground accelerations which exceeded the 500-year seismic design spectra and 
vastly exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard for the Canterbury region (Figure 1.3).  
 
Figure 1.3: Comparison between NZS1170.5 design standard (475-year spectra) and ground motions observed at Pages 
Road (PRPC) and Heathcote Valley (HVSC) during the 4 September 2010 and 22nd February 2011 earthquakes. Site 
classes are E and D respectively according to NZ1170.5 (Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011) 
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Figure 1.4 presents the variation in ground motions across Christchurch, with the second 
highest recording located at the Pages Road Pumping Station (PRPC). To provide context to 
these ground motions, prior to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence the maximum recorded 
peak ground acceleration in New Zealand was 0.39g (Bradley and Cubrinovski 2011). The 
high ground accelerations that were produced by the 22
nd
 February earthquake are predicted 
to be largely responsible for the extent of geotechnical failure on the Port Hills (Massey et al. 
2012a). Topographic amplification is also likely to have contributed to the high stress 
concentration in slope peaks. This was also the case for the 13
th
 June 2011 aftershock where 
the earthquake epicentres were located in close proximity to the Sumner suburb in the Port 
Hills and produced high ground accelerations up to 2.2g (Table 1.1). On the 23
rd
 February 
2011 the Minster of Civil Defence declared a state of National Emergency which remained 
enforced until the 30
th
 April 2011 (Mclean et al. 2012). There was no state of emergency 
declared after the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake. 
 
  
Figure 1.4: Maximum horizontal and peak vertical ground accelerations recorded at GeoNet stations during 
the 22nd February 2011 earthquake (Massey et al. 2012a) 
HVSC 
PRPC 
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1.4.1 Geological Context of Port Hills, Christchurch 
The majority of slope failures induced by the 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
were located in the Port Hills area in Christchurch. The Port Hills are located on the northern 
region of the extinct Lyttelton basalt volcano (Hampton 2010). The topography of the Port 
Hills consists of sea cliffs, gently sloping spurs and ridges, and steep-sided valleys which are 
formed by rock from the Lyttelton Volcanics Group (Brown and Weeber 1992; Forsyth et al. 
2008). These rocks consist of hard, jointed, basaltic and trachytic lava flows from the late 
Tertiary (Miocene) age, and are approximately 10-12 million years old (Forsyth et al. 2008). 
Flows are intersected by dykes, and are interbedded with breccias (scoria), agglomerate 
(course angular gravel), compacted sandy tuff (ash) and ancient buried soils (Massey et al. 
2012a). 
Overlying the volcanic rock is loess, comprised of windblown silt, greater than 1m in depth 
(Brown and Weeber 1992; Macfarlane and Yetton 2013). Loess is thickest on the base of 
slopes and in valleys due to re-deposition from higher slopes (Brown and Weeber 1992). 
Near-vertical coastal cliffs are located around Lyttelton Harbour and the outer coast and then 
continue inland to the eastern suburbs of Sumner and Redcliffs. In the suburban areas of 
Redcliffs and Sumner, the cliffs are no longer affected by wave action (Macfarlane and 
Yetton 2013). Sea cliffs are typically 15 to 30m high, and are steep, (between 65-85°) which 
makes the cliffs susceptible to collapse. Evidence of this is found from the existence of a 
talus apron at the base of many of these cliffs (Massey et al. 2012b).  
Isolated rock falls and boulder roll from outcrops of volcanic rock have occurred along the 
valley sides, and at the foot of the cliffs and quarry walls in various locations throughout the 
Port Hills (Brown and Weeber 1992). Tunnel gullying, surface erosion, soil creep and mass 
movements are widespread throughout the Port Hills within the loess and loess-colluvium 
(Brown and Weeber 1992). Slope failure is particularly common during or after periods of 
heavy rain which can cause in loss of cohesive strength in loess and results in small period 
movements or creep movements (Brown and Weeber 1992). 
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1.4.2  Earthquake-induced Landsliding initiated by the 2010-2011 Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence. 
The impacts of the four main earthquakes in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence are 
summarised in Table 1.2.  
Table 1.2: Impacts of earthquakes in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (Modified from Berryman, 2012) 
Earthquake Impacts in Christchurch flat lands Impacts in Port Hills 
4
th
 September 2010 Damage to brick and Unreinforced 
Masonry buildings (URM) 
Widespread liquefaction  and lateral 
Spreading in eastern Suburbs 
Minor localised rockfall, and minor slump 
failures in loess 
Areas such as Sumner Road, Castle Hill, 
Dyers Pass Road, and Summit Road were 
affected by rock fall. 
22
nd
 February 2011 Pre-1970 buildings and several modern 
building damaged 
Significant liquefaction in eastern 
suburbs 
Extensive and widespread rockfall, Cliff 
Collapse and loess failure. Damage to 
infrastructure, dwellings, and structures, 
plus caused loss of life 
13
th
 June 2011 Further damage to buildings affected in 
22
nd
 February earthquake 
Further liquefaction in eastern suburbs 
Rockfall and cliff collapse, extensive in 
eastern Port Hills, further damage to 
dwellings and infrastructure 
23
rd
 December 2011 Minor building damage 
Minor damage in eastern suburbs 
Minor cliff collapse and rockfall in port 
hills 
 
 
Impact on the Port Hills was minor following the initiating 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake, 
with the majority of slope failure consisting of localised rockfall. The 22
nd
 February and 13
th
 
June 2011 earthquakes impacted the Port Hills significantly and induced widespread slope 
failure throughout the Port Hills. Slope failures initiated by the 22
nd
 February and 13
th
 June 
2011 earthquakes were intially categorised into four types of geotechnical hazards (Dellow et 
al. 2011): 
 Rockfall associated with long distance boulder roll,  
 Rockfall associated with cliff collapse, 
 Failure in loess or colluvium, 
 Localised retaining wall and fill failure. 
The combination of these failure mechanisms caused damage to infrastructure, dwellings and 
structures in the Port Hills. Slope failure initiated by the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake were 
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widespread throughout an area approximately 65km
2
 in the Port hills (Figure 1.5) extending 
from Godley Head to the east, Governors Bay to the west, Lyttelton to the south and Mount 
Pleasant to the north (Hancox et al. 2011). 
 
 
1.4.2.1 Rockfall – Boulder Roll  
Typically rockfall was released from joint controlled lava blocks from outcrops on valley 
walls (Figure 1.6). Sizes of the rocks which were released ranged from 0.1m
3
 to 10m
3
 
depending on the spacing of jointing in the rock mass. Where joint spacing was greater than 
1m rocks appeared to be more rounded (Dellow et al. 2011). Rockfall or boulder roll was one 
of the highest risk slope failure initiated by the earthquakes due to the velocity at which 
boulders and rocks generally progressed down slope, and in an unpredictable path. Further 
description of the classification and characteristics of rockfall is provided in Appendix A. 
Figure 1.5: Location of area affected by earthquake-induced landsliding during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
(Massey et al. (2012a), after Hancox et al., (2011)) 
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1.4.2.2 Rockfall – Cliff Collapse 
The mechanism of Cliff collapse has been defined as including the following terms: “cliff top 
recession” which describes the result of material releasing from the top and face of cliffs; and 
“debris avalanche” which describes the process of inundation of the toe of the slope (Massey 
et al. 2012b). In the Port Hills, cliff collapse typically occurred on steep present-day and 
former (Holocene) sea cliffs, former quarry faces and steep inland bluffs (Figure 1.6); 
(Dellow et al. 2011).  
1.4.2.3 Loess failures 
Failure characteristics that have been observed in loess include zones of compression (ground 
bulging), spring formation, and tensile cracking (Figure 1.6). Several interpretations of the 
mechanisms of failure in loess have been developed since the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence. Current interpretations of earthquake-induced failure in loess include:  
Figure 1.6: Illustration of the difference between Loess failure, Rockfall and Cliff Collapse. Photographs taken by M 
Villeneuve (left and top right); and GNS (bottom right). 
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 Mass movement in either loess or colluvium alone, or in a combination of rock, loess 
and colluvium. Failure mechanisms include slump, slide, fall, flow or avalanche, or a 
combination (Massey et al. 2013), 
 Tensile fissures in loess which have been caused by a combination of bedrock 
fracturing, lateral spreading, and the ‘trampoline affect’ (Stephen-Brownie 2012). The 
trampoline affect describes a phenomenon observed in Christchurch by GNS Science 
where significant vertical ground accelerations experience during an earthquake result 
in weaker upper sedimentary layers to further upward than lower layers, this causes 
the separation of and collision of layers (Stephen-Brownie 2012). 
Research into the failure mechanisms in loess and colluvium is ongoing, and as such there is 
currently no consistently used nomenclature for these failures. For this thesis slope failures in 
loess will be referred to as “loess failures”. 
1.4.2.4 Retaining Wall Failure and Fill Failure 
Retaining wall and fill failure did not present as great a life-safety risk immediately after the 
earthquake as the remaining three hazards because they were localised failures, and 
influenced smaller areas. Fill and retaining wall failure were typically <100m
3
 and ranged 
from incipient cracking exhibiting an aperture of several millimetres, to extensive 
deformation (Dellow et al. 2011). As such, the overview of the geotechnical response to the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence developed in this thesis has had less emphasis the response 
to retaining wall failure in comparison to rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failures. 
1.5 Review of earthquake-induced landslide hazard and risk 
This section introduces a review of landslide hazard impacts and landslide risk management. 
Fundamental terminology of landslide hazard and risk used in this thesis has been provided to 
establish continuity in the use of risk assessment terms. Finally, a detailed overview of 
landslide risk management processes has been provided to contextualise the use of landslide 
hazard classification (presented in Appendix A) and analysis of consequence into a hazard 
management structure. 
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1.5.1 Landslide hazard impact 
Internationally, landslide hazards have caused significant loss of life, damage and destruction 
to infrastructure and property (direct impacts), and economic loss (indirect impacts). Table 
1.3 details the direct impacts from landslide movements which are related to the processes of 
inundation of material and slope deformation. Indirect impacts can include the interaction of 
landslide processes with environmental processes. One example of this is the formation of a 
landslide dam from the process of the inundation of landslide material into a river which can 
cause extensive loss of life, damage and destruction both upstream or downstream upon dam-
break and inundation of water (Korup 2002). Indirect impacts can also include permanent 
restrictions to land use in zones of unstable geological features such as volcanoes. 
Table 1.3: Direct impacts from landslides 
Process Direct Impacts 
Inundation of material  Damage to lifelines and structures from collision impact, collapse or 
damage by crushing from burial, associated air blast and distortion 
by gradual air pressure (Glade and Crozier 2004). 
 Loss of life or injury from impact, crushing or asphyxiation (Glade 
and Crozier 2004). 
Slope Deformation  Infrastructure and dwellings built at the top of a slope can undergo 
structural collapse, deformation or displacement from the removal of 
foundation support (Glade and Crozier 2004). 
 Deformation to lifelines, structures, and infrastructure from 
compression features at toe of slope and tension cracking which can 
induce strain on overlying structures causing damage (Dellow et al. 
2011) 
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The severity of impact from a landslide depend the following characteristics (Crozier and 
Glade 2004; Hincks et al. 2013): 
 The landslide type and magnitude.  
‘Magnitude’ refers to the volume of displaced mass and the areal extent of the slope 
failure feature, and the probable area of impact upon complete failure (Hincks et al. 
2013). 
 Run out characteristics: 
o Rate of failure/velocity of movement,  
o Travel distance,  
o Volume of debris; 
 Exposure of elements at risk in the area of impact.  
‘Exposure’ is defined as the length or proportion of time that a person, building or 
other entity runs a risk (Alexander 2002). 
‘Elements at risk’ is defined as the people, buildings and structures, infrastructures, 
economic activities, public services, or any other defined values exposed to hazards in 
a given area (Glade et al. 2004). 
The velocity of a landslide has significant influence on the impact. Rapidly moving landslides 
are considered the most hazardous as they travel at high velocities and can travel several 
kilometres beyond the slope in which they have initiated from (Keefer 1984; Glade and 
Crozier 2004). The large run out length results in a greater area affected by the landslide. 
Keefer (1984) proposed that >90% of deaths recorded from earthquake-induced landslides 
were attributed to rapid soil flows, rock avalanches and rockfalls which are fast moving. 
Unless the occurrence of a fast moving landslide can be anticipated, the onset of such slope 
failures are typically too rapid to allow evacuation or warning, consequently there can be 
potential for large numbers of fatalities (Hincks et al. 2013).  
Table 1.4 presents a correlation between landslide velocity class (see Appendix A, Table 
A.7.2) and probable destruction significance as proposed by Cruden and Varnes (1996). The 
correlation has been developed based on several case histories in which landslide velocity 
and impact has been recorded. This information presents a relationship between increases in 
velocity with increase in recorded damage from impact (Cruden and Varnes 1996). Typically 
the major factors controlling the speed of movement include the size of the mass in motion, 
the slope angle, moisture content of in transported material, vegetation cover, slope angle, 
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and horizontal and vertical travel distances (Glade and Crozier 2004). These characteristics 
can also affect the run out distance of a landslide (Glade and Crozier 2004; Hincks et al. 
2013).  
Table 1.4: Definition of Probable Destructive Significance of Landslides based on Velocity Classes according to Cruden and 
Varnes (1996) 
Landslide 
Velocity Class 
Probable destructive significance 
7 Disaster of major violence; buildings destroyed by impact of displaced material; 
many deaths; escape unlikely 
6 Some lives lost; velocity too great to permit all persons to escape 
5 Escape evacuation possible; structures, possessions and equipment destroyed 
4 Some temporary and insensitive structures can be temporarily maintained 
3 Remedial construction can be undertaken during movement; insensitive structures 
can be maintained with frequent maintenance work if total movement is not large 
during particular acceleration phase 
2 Some permanent structures undamaged by movement 
1 Imperceptible without instruments, construction possible with precautions 
1.5.2 Landslide hazard and risk management 
Risk is defined as the product of two components (ISSMGE 2004): 
 Hazard: the probability of a specific event occurring in a given timeframe  
 Consequence: the outcome or result of a hazard being realised. Includes components 
such as the cost of damage and loss of life. 
Assessment of risk associated with slope failures is often addressed through landslide risk 
management frameworks developed by authors such as Fell et al. (2005); Australian 
Geomechanics Society (AGS 2000); and Crozier and Glade (2004) which provide a method 
for assessing risk. Landslide risk assessment typically includes a hazard analysis component 
which describes the process of characterisation and identification of potential landslides and 
their occurrence, and consequence analysis which quantifies the consequences of slope 
failure (Fell et al. 2005). Appendix A further examines landslide hazard classification and 
characterisation principles. Depending on the available data, degree of site investigation and 
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nature of the consequences, landslide risk assessment frameworks may differ (Düzgün and 
Lacasse 2005). 
The landslide risk management approach presented in Figure 1.7 may not directly apply to 
post-earthquake assessment of slope failure due to the urgency of the immediate response 
which requires the rapid assessment of risk based on limited data. The requirements for post-
earthquake risk assessment of coseismic landslides also include prioritisation of high risk 
areas, and the rapid implementation of evacuations to manage the associated risk. The 
landslide risk management framework by Fell et al. (2005) (Figure 1.7) can, however, 
provide a supporting methodology for the landslide risk assessment in a post-disaster context.  
 
Figure 1.7: Landslide Risk Assessment and Management framework (Fell et al. 2005) 
18 
 
1.5.2.1 Scope 
The first consideration in landslide risk assessment is the scope definition where the purpose 
of the study and the level of detail to be included in the assessment are defined (AGS 2007). 
Defining the scope ensures that the risk analysis addresses the relevant issues and concerns in 
regards to the analysis and often details the size of the area to be assessed, the geographic 
limits of the assessment, to what extent losses will be included in the analysis, the method of 
analysis, consideration of the consequences of the analysis and the involvement of external 
parties (Fell et al. 2005).  
1.5.2.2 Hazard analysis  
Landslide hazard analysis is divided into landslide characterisation and frequency analysis. 
The characterisation component of landslide hazard analysis should include the classification 
of the landslide type. Fell et al. (2005) suggests that landslide characterisation techniques 
outlined by Cruden and Varnes (1996) is a suitable system for hazard characterisation. 
Appendix A examines landslide hazard classification in accordance with Cruden and Varnes 
(1996) and presents research into characterisation of earthquake-induced landslides by Keefer 
(1984); Rodriguez et al. (1999); Keefer (2002).  
The landslide hazard characterisation process includes an assessment of the physical extent of 
landsliding, the likely triggering events, potential pre-failure warning signs and the estimation 
of the anticipated travel distance, travel path, and velocity of movement (Picarelli et al. 
2005). Investigation methods used to assess these characteristics often include remote 
sensing, landslide monitoring, field and laboratory based testing of slope materials, and 
geomorphological and geological mapping (Hincks et al. 2013). 
Susceptibility mapping can also be used in regional hazard analysis to identify the areas 
where landsliding is likely to occur based on the state and properties of the slope (Crozier and 
Glade 2004; Hincks et al. 2013). Information that can be used in the analysis includes slope 
inclination, material constituents, vegetation cover, lithology and discontinuities in bedrock 
(Parise and Jibson 2000; Wills et al. 2011; Hincks et al. 2013). Susceptibility maps can 
inform emergency management, and pre-earthquake or post-earthquake site selection for 
construction and planning (Wills et al. 2011). 
Numerical modelling and probabilistic modelling can also contribute to landslide hazard 
analysis for site specific slope assessments (Düzgün and Lacasse 2005). Typically the 
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characterisation process of landslide features is followed by an analysis of the frequency of 
the landslide occurring. This can be calculated using a variety of methods including 
examination of historical data, use of geomorphological evidence, relationship between 
triggering event and landslide occurrence, and probabilistic modelling (Fell et al. 2005; 
Picarelli et al. 2005; AGS 2007). 
1.5.2.3 Consequence analysis 
The final component of landslide risk analysis included the assessment of the elements at 
risk, often called the consequence analysis. Comprehensive risk analysis typically includes 
physical consequences such as loss of life or damage to structures, but also societal and 
environmental consequences. Typically consequence analysis will involve the identification 
of the elements at risk, and the assessment of the temporal spatial probabilities for the 
elements at risk, and an assessment of the vulnerability of the elements at risk (Fell et al. 
2005; AGS 2007). Vulnerability is defined as the expected degree of loss to a given element 
or se of elements at risk resulting from the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given 
magnitude (Glade et al. 2004). 
1.5.2.4 Risk estimation and risk assessment 
Combined, the hazard analysis and consequence analysis inform an estimation of the risk 
(Figure 1.7). Risk assessment refers to the comparison between the risk estimation against 
risk tolerance criteria or acceptability criteria (Düzgün and Lacasse 2005; Fell et al. 2005). 
The risk assessment process then informs the risk management process where landslide 
mitigation is planned and implemented.  
1.5.2.5 Risk management 
Hazard characterisation and consequence analysis contribute to an assessment of landslide 
risk. From an understanding of the risk an appropriate methodology to manage the hazard and 
risk can be proposed. Typical strategies for landslide risk management include: 
1. Risk Avoidance  
Definition: An informed decision not to become involved in a risk situation (AGS 
2000) 
Application: Includes land use restrictions and access restrictions (Schuster and 
Kockelman 1996; Hincks et al. 2013), relocation of infrastructure and inhabited areas 
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(Bromhead 2004). In a post-earthquake landslide risk management context, risk 
avoidance is utilised through the enforcement of evacuation based on initial 
geotechnical appraisal of the situation and the post event slope stability (Crozier 
2004). 
 
2. Risk Reduction  
Definition: A selective application of appropriate techniques and management 
principles to reduce either likelihood of an occurrence or its consequences, or both 
(AGS 2000) 
Application: Includes installation of engineering protection structures and early 
warning systems (Schuster and Kockelman 1996; Bromhead 2004; Hincks et al. 
2013). Post-earthquake risk reduction may include emergency treatment of landslide 
source areas, and the installation of temporary stabilisation or protection structures. 
 
3. Risk Transfer  
Definition: Shifting the responsibility or burden for loss to another party through 
legislation, contract, or other means. Risk transfer can also refer to shifting a physical 
risk or part thereof elsewhere (AGS 2000). 
Application: Distribute the burden of loss through legislation or insurance (Schuster 
and Kockelman 1996; Hincks et al. 2013). 
An assessment of landslide hazard and risk is used to inform the suitability and effectiveness 
of each of these risk management options (Hincks et al. 2013). Hazard characterisation is 
used to anticipate the likely impacts of a landslide to the elements at risk and consequently 
informs decisions around the management of landslide impact (Crozier and Glade 2004). 
Landslide management techniques are influenced by landslide characteristics such as the 
velocity of failure (Figure 1.8). Literature indicates that for landslides up to Velocity Class 3 
it may be possible to reduce the risk with the use of engineering works, however for faster 
movements (up to Velocity Class 5) forecasting is the primary tool for risk reduction (Hincks 
et al. 2013).  
21 
 
 
In a post-earthquake context, the movement velocity will affect the rapid risk management 
approach. For landslides in Velocity Classes 6 and 7, evacuation may not be possible due to 
the lack of time available to enforce the movement of people (Cruden and Varnes 1996) For 
landslides in Velocity Classes 4 and 5 evacuation is a probable and achievable form of 
response (Hincks et al. 2013). Characteristics such as the run out length will also affect the 
size of the impact area which may affect the degree of emergency evacuation required. 
Landslides with velocity lower than this may not require evacuation, and risk reduction may 
be achieved through maintenance and stabilisation (Hincks et al. 2013). The management of 
risk associated with landslides is also dependant on the type of landslide and the amount of 
displacement that occurs. Slower moving, deep seated landslides can cause damage from 
earth pressures and differential shearing rather than collision or inundation of material (Glade 
and Crozier 2004). This may mean that the area is still habitable, however, engineering 
countermeasures may be required to manage the impact and desensitise structures from slope 
deformation (Bromhead 2004). The depth of movement will also affect the type of remedial 
measures that will be successful at a specific site (Glade and Crozier 2004). 
1.6 Thesis Format 
The thesis has been structured into the chapters summarised in Table 1.5 to provide coherent 
representation of the conducted research. 
Landslide 
Characteristics 
 Landslide type, 
magnitude 
 Run out 
characteristic 
(velocity, 
length) 
 Exposure of 
elements 
Impact Potential 
 Degree of 
damage and 
death 
 Speed of 
impact 
 Size of area 
affected 
Landslide Risk 
Management 
 Risk 
Avoidance 
 Risk Reduction 
 Risk Transfer 
Figure 1.8: Relationship between landslide characterisation and landslide risk management 
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Table 1.5: Thesis chapter summary 
Chapter Title Objectives(s) 
1 Introduction Presents the project background; thesis objectives and 
methodology; overview of the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence (geological context, seismological context and 
landslide hazards); and fundamentals of earthquake-induced 
landslide hazard and risk. 
2 Research methodology Outline method used to conduct research, including detail on 
data collection and analysis 
3 Geotechnical response to 
slope failures prior to and 
during the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence 
Provide an overview of the approach to landslide risk 
management in the Port Hills, Christchurch prior to the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Achieved through 
literature review and interviews with geotechnical 
professionals with current and former involvement in 
landslide risk management in the Port Hills. 
Documentation of the emergency response to earthquake-
induced landsliding throughout the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence. Achieved through literature review and interviews 
with geotechnical professionals and emergency management 
personnel involved in the response. 
4 Historical and 
international earthquake 
case studies 
Documentation of the emergency response and recovery to 
historical international earthquakes which produced 
significant coseismic landslides. Review of earthquake 
response was achieved through review of literature. Case 
study earthquakes included: 
1994 Northridge, California earthquake  
1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake 
2008 Wenchuan, Sichuan, China earthquake 
5 Analysis of the 
geotechnical response 
following large 
earthquakes – comparison 
between the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence and 
international examples 
Present the primary requirements for post-earthquake risk 
assessment and management of earthquake-induced 
landsliding during emergency response based on case study 
analysis of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, with 
comparison to historical earthquake case studies reviewed in 
Chapter Four 
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Chapter Title Objectives(s) 
6 Future geotechnical 
response to earthquake-
induced landslides 
Provide discussion around the requirements for geotechnical 
response to inform planning for future post-earthquake risk 
assessment and management of slope failures. 
7 Summary, conclusion and 
recommendations 
Presentation of a concise summary outlining the main thesis 
findings, conclusions and future work recommendations. 
1.7 Summary 
The Canterbury Earthquake Sequence provides an opportunity for comprehensive analysis of 
geotechnical response to coseismic slope failure hazards. Peak ground accelerations 
experienced during the CES, particularly after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, exceeded 
design standard and previously recorded ground motions in New Zealand. The significant 
ground damage which occurred in the Port Hills during the 22
nd
 February, 13
th
 June and 23
rd
 
December 2011 earthquakes has been attributed to high ground accelerations and topographic 
amplification. 
A review of landslide risk management adopted by Fell et al. (2005) and AGS (2000) has 
been conducted to provide grounding in conventional procedures for risk management of 
slope failures. To determine the applicability of this risk management procedure to post-
earthquake response, the requirements and priorities of emergency response to earthquake-
induced landslides must first be understood. This includes understanding the strategic 
requirements for implementation and coordination of post-earthquake landslide response. 
Hence this thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Research methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the research methodology that has been conducted to 
inform a comprehensive case study analysis of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). 
The aim of this research is to critically analyse the response by geotechnical professionals 
and local government to life safety risk posed by earthquake-induced landsliding during the 
CES. The intention of this research is to develop a discussion document which informs 
guidelines for post-earthquake geotechnical response to coseismic landslides. Because of the 
high seismic hazard in New Zealand (Stirling et al. 2002) it is important that lessons learnt 
from the CES are captured and used to prepare for future seismic events. 
 A mixed method approach has been employed with four principal phases: 
1. A comprehensive literature review of the response to coseismic landslides during the 
following historical international earthquakes: 
i. 1994 Northridge California earthquake, 
ii. 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake, 
iii. 2008 Wenchuan, Sichuan, China earthquake 
2. Interviewed individuals involved in the geotechnical response to the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence (CES) to inform a detailed case study analysis of post-
earthquake response to earthquake-induced landslides 
3. Interviews with analysis was undertaken to identify recurring themes and significant 
events during the CES. Data analysis was undertaken using NVivo software and 
sought to thoroughly examine information given by participants in the interviews and 
identify key components of the geotechnical risk assessment during the Christchurch 
earthquake sequence. 
4. Comparison between historical international interviews and response to the CES to 
inform discussion concerning future response to earthquake-induced landslides and 
provide recommendations for guidelines for geotechnical response. 
This chapter is supported by technical paper which details the methodology for this research 
(Appendix B).  
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2.2 Geotechnical precedent from historical international earthquakes 
Prior to commencing interviews, a comprehensive literature review of immediate response to 
earthquake-induced landslides was conducted for the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake, 
the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake and the 2008 Wenchuan, China earthquake. The 
immediate response includes the post-earthquake emergency management of earthquake-
induced landslides commencing hours to days after an earthquake until transition to recovery 
occurs several months later. The purpose of the detailed literature review (Chapter Five) is to 
examine the earthquake impacts and subsequent geotechnical response to earthquake-induced 
landslides to enable comparisons with the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), and to 
propose improved geotechnical response mechanisms.  
The literature review has also informed the development of interview questions for 
conducting research into the CES. Table 2.1 provides comparison of the types of landslides 
induced by each of the three historical earthquake and the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake 
during the CES. Boxes marked in Table 2.1 indicate the types of slope failure mechanisms 
that were observed post-earthquake in accordance with landslide classification outlined by 
Cruden and Varnes (1996). 
Table 2.1: Comparison of slope failure mechanisms between historical earthquakes and Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
Slope failure 
mechanism 
Northridge, 
California, USA 
Chi-Chi, 
Taiwan 
Wenchuan, 
Sichuan, China 
CES, New 
Zealand 
Falls X X X X 
Slides X X X X 
Flow/avalanche  X X X 
Landslide Dam  X X  
 
Reviewed literature for the Northridge, Wenchuan and Chi-Chi earthquakes provided 
information for the following research questions: 
 Was an emergency geotechnical response plan prepared prior to the three 
international earthquakes examined in the literature? 
 What were the critical tasks and priorities during the geotechnical response after the 
Northridge, Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes, and how did they progress? 
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 What were the similarities or differences in the geotechnical response and emergency 
management between the Northridge, Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes? 
 Which organisations were involved in the geotechnical response? Which 
organisations were governing the response? Was there transparent integration and 
early communication between organisations involved in the response? 
2.3 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence interviews 
2.3.1 Interview participants 
The contribution of local and national governmental agencies, as well as many private 
organisations and institutions, formed the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope 
failure in the Port Hills. Interview participants from these organisations were selected for this 
research based on their involvement in the emergency response in the Port Hills. A list of the 
primary organisations involved in either strategic level or tactical level is provided below. 
Strategic level involvement refers to individuals representing organisations involved in the 
management of the emergency response. Tactical level involvement includes participants 
who were involved in conducting field work and slope assessments on the Port Hills. 
Dividing organisations into strategic level and tactical levels allows an appreciation of 
components of practical response tasks to be gained while also encompassing the 
coordination and systems managing the response. Organisations and agencies listed below 
have been selected because of their level of involvement within the geotechnical response 
which was informed through recommendations from geotechnical engineers and engineering 
geologists involved in the CES response. 
Strategic Level organisations: 
 Christchurch City Council (CCC) 
 Canterbury Regional Civil Defence 
Tactical Level organisations: 
 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) 
 Geotechnical consultancies involved in Port Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG) 
 University of Canterbury 
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Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) contributed to the coordination of geotechnical response 
while also conducting onsite field assessments of slope failures induced by the earthquake 
sequence. Despite this, USAR has been categorised as a tactical level organisation as their 
primary involvement was in field assessments at a tactical level. Representatives were not 
sought from organisations such as the Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team 
(SCIRT) or local CDEM because participants from other organisations who had similar 
involvement were interviewed to provide a representative sample.  
2.3.2 Interview questions 
Interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format which involved developing questions 
guided by the research objectives. The semi-structured method differs from a structured 
interview by allowing the interviewer to modify the pace and order of questions, or add 
further questions to as the interview progresses to probe further response from participants 
(Gillham 2000; Qu and Dumay 2011). The semi-structured interview method was selected for 
this research on the basis that it is the most commonly used qualitative research method 
because it allows for flexibility within the interview and enables the interviewer to probe for 
further information relative to the research (Qu and Dumay 2011). In accordance with the 
semi-structured methodology, a primary question set was developed for strategic level and 
tactical level participants, which aimed to address the following objectives: 
 Establish the participant’s role in the geotechnical response to the CES and how this 
changed temporally. 
 Examine the priorities and requirements of geotechnical response to earthquake-
induced landsliding during the CES and how they changed temporally. 
 Identify significant events during the CES which influence the participant’s 
involvement in the geotechnical response to coseismic slope failures. 
 Ascertain what lessons the participant had learnt from their involvement in the 
geotechnical response during the CES. 
The primary question set provided a ‘check list’ to ensure information relevant to the research 
was addressed. The combination of these questions primarily sought to examine the 
participant’s temporal and spatial involvement after each major earthquake during the CES 
and identify lessons learnt during their involvement. This informed comparison between the 
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response requirements of each earthquake, and allow deficiencies or developments to be 
highlighted. Questions regarding landslide risk management in the Port Hills prior to the CES 
were included to enable comparison between the perception of landslide risk and conducted 
landslide risk management techniques prior to and during the CES. 
The primary question set is attached in Appendix D and was developed around the following 
sub-headings: 
1. Previous disaster response experience, 
2. Involvement in landslide risk assessment, and risk management prior to the CES, 
3. Timeframe of participant’s involvement in the response to the CES, 
4. Spatial location of involvement in the Port Hills during the CES, 
5. Role in the geotechnical response to the CES, 
6. Organisation and agencies associated with during the response to the CES, 
7. Current role in landslide risk management in the Port Hills, 
8. Lessons learnt during the geotechnical response. 
A second, individually tailored list of questions was developed for each participant to target 
specific details regarding the participant’s or organisation’s role during the response. The 
secondary question set was important for gaining details about role development and 
identifying issues specific to the participant. Both of the strategic and tactical level primary 
question sets are attached in Appendix D as part of the University of Canterbury ethics 
application for this research. 
With the permission of the participant, interviews were recorded on a digital recorder and 
stored on password protected external hard drive and backed up on the University of 
Canterbury Geological Sciences network server which is both password protected and 
encrypted. Access to interview records was maintained restricted to the researcher and 
supervisors. Physical notes, tapes and the external hard drive were kept in a locked drawer 
inside a locked office in the Geological Sciences Department in the University of Canterbury. 
The identification and contact details of participants were maintained confidential throughout 
the research project.  
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2.3.3 Visual stimuli 
Visual stimuli were presented during interviews to assist the participant’s recollection of their 
role during the Christchurch Earthquake sequence (CES). The use of graphic elicitation is a 
valuable component of qualitative research which can include the use of maps, drawings, and 
photographs to improve communication between the researcher and the interview participant 
and yield contributions from participants which are difficult to achieve through verbal 
exchanges (Crilly et al. 2006). Table 2.2 outlines the visual stimuli used during interviews, 
and provides a description and justification of each document. Upon completion of an 
interview, visual documentation became included in the research as physical notes from the 
interview. An example of each document has been provided in Appendix C. 
Table 2.2: Justification and description of visual documents 
Interview 
material 
Description and justification 
Visual Timeline A series of visual timelines were developed to provide temporal information of 
events that had occurred during the CES from September 2010 to September 
2012 (Attached in Appendix C). These events included:  
 Local or National government level decisions such the declaration of a 
state of emergency or introduction of legislation during the CES 
 Large rainfall and snowfall events - rainfall data was collected from the 
NIWA website. 
Information from media releases and publically accessible reports.  
Timelines were also developed for two week, and ten day periods commencing 
after the February 2011 earthquake for participants who were active for a 
limited timeframe immediately after the earthquake. This allows more detail to 
be focussed on these time periods. Visual timelines aimed to provide a 
reference to prompt memories during the CES and guide discussion.  
Topographic map The map centred on Lyttelton and extended up to the estuary north of the Port 
Hills, and Westmorland to the west (attached in Appendix C). The purpose of 
the map was primarily to provide a visual aide where participants can spatially 
define the location of their involvement.  
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2.3.4 Ethical approval 
Before research commenced an application to the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee was submitted to ensure that the research methods were conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of the committee. The application included research aims, 
methodology and outlined techniques to ensure the risk to participants involved in the 
research was minimised. This included addressing issues such as maintaining confidentiality 
of research data and participant’s involvement, and detailing data usage and storage. The 
application to the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee is included in 
Appendix D. 
An information sheet and consent form was generated to inform participants of the research 
aims and objectives, and outline arrangements for maintaining confidentiality. This ensured 
that the interviews were conducted in accordance with common practice for interviews in 
qualitative research, where interview participants are required to be informed of the interview 
process, the role of the researcher and how the interview data would be used before 
commencing the interview (Qu and Dumay 2011). The information sheet and consent form 
was approved as part of the ethics application processes and was distributed to participants 
prior to interviewing. The consent form was required to be signed by the interviewer and the 
participant before commencing the interview to provide evidence that the participant 
understood and agreed to the requirements for involvement in the research. 
2.3.5 Data collection 
2.3.5.1 Contacting participants 
Initially participants were contacted via email to inform them of the aims for the research and 
invite their voluntary involvement. Upon agreeing, participants were provided an information 
sheet to provide further detail on the research and ethical considerations in regards to 
confidentiality of information upon participation. A copy of the consent form was also 
provided so that participants were aware of the participation requirements prior to meeting 
for the interview. 
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2.3.5.2 Interview location 
The location of each interview was selected by the participant. The location was left to the 
participant to decide because it was important that the participant felt comfortable in the 
situation that they were being interviewed. Some participants were not in the country at the 
time of the interview process and so were interviewed via Skype or email. All verbal 
interviews were audio recorded to ensure that all information was captured.  
2.4 Analysis of interview data 
In order to examine the geotechnical response during the Christchurch Earthquake Sequence; 
several iterations of data analysis were conducted. These include: 
1. Comprehensive transcription of interview dialogue, 
2. Development of summaries of each interview for participant’s review, 
3. Analysis of interview dialogue using thematic coding in NVivo 
2.4.1 Transcription 
Comprehensive transcription of each interview dialogue commenced immediately after each 
interview. The majority of the transcription was conducted by Merrill Corporation NZ, 
located in Christchurch, however several of the interviews were transcribed by a self 
employed individual. Prior to transcription commencing, amendments were approved by the 
University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. For the self-employed individual, a 
confidentiality agreement was developed by the research to ensure privacy of interview 
dialogue (Appendix D). Files were stored on a password protected USB and participant’s 
names were not disclosed to the transcriber.  
Prior to Merrill Corporation NZ conducting transcription, an amendment was approved by 
the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee to ensure the confidentiality 
agreement between Merrill Corporation NZ and its employees would maintain the privacy of 
interview dialogue (Appendix D). Furthermore, participant’s identification information was 
maintained confidential from Merrill Corporation NZ. Upon transcription, files were stored in 
a password protected online storage facility managed by Merrill Corporation NZ, accessible 
only to the researcher. Transcription of the interview dialogue enabled quotes to be extracted 
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from interviews and timestamps to be positioned at the start of each paragraph to enable 
correlation between audio files and transcription. This facilitated the accessibility of portions 
of the dialogue. 
2.4.2 Interview summaries 
At the conclusion of the interview phase, the analysis phase commenced through preparation 
of interview summaries. Typically, the validity of qualitative research is dependent on the 
degree at which the researcher’s interpretation corresponds to reality or the interview 
participant’s presentation of reality (Cho and Trent 2006). Consequently interview summaries 
aimed to improve transparency and validity of the researcher’s interpretation of interview 
dialogue. Interview summaries were compiled from listening to interview dialogue and 
identifying the recurring ideas or significant events within the discussion. The summaries 
were consolidated into a table which consisted of two columns. One column listed the salient 
themes and statements identified in the interview, while the adjoining column remained clear 
to provide participants the opportunity to agree with the statements or provide comments or 
amendments. 
Interview summaries were divided into sub-headings to present the researcher’s interpretation 
of the progression of the participant’s role and involvement during the CES.  
The following sub-headings were used in the interview summaries: 
 Response post 4th September 2010 earthquake (if applicable) 
 Response post 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
 Response post 13th June 2011 earthquake 
 General statements 
 Lessons learnt 
Summaries were distributed via email with a supporting outline of the aim of the interview 
summary. Participants were required to return a reviewed version of the interview summary 
within seven days unless further time was requested, at which time the data became part of 
the research. Interview summaries were an important part of the analysis procedure because it 
enabled clarification of ideas and statements, and gave opportunity for participants to respond 
and provide feedback regarding the researcher’s interpretation of the data provided. This 
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process sought to endorse the credibility of the researcher’s interpretation of the data and 
acted as a form of quality control in the early stages of the data analysis (King and Horrocks 
2010). Further clarification aimed to increase the consistency of information, decrease the 
risk of significant change in the data during the research period, and aimed to achieve 
transparency within the data analysis (King and Horrocks 2010).  
2.4.3 Interview coding 
Upon approval of interview summaries, dialogue analysis commenced using of the software 
programme NVivo. NVivo is a qualitative analysis software package produced by QSR 
International. The main function of the software is to act as a tool for the collection, 
organisation and analysis of data from mixed method research. For this research NVivo was 
used to analyse audio data and interview transcriptions. It was also used to store and analyse 
documents that had been provided by the participants during the interviews. 
Audio files and transcriptions were uploaded to NVivo simultaneously so that the interview 
could be listened to in conjunction with transcription coding. Simultaneous analysis was 
important because emotion in the participant’s voice could be used for identifying negative or 
positive attitudes to events or themes (Gillham 2000). Each audio file and the associated 
transcript were labelled within Nvivo using the participant’s name and were distinguished 
based on their representing organisations using colour coding. 
2.4.3.1 Setting up nodes 
Prior to the coding, several Nodes were established to reflect the components of geotechnical 
response that were identified during review of historical international earthquakes. Nodes 
represent thematic categories identified by the researcher (Gillham 2000; King and Horrocks 
2010). Once a section of the data is coded to a Node it becomes categorised with the theme 
that the node represents. Data was coded to multiple nodes depending on associations with 
multiple themes (Gillham 2000; King and Horrocks 2010). At the duration of the analysis, the 
researcher can examine a node and revise the data assigned or coded into that category. 
Additional nodes were developed as coding of interviews progressed. Nodes were assigned a 
description when created to ensure that consistency was maintained within the coding 
analysis. Node descriptors ensured that upon disruption of coding the researcher could review 
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what theme each node represents which increased the transferability of the coding process. 
Nodes were established for organisations or agencies involved so that the role of each 
organisation could be captured in the analysis. Nodes were also created for two interview 
questions which were specifically asked in each interview to provide an overview of the 
lessons learnt during the geotechnical response on the Port Hills. Specifically coded questions 
included: 
1. What are the three most important lessons you have learnt from responding to the 
earthquake sequence? 
2. Was it obvious which authorities were responsible for the response in the Port Hills 
immediately after the earthquake? 
Responses to these particular questions were collated to form a list of opinions and 
interpretations of lessons learnt. 
2.4.3.2 Coding interview dialogue 
Interviews were coded in a hierarchical system, commencing with strategic level interviews, 
then tactical level interviews. This enabled an appreciation of the overarching coordination 
requirements before examining the tactical level tasks of the geotechnical response. 
Significant themes, challenges, and successes during the response to the CES were 
emphasised through recurring reference within participant’s statements which accentuated 
their importance and significance to the geotechnical response (Gillham 2000; King and 
Horrocks 2010). Statements were identified from interview dialogue and were coded to a 
node or multiple nodes depending on the association with themes (Gillham 2000; King and 
Horrocks 2010). Statements included phrases, sentences or paragraphs. Single words were 
not coded due to lack of information and guidance regarding the context. Ensuring context 
was maintained became particularly important in the consolidation results from interview 
analysis. Analysis was conducted slowly and thoroughly in order to fully appreciate the 
combination of nodes (ideas) that each statement referenced. Consistency of interview coding 
and analysis was important and maintained through the use of node descriptions and ensuring 
that all available nodes were reviewed before finalising node selection for the selected text.  
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2.4.3.3 Final NVivo analysis – node organisation 
At the conclusion of the analysis, nodes were revised to eliminate multiplication of themes. 
Generally coded statements and information was assigned to the appropriate node and as such 
division or merging of nodes was not required. 
2.5 Interpretation of interview results 
2.5.1 Results interpretation and development of recommendations 
Interpretation of interview results was conducted in several iterations:  
1. Results from interview analysis have been presented as a coherent timeline of the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) commencing 4
th
 September 2010 until 
December 2011. The purpose of the CES geotechnical response timeline is to provide 
representation of the temporal evolution of the geotechnical response tasks, 
requirements and priorities. Recovery activities were also included to enable 
comparison between the emergency response and the subsequent recovery phase.  
2. Significant themes were identified from coding analysis. Challenges and successes 
identified within each theme were examined to consider the probable causes which 
led to developments in the geotechnical response. The response to the CES was 
compared to the responses to historical international earthquakes to provide 
supporting evidence or contrast with comparable events. 
3. A temporal model of the geotechnical response to the CES was developed to 
emphasis the evolution of tasks and requirements in the context of post-earthquake 
coordination of a geotechnical response and management coseismic landslide hazard. 
Phases within the model were developed to delineate stages within the geotechnical 
response are supported through comparison with historical international earthquakes. 
The interpretation of interview results informed the final objective of this research which is to 
develop recommendations on the requirements for post-earthquake geotechnical response 
based on results from the case study analysis of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence and 
comparison with literature review of the 1999 Chi-Chi Taiwan earthquake, the 1994 
Northridge earthquake and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. Comparison across events 
ensured the credibility and transferability of recommendations to inform guideline 
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development, and supports the applicability of recommendations internationally. 
Recommendations (Chapter Six) aimed to inform future response to earthquake-induced 
slope failure to achieve a coordinated and efficient response. Further detail of the 
methodology for development of recommendations for geotechnical guidelines can also be 
found in Appendix B. 
2.5.2 Structure and use of recommendations 
Recommendations (Chapter Six) were developed as a discussion document to illustrate 
methods for management and practice of post-earthquake geotechnical response to advise the 
geotechnical community and government level organisations of recommendations for the 
development of formalised geotechnical response guidelines. Chapter six aims to inform 
organisations such as Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups (CDEM), national 
and local government, consultancies and research based contributors who were involved in 
the geotechnical response to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. 
2.5.3 Limitations to research methodology 
Although semi-structured interviews are used extensively in qualitative research, there are 
limitations to this research methodology (Qu and Dumay 2011). Limitations can include the 
following (Qu and Dumay 2011; Roulston 2013): 
1. Participants/interviewees may have inaccurate recollections of their experiences. 
2. Participants/interviewees may not articulate responses to questions clearly. 
3. Participants/interviewees may experience difficulty in comprehending the 
interviewers’ questions. 
4. Expression of emotional states by participants may distort the information provided in 
response to questions. 
5. Participants/interviewees may provide inconsistent or contradictory information. 
6. Participants/interviewees may avoid questions or may be uncooperative. 
7. Cultural differences between the interviewer and participant may mean that 
communication is hindered by differences in meanings of words and phrases. 
8. The researcher may misinterpret the information that the participant discloses which 
raises concern regarding the validity of the research. 
37 
 
Interviews are considered “successful” when the participant provides an objective and factual 
report of their experiences regarding the event/s in questions (Roulston 2013). The limitations 
listed above can be minimise through the use of pre-planning prior to interviews commencing 
(Qu and Dumay 2011). For this research, several of these limitations such as inaccuracies in 
information collected during interviews were addressed through the use of interview 
summaries (section 2.4.2) which allowed participant to review the information. Furthermore, 
ongoing interaction with participants via email enabled further clarification of responses that 
were not well articulated in the interviews. 
2.6 Summary 
This research has been conducted using a mixed-method approach to inform a case study 
analysis of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), and develop recommendations for 
future response to earthquake-induced slope failures. Case study analysis has been informed 
through interviews with personnel from a selection of organisations that were involved in the 
geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides during the CES. Interview analysis 
has been conducted using NVivo to identify critical themes, priorities and tasks during the 
response.  
A literature review of international earthquake-induced landslide responses has been 
conducted to identify fundamental aspects of response to earthquake-induced landslides, and 
provide comparison between geotechnical response methodologies conducted in New 
Zealand and internationally. Interpretation of the case study analysis has informed the 
development of a discussion document (Chapter six) to provide recommendations for future 
geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure.  
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Chapter Three: Geotechnical response to slope failures 
prior to and during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
3.1 Introduction 
The Canterbury earthquake sequence (CES) presents a New Zealand case study for analysing 
response by local government and geotechnical professionals to widespread and complex 
earthquake-induced slope failure in an urban environment. This chapter establishes the 
context of landslide risk and landslide risk management in the Port Hills prior to the CES 
based on literature review and information collected during interviews. To examine the post-
earthquake geotechnical response and management of earthquake-induced slope failure 
implemented during the CES, a timeline of the response has been developed from 
information collected from interviews and supporting literature. Significant themes identified 
during the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure have been identified to 
contextualise the response mechanisms which were initiated during the CES. 
3.2 Geotechnical risk management in Port Hills prior to Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence 
To provide context to the response to earthquake-induced slope failure during the CES, it is 
important to examine the stability of the Port Hills prior to the earthquakes occurring, and 
understand the subsequent approach to management of risk from slope failure. These 
understandings contribute to the approach to landslide risk management in the Port Hills prior 
to the earthquake sequence. 
3.2.1 Landslide hazard in the Port Hills  
Prior to the earthquake sequence there have been a series of recorded slope failures which 
have occurred in the Port Hills (Table 3.1). Infrequently these events caused damage to 
structures and infrastructure. Primarily the more damaging slope failures, such as the 1907 
and 1912 rockfall on Sumner Road, and the rockfall at Heberden Avenue and Wakefield 
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Avenue in 2000 and 2006 respectively appear to have been associated with the occurrence of 
rainfall (Star Newspaper 1907; Brown and Weeber 1992; Massey et al. 2012a). Anecdotal 
evidence and discussion from interviews suggests that minor rockfall and isolated boulder 
roll was the most common form of slope failure in the Port Hills. However many of these 
events have not been recorded. This is likely to have been because they were minor events 
which did not cause significant damage. 
Table 3.1: Recorded Slope failures in the Port Hills prior to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
Year Location Type of failure and 
Volume of material 
Impact Reference 
1907 Cliff at Sumner Road, 
Shag Rock Reserve 
(northern end of cliff) 
– Failure occurred 
after heavy rain 
Failure mechanism 
not specified 
3000-5000tons 
material (~1500-
2000m
3
) 
Inundation of 
roadway, damage 
to infrastructure 
such as water mains 
and tramline 
Star Newspaper 1907 
1912 Cliff at Sumner Road, 
Shag Rock Reserve 
(southern end of cliff) 
– Failure associated 
with rainfall but did 
not occur during 
rainfall 
Rockfall  
150m
3 
Inundation of 
roadway and 
tramline 
Brown and Weeber 
1992 
1986 Scarbourgh  Isolated rockfall 
Volume not specified 
Closed Edwin 
Mouldey Track 
Damaged Pump 
station 
Elder et al. 1991; 
Brown and Weeber 
1992 
1986 Governors Bay Isolated Boulder roll 
Volume not specified 
Damage to rear 
wall of house 
Elder et al. 1991 
1992 Raekura Place, Red 
Cliffs 
Rockfall  
~50m
3
 
Minor damage to 
property 
Bell 1992 
1996-
2011 
Various locations in 
Port Hills 
6 landslides (types 
not specified)  
Each failure <10m
3
 
Some affected 
roads 
Massey et al. 2012 
(GNS Landslide 
Database) 
2000 Heberden Avenue 
Rainfall initiated 
Rockfall (volume not 
specified) 
House Destroyed Massey et al. 2012 
(GNS Landslide 
Database) 
2006 Wakefield Avenue 
Rainfall initiated 
Rockfall 
Several hundred 
cubic metres 
Two homes 
damaged 
Massey et al. 2012 
(GNS Landslide 
Database) 
 
From historical evidence of slope failure in the Port Hills under static conditions (Table 3.1) 
and geomorphological evidence it was expected that earthquake-induced landsliding in the 
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Port Hills was likely to include boulder roll, rock fall, rock slide and failure in loess (Elder et 
al. 1991). In a review of the Christchurch earthquake hazard by Elder et al. 1991 for the 
Earthquake Commission (EQC) it was identified that in the Port Hills there were many steep 
slopes with the potential to generate significant debris during an earthquake, however, the 
extent of susceptible slopes had not been quantified. This was supported by the Centre for 
Advanced Engineering (1997) (CAE), who identified a risk of slope failures impacting 
lifelines in the Port Hills in the event of a severe rainstorm (1 in 100-year local rainstorm) or 
a 1 in 100 or 150 year earthquake occurring in late winter where ground water levels are 
elevated. Elder et al. (1991) proposed that rock slopes in the Port Hills will fail more 
frequently than soil slopes, and are likely to undergo minor failure from shaking intensities 
between VI to VII, i.e. earthquake with 1 in 12 to 25 year return period. Thus identifying the 
potential for damage to residential areas where dwellings are adjacent to steep rock slopes 
(Elder et al. 1991). 
Although earthquake-induced landsliding had been identified as a hazard in Christchurch the 
scale of slope failure experienced in the Christchurch Earthquake Sequence had never been 
previously observed in the Port Hills. Because of this, the extent of the slope failure 
experienced in the Christchurch Earthquake Sequence was not appreciated from a planning 
perspective. The mechanism of cliff collapse, which occurred after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake and includes the process of debris avalanche and cliff top recession, had not 
previously been considered prior to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. 
3.2.2 Seismic hazard in Christchurch 
Prior to the earthquake sequence, seismic hazard in Christchurch was primarily focussed on 
known distal active faults in the region such as the Alpine Fault, the Hope fault, Porters Pass 
Tectonic zone, Pegasus Bay fault, and Kaiwara Fault where earthquakes larger than 
magnitude 7 had previously been recorded (Sinclair 2008; Stirling et al. 2008). Figure 3.1 
shows the active faults within a 200km radius of Christchurch City that scientists were aware 
of prior to the Canterbury earthquake sequence.  
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Close proximity events were not included in the probabilistic seismic hazard model for the 
Canterbury region and which indicated a low probability of a local rupture event (Stirling et 
al. 2008). Estimated peak ground accelerations (PGA) for Christchurch were 0.31g and 0.4g 
for earthquakes with return periods of 500 and 1000 years respectively for class C (shallow 
soil) site conditions (Stirling et al. 2008). These estimated PGAs were significantly less than 
what was experienced in the Port Hills during the 22
nd
 February and 23
rd
 June 2011 
earthquakes. Figure 3.2 presents the probabilistic seismic hazard maps for the Canterbury 
region based on the 2008 probabilistic seismic hazard model developed by Stirling et al. 
(2008). 
Several historic earthquake events have been recorded which were located in close proximity 
(<20km) from Christchurch City, however no coseismic landslides in the Port Hills have 
been associated with these events. In 1869 a local source MW 4.7-4.9 earthquake was 
recorded in Christchurch City and was described as the most damaging historical earthquake 
Figure 3.1: Known active faults within 200km of Christchurch prior to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (Centre for 
Advanced Engineering 1997) 
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before the Christchurch Earthquake Sequence (Stirling et al. 1999; Downes and Yetton 
2012). Damage to chimneys and brick and stone masonry buildings occurred in Christchurch 
suburbs and the central business district, however no liquefaction or ground damage was 
reported (Downes and Yetton 2012). The earthquake epicentre was first thought to have been 
located in New Brighton, however recent research suggests the earthquake was located within 
5km of the Central Business District (Downes and Yetton 2012).  
 
In 1870 an earthquake ruptured near Lake Ellesmere, which caused MM6 intensity shaking in 
Christchurch using the Dowrick (1996) version of the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale 
(Downes and Yetton 2012). These earthquakes, with the addition of other smaller 
earthquakes within a 50km radius of Christchurch City, indicated that close proximity 
faulting directly in the Christchurch City area was a possibility (Elder et al. 1991). However, 
a study completed for Canterbury Regional Council (now Environment Canterbury) 
concerning Earthquake Hazard and Risk Assessment noted the inadequacy of information 
regarding these historical close proximity earthquakes in Canterbury (Pettinga et al. 1998).  
Figure 3.2: Probabilistic seismic hazard maps for the Canterbury region. Maps show the levels of peak ground acceleration 
(PGA) for return periods of 475 and 1000 years on class C (shallow soil) site conditions. Accelerations are presented in units 
of g. 
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3.2.3 Landslide risk management in the Port Hills 
In 1997 Environment Canterbury (Canterbury Regional Council) commissioned a series of 
studies to further the understanding of seismic hazard in the Canterbury region (Kingsbury et 
al. 2001). Under the requirements of the Resource Management Act (1991) (RMA) regional 
and local authorities are required to address the control land use for the mitigation or 
avoidance of the affects of natural hazards on the understanding that the impacts from natural 
hazards can be managed by hazard reduction, loss sharing and event modification (Hull 
1997). Consequently restrictions in land use development have been previously enforced 
through the district plan for Christchurch City and surrounding local authorities such as 
Selwyn district and Waimakariri district. 
Furthermore, with the knowledge that slope failures could pose a significant hazard in the 
event of a significant rainstorm or earthquake, analysis of aerial photographs and field 
observations informed the division of the Port Hills into slope hazard zones (Centre for 
Advanced Engineering 1997; Sinclair 2008). Pre-earthquake Port Hills slope hazard zones 
have been attached in Appendix E. Hazard zones broadly corresponded to the level of hazard, 
and advised on the requirement for site investigation prior to construction or future 
subdivisions (Centre for Advanced Engineering 1997). Due to the infrequency of large scale, 
damaging slope failures in the Port Hills, risk management was often primarily focussed on 
isolated boulder roll or rockfalls which were typically more common. To manage the risk of 
rockfall, mitigation techniques were recommended to specific sites where there was risk of 
impact to properties or lifelines.  
“That was what we did, we built fences, we dug ditches, we built bunds, we scaled, we 
avoided in some cases but generally speaking we didn’t avoid, because we weren’t expecting 
blocks the size of this table to come down”. – Senior Geotechnical Consultant 
Mitigation techniques used for reducing the risk of rockfall to residents in the Port Hills 
included rock removal, stabilisation, and installation of engineered protection structures. 
Rock removal included the identification of loose or hazardous material on slopes and then 
removal of the material by scaling of the slope. Stabilisation or reinforcement of slopes 
included treatment of weakened material in some areas by use of rock bolting, shotcrete and 
installation of mesh on rock slopes.  
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3.3  Geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides during the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. 
3.3.1 4th September 2010 earthquake 
Slope failure initiated in the Port Hills during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) 
resulted in the involvement of the geotechnical community in the management of 
geotechnical hazard and risk. Involvement of the geotechnical community was progressive, 
with the least involvement required after the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake due to the 
relatively minor impact of the earthquake on the Port Hills.  
After the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake the geotechnical response was managed through the 
involvement of local geotechnical professionals maintained on a contractual basis under the 
direction of Christchurch City Council (CCC). The response included the requirement to 
assess slopes to inform road use restrictions and road closures during the state of local 
emergency which commenced on the 4
th
 September 2010 and ceased on the 16
th
 September 
2010. A state of local emergency was declared in Christchurch city, Selwyn district, and 
Waimakariri district. 
After the state of emergency ceased, a local geotechnical professional was contracted by CCC 
to report on the impact of the earthquake on the Port Hills. The report was to be delivered to 
the CCC on the 22
nd
 February 2011 but was never delivered due to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake which caused further damage to the city and the Port Hills. 
3.3.2 22nd February and 13th June 2011 earthquakes 
The most extensive involvement from the geotechnical community was required after the 
22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, when widespread slope failure resulted in the development of 
a large geotechnical response contingent which later formed the Port Hills Geotechnical 
Group (PHGG). After the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical response involved 
rapid risk assessment of slope failures to inform the implementation of risk management 
techniques such as evacuations, road closures, and restrictions to building use. As such, 
protection of life safety was a priority for the response group in the aftermath of the 
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earthquake. A state of national emergency was declared on the 23
rd
 February 2011, and 
remained enforced until the 30
th
 April 2011. 
Coordination of the geotechnical response was also a priority after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. During the initial 48 hours post-earthquake, geotechnical professionals mobilised 
individually and there was no management structure to coordinate the response. By the 24
th
 
February 2011 communication between geotechnical professionals increased through daily 
meetings, which highlighted the requirement for a coordination framework to be developed 
within the response. Developments in coordination were driven by the need to formulate a 
framework for efficient execution of life safety risk assessment so that the extent of slopes 
affected by the earthquake could be assessed as quickly and as thoroughly as possible.  
Within one week of the earthquake a format for liaison between USAR and geotechnical 
professionals was established, and daily meetings were initiated by a leader within the 
geotechnical group to facilitate discussions around the coordination and execution of the 
response. Over the course of the week, a standard slope assessment format was developed 
and the Port Hills were divided into nine sectors that were assigned to geotechnical 
consultancies who were involved in the response. These developments formalised data 
collection and deployment processes and enabled a thorough execution of slope assessments 
by mitigating the duplication of slope assessments.  
When the state of national emergency ceased further restructuring took place within the 
PHGG, and contractual agreements between geotechnical consultancies and the Christchurch 
City Council (CCC) were developed. The protection of life safety remained a priority for the 
Port Hills Geotechnical Group until 2013 when the group was disbanded. The PHGG 
response to slope failures after the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake continued in the same format 
that was in place at the end of the state of national emergency. Because further slope failure 
was initiated, reassessment of slopes in the Port Hills was required after the 13
th
 June 2011 
earthquake to inform further building use restriction. 
From analysis of interview data collected during this research a timeline has been developed 
to present how the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landsliding changed over 
time from the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake (Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4). For Table 
3.3, colour coding has been used to relate activities to themes in the response, i.e. text in 
yellow relates to life safety, blue relates to coordination of the geotechnical response, and 
green relates to public communication. These timelines present the involvement of Civil 
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Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM), Christchurch City Council (CCC), Urban 
Search and Rescue (USAR) and geotechnical professionals (including GNS and local 
geotechnical professionals who weeks after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake formed the 
Port Hills Geotechnical Group). The involvement of each organisation was influenced by the 
changing priorities throughout the response, and the degree of formalised coordination and 
legislation. 
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Table 3.2: Port Hills geotechnical response timeline between September 2010 - April 2011  
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Table 3.3: Port Hills geotechnical response timeline between 22nd February - 30th April 2011  
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slope to inform evacuations and lifeline safety 
 Evacuations implemented immediately (some residents self 
evacuated) 
 Strategic routes between Lyttelton and Sumner, and Sumner 
and Christchurch City stayed a priority for USAR for 
approximately the first three weeks of the response. Sumner 
was particularly vulnerable due to the limited accessibility to 
the suburb and the requirement for water to reach the suburb 
 Body recovery commences 
 Hazard identification  and rapid qualitative assessment of slope 
to inform evacuations and lifeline safety continues 
 Recovery of bodies continues 
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 Hazard identification  and rapid qualitative assessment of slope to inform 
evacuations and lifeline safety continues 
 Body recovery complete 
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 Geotechnical contingent of USAR disband 
after 3 weeks because of no further 
requirement for evacuation in Port Hills  USAR communicated directly to EoC, Fire Brigade Command, 
local fire brigade and Police regarding evacuation requirements 
 Coordination with local geotechnical professionals increases - 
Geotechnical professionals provide recommendations to USAR 
and CDEM for evacuations 
 Daily report to USAR base and CDEM continues 
 USAR involvement with daily meetings of geotechnical 
response commences 
 USAR divide Port Hills into areas - deployment in teams or 
individually depending on scale of slope failure 
 Observations and daily meetings influence deployment 
 Daily report to USAR base and CDEM continues 
 USAR Involvement with daily meetings of geotechnical response 
continues 
 USAR start to attend community meetings 
 USAR personnel report daily to USAR base and CDEM 
 Initial deployment to lifeline routes, further deployment 
based on observations 
 USAR communicate individually with residents 
 USAR communicate individually with residents and starts to 
form contact with local community groups 
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 Hazard identification and rapid Qualitative Slope assessment 
to assess slope failure risk to dwellings and lifelines 
 Installation of basic monitoring equipment i.e. pegs, string 
line for early warning system - monitored hourly 
 GPS locations of cracks recorded and noted so that 
information could be passed on to personnel at the local 
Emergency Operation Centre (EoC) 
 Aerial reconnaissance undertaken to inform impact 
assessment 
 Hazard identification and rapid Qualitative Slope assessment to 
assess slope failure risk to dwellings and lifelines – formalised 
assessment format starts to develop and recommendations for 
evacuations are passed on to USAR and CDEM 
 Installation of further monitoring equipment such as survey 
network and continuous GPS 
 Monitoring continue several times daily 
 Emergency slope remediation and stabilisation commences 
 Slope assessments continue with slope monitoring frequency decreasing 
at some sites where limited post-earthquake movement has occurred 
 Standard design for mitigation works developed in some sectors - 
designed as temporary support with deconstructed expected later during 
the recovery process 
 Mapping and data collection continues for  
GNS Science risk model 
 Slope monitoring continues - further 
monitoring equipment installed 
 Stabilisation and remediate work continue 
 Daily Meetings at Opus continue with representatives from CDEM and 
CCC attend - Some notes or short memos passed on to CDEM or CCC 
 GNS steps back to technical support role 
 Nine sectors developed in the Port Hills – sectors appointed to 
consultancies involved in response - deployment now within sectors 
 Deployment informed through information gathered at CCC call centre 
and passed onto geotechnical professionals 
 Contractors partner with consultancies to undertake work in sectors 
 Pro forma developed for slope assessment 
 Development GIS database continues 
 Data collected during field assessments logged in GIS using pro forma 
 Aerial photographs become available – remote mapping commences 
 GPS equipment installed at some loess failure sites 
 Meetings continue at Opus International 
Consultants – over time these decrease to 
weekly 
 Formal notes or short memos become more 
frequently used CDEM or CCC 
 Deployment guided increasingly by 
mapping required for GNS model and 
hazard mitigation work 
 GIS database now in use – hazard mapping 
logged in database 
 Some changes within allocation of sectors 
and sector boundaries due to resourcing by 
consultants 
 No coordinated process or methodology for slope 
assessments 
 Daily meetings at Emergency Operations Centre 
 Verbal reporting between geotechnical professionals and 
CDEM 
 Geotechnical Professions self deploy - deployment guided by 
information from the public and visual observations 
 Local knowledge and aerial reconnaissance informed initial 
deployment 
 Daily meetings at opus international consultants (opus) - verbal 
reporting continues 
 Small response groups form (2-3 people) for deployment 
 Deployment informed by CDEM/CCC call centre, information 
from residents, visual observations and aerial observations 
 Development of GIS database commences 
 Mobilisation of further geotechnical professionals expands 
through contacts and networking 
 Communication continues on individual basis between 
geotechnical professionals and residents 
 Community meetings set up - communication with public also continues 
on individual basis  
 Geotechnical professionals distribute information for welfare assistance 
where possible 
 Community meetings continue 
 Individual communications between geotechnical 
professionals and residents 
C
C
C
 
 CCC provide staff for Emergency Operations Centre (EoC)  CCC Staff Emergency Operations Centre 
 EoC becoming more aware of issue in Port Hills 
 CCC staff Emergency Operations Centre 
 Relationship with PHGG strengthens 
 GNS commissioned to develop risk 
models. 
 Public able to report concerns to CCC (Call Centre)  CCC call centre pass on information from residents to geotechnical 
response group 
 Development of contractual agreements 
with geotechnical professionals 
 Slope failure in the Port Hills identified as 
long term issue - affects of February 
earthquake increased the rockfall and cliff 
collapse hazard in the area.  
 Natural hazard response sits within CCC 
with partnership with CERA 
C
iv
il
 D
ef
en
ce
  Building safety evaluation teams activated 
 CDEM volunteer response team involved in abseil work at 
cliffs in Port Hills to assist in slope stabilisation 
 Building safety evaluation continues  Oversee PHGG response 
 Christchurch Earthquake Response Centre becomes increasingly aware 
of situation and extent of damage in the Port Hills. Port Hills became 
increasingly encompassed in the CDEM response 
 Oversee PHGG response 
 Management of response continues with 
increasing involvement from CERA and 
CCC 
 EoC and ECC Combine to form Christchurch Earthquake 
Response Centre 
 Science liaison involvement with Port Hills response 
 Cordon more thoroughly managed 
 Initially CDEM response was primarily focussed on the 
extensive liquefaction and lateral spreading which had 
occurred across Christchurch 
 Port Hills geotechnical email address set up 
 Fact sheets developed and distributed 
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February 22
nd
- 23
rd
 February 24
th
- 28
th
 March 1
st
 – 14th March 15th – April 30th   
  1-2 days post-earthquake 3-7 days post-earthquake 1-2 weeks post-earthquake 1-2 months post-earthquake  
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Table 3.4: May 2011 - December 2011 Port Hills geotechnical response timeline 
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3.3.3 Comparison between risk perceptions prior to and after the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence 
A review of landslide and seismic hazard and risk in Christchurch prior to the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence in section 3.2 has enabled comparison between the perception of 
geotechnical hazard prior to 2010, and the geotechnical hazard that was experienced during 
the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES). The ground motions experienced in the Port 
Hills during the 22
nd
 February and 13
th
 June 2011 earthquakes significantly exceeded 500-
year seismic design spectra and ground motion estimations from the Canterbury probabilistic 
seismic hazard model. Consequently, post-earthquake response preparation and pre-
earthquake land use planning in the Port Hills was not executed anticipating ground motions 
and subsequent slope failures that were experienced during the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake (Table 3.5). This highlights one limitation to the probabilistic seismic hazard 
model and emphasises the complexity of incorporating low probability earthquakes when 
taking a probabilistic approach to seismic hazard. 
Table 3.5: Estimated PGA from Probabilistic Seismic Hazard model for Canterbury, and observed slope instability prior to 
the CES, compared with PGA and slope instability experienced in the Port Hills between 4th September 2010 and 13th June 
2011 earthquakes (Massey et al. 2012a) 
Earthquake Slope instability in Port 
Hills 
Peak horizontal ground 
acceleration 
Peak vertical ground 
acceleration 
Prior to Canterbury 
earthquake Sequence 
Localised rockfall and 
loess failure common 
(Brown and Weeber 
1992) 
For class C (shallow soil) site conditions (Stirling 
et al. 2008): 
 0.31g estimated for 500-year event  
 0.4g estimated for 1000-year event  
 0.5g estimated for 2000-year event 
4
th
 September 2010 Few localised rockfalls 
and loess failure 
0.6g at Heathcoate 
Valley School 
0.3g at Cashmere High 
School 
22
nd
 February 2011 Widespread rockfall, cliff 
collapse, loess failure and 
retaining wall failure 
1.41g at Heathcoate 
Valley School 
2.21g at Heathcoate 
Valley School 
13
th
 June 2011 Widespread rockfall, cliff 
collapse, loess failure and 
retaining wall failure 
0.6g at Heathcoate 
Valley School 
0.2g at Heathcoate 
Valley School 
2.2g near Godley 
Drive, Sumner 
1.1g near Godley 
Drive, Sumner 
 
Furthermore, historical evidence did not demonstrate a risk of large scale slope failure such 
as cliff collapse in the Port Hills; rather historically the most common failure mechanism was 
localised rockfall. Moreover, the extent of slope failure that occurred after the 4
th
 September 
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2010 earthquake conformed to previous expectations of slope behaviour in the Port Hills, 
with minor rockfall and loess failure occurring. Talus at the base of cliffs prior to the CES 
suggested that shedding of loose material had occurred previously, however at a smaller scale 
and slower rate than observed during the 22
nd
 February and 13
th
 June 2011 earthquakes. This 
meant that the widespread slope failure that occurred was unexpected and consequently, there 
were no planned procedures for coordinating geotechnical response to manage co-seismic 
slope failure in urban areas. Furthermore, no procedures were developed after the 4
th
 
September earthquake as the limited impact on the Port Hills conformed to historic evidence 
of previous slope failure. 
3.3.4 Involvement of organisations in geotechnical response 
3.3.4.1 Canterbury Regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group 
The involvement of the Canterbury regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(CDEM) group commenced immediately after the 4
th
 September 2010 and 22
nd
 February 
2011 earthquakes and remained active throughout the State of Local Emergency (ceased 16
th
 
September 2010), and the State of National Emergency (ceased 30
th
 April 2011) respectively. 
The role of Canterbury Regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group was to 
coordinate the regional emergency response by assessing the impact of the event at a regional 
scale and developing action plans to support local response. Appendix F provides further 
detail of the general structure and capabilities of CDEM, and involvement after the 4
th
 
September 2010 and 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquakes. The objectives of the CDEM response 
in relation to earthquake-induced slope failures in the Port Hills are summarised in Table 3.6. 
After the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, priorities of CDEM were impact assessment and the 
protection of life safety through implementing building safety evaluation and building use 
restrictions in the Port Hills. CDEM science liaison became crucial in the coordination of the 
geotechnical response after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake because of the scale and 
complexity of the event. Typically the role of science liaison would involve communicating 
between scientists and CDEM so that scientific information may inform post-earthquake 
emergency management. CDEM science liaison became important for ensuring the response 
from geotechnical professionals was integrated into the CDEM response and that 
communication was maintained between the two groups. As such science liaison became the 
CDEM representative at daily meetings held by Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and the 
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Port Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG). Although it was not typically part of the role, science 
liaison also became involved in communication with residents in the Port Hills until public 
communication could be included in the capabilities of Christchurch City Council (CCC).  
Although additional extensive slope failure was initiated after the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake, 
there was no requirement for involvement from CDEM as further protection of life safety 
could be implemented through the response for the Port Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG) 
under the direction of CCC. 
Table 3.6: Priorities of Civil Defence and Emergency Management in relation to earthquake-induced slope failures 
Timeframe Objectives 
4
th
 September 2010 Earthquake 
No involvement with Port Hills, however active involvement with emergency management in 
Christchurch CBD, Christchurch suburbs and Selywn and Waimakariri districts. 
22
nd
 February 2011 Earthquake 
1-2 days post-
earthquake 
 Impact assessment 
 Body Recovery and rescue 
 Protection of life safety 
3-7 days post-
earthquake 
 Body Recovery and rescue 
 Protection of life safety - building safety evaluation increasing priority 
 Increasing focus on Welfare (in the first days after the earthquake welfare 
was sustained by communities assisting one another) 
1-2 weeks post-
earthquake 
 Protection of life safety - building safety evaluation continues 
 Supplying communities with welfare and sanitation 
13
th
 June 2011 Earthquakes 
No involvement with Port Hills – geotechnical response in the Port Hills was managed by the Port 
Hills Geotechnical Group and Christchurch City Council. 
 
3.3.4.2 Christchurch City Council 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) was involved in the geotechnical response since the 
initiating earthquake on 4
th
 September 2010 when they commissioned local geotechnical 
professionals to report on the impact in the Port Hills, and manage remediation of slopes that 
had failed during the earthquake. In the aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake CCC 
was primarily involved in emergency management through involvement in local CDEM 
arrangements, consequently the response directly from CCC was minimal in the immediate 
aftermath of the event. Over time representatives from CCC became increasingly involved in 
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the Port Hills response as it became apparent the slope instabilities caused by the earthquake 
were likely to continue to be an issue beyond the duration of the state of national emergency. 
As such, the CCC was required to become involved in the continuing management of slope 
failures. The objectives of CCC throughout the response are shown in Table 3.7. The 
involvement of CCC continued beyond the state of national emergency, and continues at the 
time of writing this thesis. 
Table 3.7: Priorities of Christchurch City Council during geotechnical response 
Timeframe Objective 
4
th
 September 2010 Earthquake 
Response during 
Local State of 
Emergency 
 Provide Staff for Emergency Operations Centre (EoC) 
Recovery  Commission Port Hills impact assessment 
22
nd
 February 2011 Earthquake 
1-2 days to 2 weeks 
post-earthquake 
 Provide staff for EoC 
1-2 months post-
earthquake 
 Provide staff for EoC 
 Coordinate assessment of long term risk and geotechnical response 
group (Focus on recovery increases) 
Recovery  Provide staff for EoC 
 Coordinate and oversee assessment of long term risk and 
geotechnical response group 
 Manage long term risk associated with Port Hills slope failures 
13
th
 June 2011 Earthquakes 
Response  Coordinate and oversee activities of geotechnical response group 
 
3.3.4.3 Urban Search and Rescue 
The role of Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) in an earthquake response includes the 
protection of life safety by locating and rescuing victims, and using technical expertise to 
evacuate people from areas at risk from unsafe structures. In the context of the Port Hills, the 
involvement of USAR was critical because of their authority to enforce evacuations under the 
NZ Fire Service Legislation. USAR was involved in the emergency response within 
Christchurch after the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake, and again after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. 
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Immediately after the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake there was no mobilisation of USAR 
geotechnical professionals to Port Hills because the minor slope failures that were initiated 
could be managed within local resources. Some USAR personnel stepped down from their 
roles 24 hours after the earthquake due to the lack of requirement of their response capability, 
while others were involved in the removal or stabilisation of unsafe chimneys and inspection 
of unsafe properties which extended beyond the end of the state of local emergencies that 
ended on the 16
th
 September 2010. 
Immediately after the 22
nd
 February earthquake USAR established an operational base at 
Latimer Square. Four USAR personnel trained in geotechnical engineering or engineering 
geology and were deployed to the Port Hills on the afternoon of the 23
rd
 February 2011. The 
priorities of the USAR geotechnical response included:  
 Protection of life safety on lifelines – initiate road restrictions and road closures 
accordingly, 
 Protection of life safety of inhabitants at risk from slope failure – enforce evacuations 
and initiate restrictions to building use, 
 Body recovery (during first week of response). 
These priorities were maintained throughout the duration of USAR involvement in the Port 
Hills. The geotechnical contingent of USAR was disbanded after three weeks post-earthquake 
because evacuations were then completed in the Port Hills. 
3.3.4.4 Geotechnical professionals 
Local geotechnical professionals have been involved in the response in the Port Hills since 
the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake occurred. The minimal impact the 4
th
 September 2010 
earthquake had on the Port Hills meant that the response required could be facilitated through 
the Christchurch City Council and locally contracted consultants. In the aftermath of the 
earthquake, local geotechnical professionals were deployed to the Port Hills with local 
knowledge regarding locations where previous slope failures had occurred. This led to the 
evaluation of slope stability to provide advice for remediation and risk management.  
Due to the widespread slope failure initiated by the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake the 
involvement of geotechnical professionals was significantly more extensive and required the 
involvement of GNS and geotechnical professionals sourced locally and from locations 
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outside of Christchurch. Consequently a response group was formed of geotechnical experts 
and professionals who were aware of the life safety risk associated with the initiated slope 
failures. The objectives of local geotechnical professionals are provided in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8 : Priorities of local geotechnical professionals during response to earthquake-induced landslides 
Timeframes Objectives 
4
th
 September 2010 Earthquake 
Response and 
Recovery 
 Protect lifelines and major roads in the Port Hills 
 Impact assessment 
22
nd
 February 2011 Earthquake 
Response 1-2 days post-
earthquake 
(During National State 
of Emergency) 
 Impact assessment 
 Protection of life safety – rapid assessment of slopes to make 
recommendations for evacuations 
Response 3-7 days 
(During National State 
of Emergency) 
 Protection of life safety – rapid assessment of slopes to make 
recommendations for evacuations and building safety notices 
 Coordinate and expand group to improve response 
Response 1-2 weeks 
(During National State 
of Emergency) 
 Protection of life safety – rapid assessment of slopes to make 
recommendations for evacuations and building safety notices 
 Development of GIS database 
Response 1-2 months 
(During National State 
of Emergency) 
 Protection of life safety 
 Data collection for GNS Life Safety models 
 Requirement for slope assessments to inform Building Safety 
Restrictions decreases 
Recovery  Protection of life safety 
 Data collection for GNS Life Safety models 
13
th
 June 2011 Earthquakes 
Response  Protection of life safety through rapid assessment of slopes and 
making further recommendations for evacuations and building safety 
evaluations 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, there were no established methods or statutory 
requirement for coordinating slope assessments with building safety evaluation and 
protection of lifelines. As the geotechnical professionals became involved with USAR and 
CDEM, systems for response coordination developed and local consultants formed the Port 
Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG) within the first week of the response. Initially the group 
functioned under auspices of CDEM during the state of national emergency, and received 
technical support from GNS. During the recovery phase each local consultancy was engaged 
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in a contractual arrangement with the Christchurch City Council to undertake geotechnical 
work in the Port Hills including slope assessments, slope stabilisation and rockfall modelling. 
The PHGG were involved in the geotechnical response in the Port Hills after subsequent 
aftershocks following the 22
nd
 February 2011, and continued until early 2013.  
3.3.4.5 Interactions between organisations  
The relationships and interactions between organisations involved in Port Hills slope failure 
hazard have evolved and developed throughout the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Prior to 
the earthquake sequence the main participating organisations that were involved in slope 
failure hazard in the Port Hills were the Christchurch City Council (CCC), Environment 
Canterbury (ECan), GNS and local geotechnical professionals (Figure 3.3).  
 
 
The involvement of strategic organisations such as CCC and Ecan took place under legal 
requirements of local and regional councils to address natural hazards under government 
legislation (Table 3.9). Because of this requirement, local and regional authorities contracted 
geotechnical consultants to undertake slope failure risk assessment and hazard identification 
in the Port Hills, and provide recommendations for risk management options such as rockfall 
protection and land use planning. 
  
Local Geotechnical 
Consultants 
Organisations undertaking risk assessments of 
slopes  
Employment agreement for 
geotechnical advice and hazard 
assessment when required 
Christchurch City Council Environment Canterbury 
Employment agreement 
for slope failure hazard 
assessment in Port Hills 
when required 
GNS Science 
Figure 3.3: Interaction of organisations prior to earthquake sequence 
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Table 3.9: Legislation prior to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
Legislation  Impacts on Port Hills slope failure hazard and risk 
Resource Management Act 
(1991) 
 Section 30 of the RMA (1991) requires local and regional authorities 
to control the use of land to avoid to mitigated impacts of natural 
hazards 
Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Act (2002) 
 Local and regional authorities prepare an emergency management 
plan i.e. Canterbury Regional Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Recovery Plan which was in place when 4
th
 September 
2010 earthquake occurred 
Building Act (2004)  Section 71 of Building Act requires building consent authorities (e.g. 
local council) to refuse to grant building consent for construction on 
land is subject to natural hazard. Natural hazard is defined as erosion, 
slippage, falling debris, subsidence and inundation. 
 
The occurrence of the initiating event in the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (the 4
th
 
September 2010 earthquake) did not change the use of contractual arrangement between CCC 
and local geotechnical professionals because the minor impact that the earthquake had on the 
Port Hills could be managed with existing consulting capability (Figure 3.4). Although it did 
not directly impact the response in the Port Hills, CCC became involved with the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Commission after the passing of the Canterbury Earthquake Response 
and Recovery Act, 2010. A description of the act and impacts on the response are provided in 
Table 3.10. 
 
 
  
Local Geotechnical 
Consultants 
Christchurch City 
Council 
Organisations undertaking risk assessments of slopes  
Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Commission 
CCC mayor involved in CERC 
Employment agreement to 
undertake impact 
assessment in Port Hills 
and report to CCC 
Figure 3.4: Interaction of organisations within the Port Hills response after 4th September 2010 earthquake 
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Table 3.10: Legislation passed during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
Legislation Description Impacts on Port Hills slope 
failure hazard and risk 
Post 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake 
Canterbury 
Earthquake 
Response 
and 
Recovery 
Act, 2010  
(CERR 
2010) 
 CERR 2010 overruled the existing pre-
earthquake Canterbury Regional Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management Recovery Plan 
and endorsed the Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Commission (the commission) 
 The commission was established to provide 
advice to central government in relation to 
prioritising resources and funding allocations 
(See glossary) 
 Aimed to assist the response and recovery to the 
earthquake as from a strategic perspective the 
capabilities of existing legislation did not 
provide the necessary resources for the response 
 Limited impact on Port 
Hills - work was undertaken 
under client and contractor 
engagement. 
 Establishment of the 
commission made it 
difficult for some scientists 
and science liaison to 
identify where to request 
funding from. Many 
scientists felt that the role of 
the commission was not 
clearly defined. 
Post 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake 
Canterbury 
Earthquake 
Recovery 
Act, 2011  
(CERA 
2011) 
 CERR (2010) was repealed by the CERA 
(2011) in April 2011  
 CERA (2011) enabled the recovery to be 
handed over to the new government authority, 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority 
which was established under the New Zealand 
State Sector Act of 1988 
 Purpose of CERA was to lead a locally focussed 
and co-ordinated recovery following the 
February 2011 earthquake by providing a 
framework for public entities to work within 
community organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, iwi and the private sector 
(Controller and Auditor General 2012) 
 Endorsed partnership 
agreement between CCC 
and CERA 
 Enables CCC and CERA to 
co-manage and co-fund 
infrastructure rebuild and 
risk assessment in Port Hills 
 Initially required local 
authorities and CERA to 
define their roles within the 
response and recovery in 
the Port Hills and 
Christchurch. 
 
At least 48 hours after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake the geotechnical professionals 
became involved in the response in the Port Hills by assessing slopes and providing verbal 
recommendations to USAR and CDEM for evacuations, road closures and building safety 
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evaluation notices (Figure 3.5). Representatives from CCC and CDEM science liaison 
attended meetings held by USAR and geotechnical professionals, however the interaction 
between these organisations was limited within the first week after the earthquake as the 
geotechnical response was operating independently of CDEM. Once interaction between 
CDEM and geotechnical professionals increased, science liaison began to pass information 
from residents to geotechnical professionals regarding areas where slope failure had 
reportedly occurred in the Port Hills which increased the integration of the geotechnical 
response within CDEM response. 
 
Approximately one week after the earthquake, a framework of response was beginning to 
develop with the division of sectors in the Port Hills. This formed the foundation of the 
operating structure for the Port Hill Geotechnical Group (PHGG) and changed the interaction 
of organisations. Concurrently, GNS stepped back from PHGG and employed a role of 
technical support. GNS then started to develop a life safety risk model for rockfall and cliff 
collapse for Christchurch City Council (CCC), which formalised the relationship between the 
two organisations into a contractual arrangement (Figure 3.6). PHGG continued to assess 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
Geotechnical Professionals 
 
 The University of Canterbury 
 Geotech Consulting 
 GNS 
USAR 
Attend daily meetings 
Science liaison passes on 
information to PHGG  
Science Liaison Building Safety Evaluation 
Teams 
Christchurch City 
Council 
USAR and PHGG provide 
recommendations to CDEM for 
Building Safety Evaluation 
Notices and evacuations 
PHGG provide 
recommendations to 
USAR for evacuations 
Organisations undertaking risk assessments of slopes  
Figure 3.5: Interactions of organisations in response in Port Hills approximately 48 hours after 22nd February 2011 
earthquake during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
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slope failures and provide verbal recommendations to USAR and CDEM for evacuations and 
building safety evaluation notices. The requirement for this interaction decreased during the 
three weeks that USAR was involved in the geotechnical response, as the requirement for the 
enforcement of evacuations reduced.  
 
As the requirement for evacuations decreased and USAR became less involved in the 
response, PHGG became increasingly involved in data collection to inform the life safety risk 
model developed by GNS. By the end of the state of national emergency (30
th
 April 2011) 
contractual agreements between CCC and geotechnical consultancies were developed which 
formalised the relationship between the two organisations. The framework for interaction 
(Figure 3.7) which was established at the end of the state of national emergency was 
maintained throughout the response to the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake and continued until 
PHGG ceased in 2013. After the state of national emergency ceased, and the Canterbury 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
PHGG 
 Bell GeoConsulting 
 The University of 
Canterbury 
 Geotech Consulting 
 Opus 
 Aurecon 
 GHD 
 URS 
USAR 
(Involvement up to 3 
weeks post-
earthquake) 
Attend daily meetings 
Science liaison passes on 
information to PHGG  
Science Liaison Building Safety Evaluation 
Teams 
Christchurch City 
Council Staff 
USAR and PHGG provide 
recommendations to CDEM for 
Building Safety Evaluation 
Notices and evacuations 
PHGG provide 
recommendations to 
USAR for evacuations 
GNS 
Employment agreement to 
undertake life safety risk 
model for rockfall and 
cliff collapse 
GNS provide technical 
support to PHGG  
Organisations undertaking risk assessments of slopes  
Exchange information  
Figure 3.6: Interaction of organisations in the Port Hills response from approximately one week after the 22nd 
February 2011 earthquake 
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Earthquake Recovery Act (2011) repealed the Canterbury Earthquake Response and 
Recovery Act (2010), the CCC and Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 
began to oversee the recovery of the city. Because slope failure in the Port Hills was expected 
to be a long-term issue for Christchurch City, and CERA had a limited timeframe for 
involvement, the majority of the management of slope failure was maintained by CCC. 
 
3.4  Key themes from the geotechnical response 
Themes which had significant contribution to the geotechnical response to the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence (CES) have been identified from interview information. Examination 
of these themes sheds light on the progression of the response and presents key milestones 
that were pivotal in the execution of the response. The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake has 
been the most influential event in the analysis of the CES as it required the largest 
contribution of involvement from the geotechnical community. 
PHGG 
Geotechnical consultants 
including, but not limited to: 
 Opus 
 Aurecon 
 GHD 
 URS 
Christchurch City 
Council 
GNS 
GNS provide technical 
support to PHGG and 
information exchange 
Organisations undertaking risk assessments of slopes  
Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority 
Signed partnership  
Memorandum of understanding 
Information exchange 
Employment agreement to 
undertake life safety risk 
model for rockfall and 
cliff collapse 
Contract arrangement between CCC and 
Geotechnical consultancies 
Figure 3.7: Interactions of organisations in Port Hills response after state of national emergency ceases (30th April 2011) 
after the 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
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3.4.1 Coordination of geotechnical response 
Coordination of the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure was a 
significant theme in the CES due to the influences that changes in the coordination had on the 
execution of the response from a management level and tactical level. Table 3.11 outlines 
notable changes in the coordination of the geotechnical response which have had implications 
for the processes utilised in the response such as deployment of geotechnical professionals, 
field data collection and communication between organisations. 
Table 3.11: Example of coordination developments in Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
Coordination Timeframe Implications for geotechnical response 
Post-4
th
 September 2010 Earthquake 
Development of the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery 
Commission and CERR (2010) 
14
th
 September 
2010 
Pre earthquake recovery plan needed support and 
coordination from government  
Post 22
nd
 February 2011 Earthquake 
Integration of Emergency 
Operation Centre (EoC) and 
Emergency Coordination 
Centre (ECC) to form 
Christchurch Earthquake 
Response Centre (See Appendix 
F for further detail) 
Approx. 3 days 
post-earthquake 
Although this did not directly affect the response 
in the Port Hills, however it did result in the 
requirement for new coordination systems to form 
during the aftermath of the earthquake 
Collaboration between USAR 
and PHGG 
Approx. 2 days 
post-earthquake 
Development of response framework where 
geotechnical professionals assess slopes and 
provide recommendations to USAR for 
evacuations  
Development of a local 
geotechnical response group 
Approx. 2 days 
post-earthquake 
Coordination between geotechnical professionals 
improved with  
 
Division of the Port Hills into 
sectors 
Approx. 1 week 
post-earthquake 
Coordinated deployment in Port Hills 
Reduce duplication of assessments 
All areas of Port Hills included in response 
Development of standard slope 
assessment format 
Approx. 1 week 
post-earthquake 
Consistency in data collection and slope 
assessment techniques 
Development of a GIS database 
for management and analysis of 
field data 
Approx. 1 week 
post-earthquake 
Produce maps to inform PHGG daily meetings 
and assist coordination 
Maps show: known extent of slope failure, sectors 
division, reports from Port Hills residents.  
Daily/Regular meetings Approx. 2 days 
post-earthquake 
and continued 
weeks after 
earthquake 
Facilitate coordination and communication within 
geotechnical response group 
Contractual agreements 
between CCC and PHGG 
consultants 
After state of 
national 
emergency 
CCC oversees work in Port Hills 
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3.4.1.1 Initial coordination of geotechnical response 
Coordination became a predominant concern in the immediate aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 
2011 earthquake when local geotechnical professionals self-mobilised to inspect slope 
failures, and to provide input into building access restrictions and evacuations. In the first 
instance, coordination between USAR and local geotechnical professionals was not 
established due to the self-mobilisation of geotechnical professionals or at the request of 
clients. As such, initially the response was undertaken on an individual basis and 
consequently coordination between organisations was minimal. Furthermore, geotechnical 
professionals found it difficult to discern who to report their observations to as there was no 
overarching management of the geotechnical response. 
On the 23
rd
 and 24
th
 February 2011 coordination between geotechnical professionals started 
to increase. Personnel from the Christchurch City Council (CCC) and local geotechnical 
professionals identified the need for a geotechnical response group to be formed. The 
utilisation of networking and contacts within the geotechnical community aided the 
development and expansion of the group. By the 24
th
 February the geotechnical response 
began to form contact with geotechnical representatives from USAR and a reporting 
procedure developed between the two organisations. Some geotechnical professionals 
involved in the response had no previous experience or training in emergency response, and 
were unaware of the roles of Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (CDEM). Consequently within the first week of the response 
emphasis on role definition became important for the enforcement of evacuations, which 
facilitated the system for response between USAR and PHGG. The arrangement for 
communication between geotechnical professionals, USAR and CDEM is presented in Figure 
3.8.  
Days after the earthquake, aerial photography by New Zealand Aerial Mapping was used to 
provide visual information of the area and enable geotechnical professionals to identify land 
damage in the Port Hills. Within the first week after the earthquake it became difficult to 
obtain the aerial photographs because Dead Victim Identification (DVI) had not been 
completed. This hindered the ability of geotechnical professionals to remotely map spatial 
placement of slope failures to gain an understanding of the impact of the earthquake. 
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The collaboration between local geotechnical professionals and USAR became imperative for 
the execution of the response due to the scale of slope failure in the Port Hills. While USAR’s 
role in the response was temporary and focused largely on victim recovery, it was important 
that the team was present so that evacuation could be legally enforced. The demand for 
geotechnical response could not be met by local resources alone and consequently 
consultancies deployed geotechnical professionals from other areas of New Zealand which 
was supported by CDEM and private clients.  
Despite the initial involvement of strategic level organisations such as CCC and CDEM, the 
geotechnical response operated detached from the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management response during the emergency phase. Geotechnical professionals involved in 
Self Mobilisation of geotechnical 
professionals to Port Hills 
Geotechnical Professionals pass on 
recommendations to USAR and Civil 
Defence for evacuations and/or 
application of Building Safety 
Evaluation notice 
Verbal communication of location 
and extent of earthquake-induced 
landsliding to authorities for impact 
assessment 
Geotechnical Professionals evaluate 
slope failures and identify where 
residents should be evacuated 
USAR and Civil Defence Building 
Safety Evaluation team implement 
evacuations and apply Building 
Safety Notices 
Figure 3.8: Arrangement for communication between PHGG, USAR and CDEM during the geotechnical response days 
after the 22nd February 2011 earthquake. 
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PHGG maintained a self-sufficient structure when managing geotechnical response activities. 
From the perspective of the geotechnical professionals this worked well as they had the skills 
and knowledge to address the issue of risk to life safety from coseismic landsliding 
3.4.1.2 The role of communication within coordination 
Communication was an element of the geotechnical response that was spoken of frequently in 
interviews. This was primarily because the progression and coordination of the geotechnical 
response was greatly influenced by communication. As there were no pre-existing processes 
in place to guide the geotechnical response, pathways for communication between 
geotechnical professionals, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (CDEM) were required to form in the aftermath of the earthquake. 
This hindered coordination internally between geotechnical professionals, and externally 
between geotechnical professionals and with CDEM. Table 3.12 provides examples of when 
communication influenced the geotechnical response coordination. 
Communication was facilitated through daily meetings which enabled the group to coordinate 
deployment, data collection, slope assessments, distinguish roles and create contacts within 
the group. Meetings were also an opportunity for information exchange around hazard 
locations and areas that had been evacuated. Written records of decisions and observations in 
the first months after the earthquake were limited however an up to date contact list became 
important during this time as staffing changes within the PHGG was common.  
After the development of sectors one week post-earthquake, it became important that 
meetings of the PHGG continued so that information was exchanged between sectors and 
consultancies. Daily meetings became important in facilitating coordination of the 
geotechnical response. It was important that Christchurch City Council (CCC) representation 
was present at meetings with the geotechnical response group because it facilitated a conduit 
between the interests of the council and the activities of the group of geotechnical 
professionals. Meetings were also attended by a CDEM Science liaison representative who 
coordinated between geotechnical professionals that were responding in the Port Hills, and 
the CDEM response establishment in the Christchurch City Art Gallery. This enabled the 
technical capabilities of the volunteering geotechnical professionals to be incorporated into 
the emergency response. Over time the frequency of meetings decreased as the processes for 
slope assessments and data collection were in place. 
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Table 3.12: Examples where communication influenced coordination of geotechnical response to the 22nd February 2011 
earthquake  
Example Implications for response in Port Hills 
Although a formal communication process was 
present between the EoC and the USAR 
Command, early in the response to the 22
nd
 
February earthquake the flow of information was 
not fluid 
 Geotechnical USAR personnel reported back 
to the EoC individually with their 
observations from the Port Hills – Impact of 
earthquake on Port Hills was not fully 
appreciated by CDEM initially 
Days after the 22
nd
 February 2011 some 
geotechnical professionals found it difficult to 
distinguish who in the EoC observations should 
be reported to and what response processes local 
geotechnical response were required to adhere to.  
 Strained communication between some local 
geotechnical professionals and CDEM 
 Geotechnical response detached from CDEM 
Communication within the geotechnical group 
developed over the first weeks of the response. 
 Formation of PHGG 
 Coordination within deployment i.e. 
development of nine sectors 
Daily meetings of PHGG   Facilitated communications within the group 
and with entities such as USAR, CDEM and 
CCC 
 Encourage deployment coordination 
Science liaison reported back to CDEM daily.   Situation reports were passed through the 
emergency management lines to inform 
CDEM of progress of geotechnical response 
 Information was communicated to the CCC 
Call Centre so that information could be 
passed on to residents in need of information. 
 
3.4.1.3 Development of sectors in the Port Hills 
Although communication between geotechnical professionals was improving days after the 
earthquake, deployment coordination continued to remain problematic. Initially deployment 
was influenced by observations made during ground reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance 
and communication with residents. Throughout the first week after the earthquake a 
deployment system developed where public enquires were passed onto geotechnical 
professionals through CDEM or CCC. Responders within the geotechnical group would then 
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prioritise the sites and deploy to assess the hazards and potential risk that slope failures posed 
to the life safety of residents.  
However, the lack of procedures for deployment resulted in the duplication of site assessment 
which hindered the timeliness of the response and resulted in inefficiencies in the utilisation 
of resources. Consequently approximately one week after the February earthquake the Port 
Hills were divided into nine sectors based on geomorphological features such as ridgelines 
and valleys. Sectors were assigned to consultancies involved in the geotechnical response 
group. Once a consultancy was assigned a sector it was their responsibility to assess slopes 
within that area. Table 3.13 shows the list of sector locations, sector consultancies and 
principle geotechnical issues. Information from residents who had called the Christchurch 
Earthquake Response Centre would be directed to the consultancy responsible for that sector 
(Figure 3.9). An example of the Port Hills sector map has not been included in this document 
due to confidentiality requirements from Christchurch City Council. 
Table 3.13: Port Hills sectors during the state of national emergency (Macfarlane and Yetton 2013) 
Sector Area Team Principle geotechnical issues 
1 Sumner and East URS/SKM Cliff Collapse, boulder roll 
2 Clifton Hill Aurecon Cliff Collapse, mass movement, 
boulder roll 
3 Redcliffs Geotech Consulting Cliff Collapse 
4 Mt Pleasant University of Canterbury/Bell 
GeoConsulting 
Retaining wall failure, boulder roll, 
cracking 
5 Heathcote Valley Opus Boulder roll 
6 Lyttelton University of Canterbury/Bell 
GeoConsulting 
Boulder roll, retaining wall failure 
7 Avoca/Huntsbury GHD Boulder roll, ground cracking 
8 Inner Harbour Aurecon Boulder roll 
9 Cashmere University of Canterbury/Bell 
GeoConsulting 
Ground cracking, boulder roll 
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USAR also utilised a similar sector system and deployed both on an individual basis and in a 
group depending on the situation that needed assessing. Upon the development of sectors in 
the Port Hills, GNS changed their role in the response to providing technical support to the 
Port Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG). This allowed GNS to focus on the scientific and 
research-based response which ensured that data of an ephemeral nature could be collected. 
The need for a centralised database was identified within the first week of the response. 
Approximately one week after the earthquake a Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data 
base was established by GNS using data sets such as property boundaries, street maps, and 
postal addresses gathered from the CCC and Environment Canterbury. Based in the 
Christchurch Earthquake Response Centre the database was used to record and manage 
information gathered by the emerging geotechnical group. It allowed the production of maps 
to aid and inform decisions within the response, and enabled data to be passed on to CDEM 
and Christchurch City Council (CCC) in a suitable format. Initially the database was 
Daily Meetings  
Recommendations to USAR and Civil 
Defence Building Safety Evaluation Team 
for evacuations and Building Safety 
Notices 
Assessment of risk associated with 
coseismic landslides 
Deployment of Geotechnical Professionals 
and USAR 
(Within sectors and USAR areas) 
Implementation of hazard Mitigation (i.e. 
evacuations) 
Information from CCC/CDEM Call 
Centre  
Figure 3.9: Geotechnical response process after the development of sectors one week after the 22nd February 2011 
earthquake, until approximately three weeks post-earthquake 
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developed essentially by one GIS expert however, the size of the project required additional 
GIS experts to assist. It was several days before additional GIS technicians and resources 
became available. 
Several geotechnical consultants involved in the response used their own internal GIS 
capability to manage and record data that could then be passed onto the GNS database and 
incorporated into the larger data analysis. Months after the earthquake, a system was 
established where geotechnical professionals could use an electronic device such as an ipad 
to record information in the field and upload it directly to the GIS database. This was useful 
because it reduced the need for uploading data manually into the database.  
3.4.1.4 Coordination during earthquake recovery 
Throughout late March and April 2011 Christchurch City Council (CCC) became 
increasingly active and influential in the coordination of the Port Hills Geotechnical Group 
(PHGG). When the state of national emergency ceased (30
th
 April 2011) the group needed 
direction and guidance to continue slope assessments and data collection and contractual 
agreements were established between the Christchurch City Council and consultancies in the 
PHGG. During this time, the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) became 
increasingly more interested in the Port Hills response. 
As the requirement for the PHGG was expected to last for years, the organisation of the 
group needed to be improved to best sustain and utilise resources and skill sets. The internal 
coordination of the PHGG changed with the formation of a leadership team and an 
engineering team to optimise the use of leadership and technical capability. Leaders were 
selected for each sector in the Port Hills and became responsible for managing the 
geotechnical activities in their area. The appointment of sector leaders within the group 
introduced an operating structure outlined in Figure 3.10. Sector leader meetings occurred 
regularly with the aim to standardise the approach between sectors and maintain 
communication between consultancies. At this point, external peer review was recommended 
to the CCC by the PHGG to oversee and guide the geotechnical activities.  
After the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake the systems for the geotechnical response were in place 
and there was no need to develop coordination between response entities because this had 
been established after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. By the time the 13
th
 June 
earthquakes occurred, CCC was coordinating contracts with consultants to undertake 
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mapping and mitigation works. By 2013, CCC developed a list of geotechnical consultancies 
that could provide geotechnical engineering advice. 
 
 
3.4.2 Life safety 
The threat that earthquake-induced rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failure posed on 
inhabitants and road users in the Port Hills meant that life safety became a significant focus 
throughout the response to the CES. In this thesis, life safety refers to the both the life and 
physical well-being of individuals. After the 4
th
 September 2011 earthquake risk to life safety 
was addressed through the deployment of a local geotechnical professional to assess the 
impact of rockfall, which was managed with road use restrictions and road closures. Weeks 
after the earthquake the CCC commissioned the same local geotechnical professionals to 
report on the impact that the earthquake had caused on the Port Hills and whether land use 
planning and residential development practices should be changed as a result of the affects of 
the earthquake. The report concluded that in light of the minimal impact to the Port Hills after 
a large earthquake event, no changes to land use planning would be required and indicatively 
no long-term life safety issues were present. 
Leadership Team 
Database Coordinator 
Sector Leader Sector Leader Sector Leader 
Assessment Teams 
Figure 3.10: Operating structure for geotechncial response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake after the state 
of national emergency ceased (30th April 2011) 
Engineering team 
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Immediately after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, protection of life safety in the Port 
Hills became the priority for CDEM, USAR and the local geotechnical response group due to 
the perception that earthquake-induced slope failures posed imminent life safety risk to 
residents. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake it was uncertain whether further 
aftershocks; static conditions or rainfall could induce further rockfall, cliff collapse and loess 
failure. Consequently areas where failure had occurred needed to be assessed to quantify the 
risk to life safety and enforce techniques such as road closures and restrictions, evacuations 
and building use restrictions. 
3.4.2.1 Assessment of life safety risk 
In the immediate response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake the aim of the geotechnical 
response was to determine as quickly as possible where people were at risk so that PHGG 
could provide recommendations to USAR and CDEM of locations where evacuations, road 
restrictions, or building safety placards would be required (Figure 3.11). To achieve this, the 
initial slope assessment procedure executed by geotechnical professionals included rapid 
identification of areas of significant ground damage in residential areas in the Port Hills. Due 
to the extent of rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failure which had occurred there was a high 
demand for local geotechnical professionals to participate in rapid site assessments.  
Immediately after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, risk to life safety was assessed 
qualitatively based on expert opinion and previous knowledge and experience by 
geotechnical professionals responding in the field. Qualitative assessment allowed for speed 
of assessments and rapid coverage of the area affected. Information from interviews indicated 
that the time taken to assess each failure was variable depending on the extent and intricacies 
of the slope failure. At this stage, monitoring data was limited to what had been collected 
since the earthquake. 
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During the initial response areas that were considered at risk included:  
 Properties or roads at the top of slopes affected by cracking and displacement of 
material, 
 Properties or roads at the base of slopes that were affected by compression features, 
adjacent to material inundation, or have been inundated themselves. 
Observations included in qualitative slope assessments for each failure type are listed in 
Table 3.14. Assessments also included observations of potential source areas, topography, 
vegetation, and proximity of slope failures to elements at risk. USAR developed a similar list 
of critical observations to record during the assessment. Basic slope monitoring equipment 
including string lines and spray paint markers across sites were installed where movement 
had occurred to provide information regarding the slope behaviour which contributed to an 
estimation of the likelihood of failure. Regular measurements of monitoring equipment were 
recorded to establish a flow of information regarding the slope movement and behaviour, and 
Mobilisation of geotechnical professionals to Port 
Hills 
Geotechnical Professionals pass on 
recommendations verbally to USAR 
and Civil Defence for evacuations 
and/or application of Building Safety 
Evaluation notice 
Verbal communication of location and 
extent of earthquake-induced 
landsliding to authorities for impact 
assessment 
Geotechnical Professionals evaluation slope failures 
and identify where residents should be evacuated 
Figure 3.11: Process for slope assessment informing hazard management during the geotechnical response one week after 
22nd February 2011 earthquake 
USAR and Civil Defence Building Safety 
Evaluation team implement evacuations and apply 
Building Safety Notices 
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shed light on the mechanisms of failure at the site. Continuous GPS and survey networks 
were installed at some sites in order to regularly monitor any further movement. 
Table 3.14: Assessment observations for each slope failures during the geotechnical response to the 22nd February 2011 
earthquake 
Slope failure type Assessment observation 
Cliff Collapse  Crack locations and aperture 
 Location and extent of debris inundation 
 Rock Mass condition 
 Monitoring of slope movement i.e. crack apertures, extent, magnitude and 
direction of displacement 
Rockfall (boulder 
roll) 
 Rock mass condition 
 Rockfall run out path 
 Boulder mapping 
 Potential Source areas 
Loess failures  Crack locations and aperture 
 Location of compression features (toe bulging) 
 Monitoring of slope movement – extent, magnitude, direction of displacement 
 
Categorisation of slope failures in the Port Hills was conducted through visual observations 
made on site corresponding to failure features such as cracking and toe bulging as there was 
no subsurface information available. The aim of defining the failure mechanism was to 
distinguish what hazards were associated with these features and determine what data needs 
to be collected. An interpretation of the risk management process which was implemented 
immediate post-earthquake is presented in Figure 3.12.  
During the first week of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011, emphasis was placed on the 
identification and characterisation of the slope failure hazard to estimate a likelihood of 
failure, which subsequently informed implementation of hazard management techniques. 
Risk assessment was undertaken through consideration of the potential impact on critical 
infrastructure or dwellings located in the affected area. The evaluation of risk in rapid 
response was quantified by whether there was potential for loss of life or injury if the hazard 
identified was to fail further. This was because earthquake-induced slope failures presented 
imminent risk which was exacerbated by uncertainty around the likelihood of further failure 
or reactivation. 
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Initially after the earthquake the uncertainty around defining the failure mechanism was 
significant due to the lack of detailed information, however this decreased over time as slope 
behaviour was further monitored. Lack of understanding and knowledge around the failure 
mechanism at some sites also influenced the perception of risk, and in some cases this may 
have resulted in an overly conservative risk management approach which consequently can 
result in the unnecessary displacement of people. Uncertainty was reduced through 
discussions between USAR and geotechnical professionals regarding the potential risk at 
each site. This discussion acted as a form of informal peer review to ensure that the most 
appropriate risk management decision possible was made for each site.  
3.4.2.2 Implementation of standard slope assessment format 
Approximately one week after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, a formalised slope 
assessment reporting format was developed by several of the geotechnical professionals 
involved in the response. The format was developed to improve consistency of risk 
assessment of earthquake-induced slope failures and outlined a methodology for qualitative 
slope assessment of the potential effect or consequence of the failure and the likelihood of 
failure to guide treatment decisions. The process for the reporting format is outlined in Figure 
3.13 and the standard slope assessment format attached in Appendix G. 
Risk Management 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Analysis 
Hazard Analysis Consequence Analysis 
Figure 3.12: Interpretation of emergency risk assessment methodology for earthquake-induced slope failure implemented 
during the immediate response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
Qualitative Risk Estimation 
Identification of potential Loss of 
Life or injury 
 
Identification of lifelines and 
People at risk 
Hazard Identification and rapid 
evaluation of likelihood of 
failure and extent of failure 
Scope 
Protect life safety in areas affected 
by coseismic slope failures 
Risk Treatment 
Recommend Evacuation and/or 
Building Safety Evaluation Notice 
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This assessment process appears to have followed a similar procedure to that of the landslide 
risk assessment outlined by Crozier and Glade (2004); Fell et al. (2005); and AS/NZ ISO 
31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines where hazard analysis, 
consequence analysis, risk estimation, risk evaluation and risk treatment is encompassed in 
the management process (Figure 3.14).  
Similarly to landslide risk assessment outlined by AGS (2000); Fell et al. (2005) (Chapter 
One) post-earthquake risk assessment for seismically induced slope failures is composed of 
hazard analysis and consequence analysis. Post-earthquake risk assessment is differentiated 
from the landslide risk assessment processes outlined by AGS (2000); Fell et al. (2005) by 
replacement of frequency analysis with the requirement for an estimation of the likelihood of 
further failure and the failure timeframe. Both estimations are informed through the 
characterisation of slope failures based on rapid observations made onsite. Post-earthquake 
consequence analysis encompasses rapid estimation of the exposure of residents to further 
slope failure and thus analysing the life safety impact.  
Provide detail of: 
 Location information 
 Description of affected area 
 Type of failure mechanism 
Classify impact from slope failure (i.e. 
inundation of debris) and estimate the scale 
of impact (i.e. degree of loss of life) using 
an importance rating (1 to 100) 
Provide a description of 
initiation/progression of mechanism and 
estimate an Initiation rating (Unlikely to fail 
further = 1; to failure imminent = 5) 
Hazard Exposure Score 
Importance Rating x Initiation Rating 
Treatment Plan 
Figure 3.13: Format for slope assessment outlined by standard reporting format that was developed one week after the  
22nd February 2011 earthquake 
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Due to the implications of imminent risk on the life safety of residents there was little time 
for detailed assessment to calculate the vulnerability of elements at risk as part of the 
consequence analysis. In the absence of this, an approximation of the population exposed to 
the hazard in question was made and qualitative numerical measures were used to generate a 
hazard exposure score to quantify the level of risk at the site (Appendix G). In the case of 
rapid emergency risk assessment of earthquake-induced slope failures, the process of 
generating a hazard exposure scope is useful in maintaining consistency within slope 
assessments and follows typical risk management procedures. 
It is unclear to what extent the slope assessment reporting format was implemented 
throughout the group and issues arose when geotechnical professionals collected varying 
levels of detail which made data collation difficult. The collection of null data was important 
Risk Management 
Risk Assessment 
Risk Analysis 
Scope 
Assess the risk of landsliding impacting the life safety of life lines and residents 
Collect data to inform an assessment of long term risk 
Hazard Analysis Consequence Analysis 
Failure dynamics 
Likelihood of failure 
Timeframe of failure 
Landslide Characterisation 
Type, failure features (cracking, 
debris, compression features) 
Characterisation of 
Consequences 
Size of affected area 
Identify affected elements 
Consequence of failure 
Injury 
Death 
Risk Estimation 
Hazard exposure rating 
Risk Assessment 
Does the slope present imminent 
risk from further failure? 
Risk Treatment 
Evacuation 
Treatment at Source 
Protection Structures 
Figure 3.14: Interpretation of the process for post-earthquake risk assessment of earthquake-induced landsliding 
implemented during the response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, approximately one week post-earthquake 
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so that geotechnical professionals were not deployed multiple times to areas that had already 
been assessed and no hazard found. The assessment process outlined in the slope assessment 
reporting format was structured around the evaluation of the slope failure feature and how it 
impacts vulnerable elements, rather than how slope failures impacted a particular dwelling. 
While this process was ongoing, geotechnical professionals were also assessing the effect of 
slope failures on particular dwellings by responding to call outs from CDEM and USAR.  
From March 2011, field assessment of rockfall began to include evaluation of boulder 
stability to classify the associated risk level (Macfarlane and Yetton 2013). An assessment 
criteria was developed to include rock size and shape, evidence of recent movement and 
property or lifelines at risk to classify whether the unstable rocks were high, medium or low 
risk. Field stability classification for rocks and boulders based on the following criteria 
(Macfarlane and Yetton 2013): 
1. Individual rock or boulder is detached – either loose boulders or in outcrop where 
fresh cracking is present above/below individual rock or within rock mass. 
2. Ability to roll – examine rock shape. 
3. Would the release of boulder or rock result in threat to properties or lifelines? 
4. Is rock unstable at time of assessment (moves when pushed by hand). 
One to two months after the earthquake PHGG began to focus on collecting data to inform a 
detailed life safety risk model developed by GNS Science, which aimed to quantify the 
Annual Individual Fatality Risk in the Port Hills from cliff collapse and rockfall. Annual 
Individual Fatality Risk refers to the probability (likelihood) that a particular individual will 
be killed in any year at their place of residence as a result of rockfall or cliff collapse (Massey 
et al. 2012a; Massey et al. 2012b). Geotechnical professionals were primarily involved in the 
mapping of boulders and cracks to provide data for the hazard model that was beginning to be 
developed by GNS. The aim of the detailed life safety risk model was to formalise the initial 
assessments of risk to life safety to remove the element of expert opinion, and to include 
physical measurements which would reduce the uncertainty included in the emergency 
response slope assessments. 
3.4.2.3 Slope assessment after the State of National Emergency ceased 
Reassessment of risk to life safety continued throughout the response period in an effort to 
periodically re-evaluate the requirement for building safety evaluation notices on dwellings. 
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At the end of the state of national emergency (30
th
 April 2011) the building safety evaluation 
notices that had been assigned by the Civil Defence building safety evaluation teams were to 
be replaced by the section 124 (s124) notices under the Building Act, 2004 (Macfarlane and 
Yetton 2013). The method of assessment of S124 notices was primarily hazard 
characterisation which was less dependent on calculated risk and numerical values relating to 
the consequence of failure and the likelihood of failure. The S124 notice hazard analysis 
methodology enabled the interaction between hazard characteristics and environmental 
factors to assist decisions regarding safety around the slope failure and was more simplistic 
then the standard risk assessment format used during the state of national emergency.  
S124 notice assessment flow charts were developed for each failure mechanism to ensure that 
the decision making process was kept systematic and consistent to ensure that geotechnical 
professionals undertaking the assessments would arrive at a rational conclusion. The s124 
notice flow chart for boulder roll is attached in Appendix H. Assessments were undertaken by 
two or three geotechnical professionals, one of which was required to be a senior 
geotechnical professional. This flow chart system was informally accepted by the 
Christchurch City Council.  
After the 13
th
 June earthquakes, the Port Hills Geotechnical Group reassessed slopes within 
their sectors. Sectors located around the Sumner areas were affected the worst by the 
earthquake, and entire slopes within these sectors were required to be reassessed. S124 
notices that had been assigned to houses were checked, and in some cases further s124 
notices were assigned to houses that had previously been unaffected by the earthquakes.  
3.4.2.4 Protection of life safety 
Immediately after the 22
nd
 February earthquake the following techniques were used in the 
Port Hills for the protection of life safety: 
 Evacuation 
 Enforcement of Building Safety Evaluation Notices (building use restrictions) 
 Road closures  
 Road use restrictions 
One week after the earthquake emphasis was beginning to grow on the stabilisation of rock 
bluffs above roads and lifelines in particular to reduce the life safety risk posed to road users. 
Also implemented after 4
th
 September 2010 
earthquake 
79 
 
At this stage stabilisation work was also undertaken above undamaged houses to prevent 
further damage from rockfall. Consultancies involved in the geotechnical response partnered 
with local contractors to undertake mitigation and remedial works within each sector. 
Evacuations and enforcement of building safety evaluation notices were completed several 
weeks after the earthquake. In the days after the earthquake, it was unclear how temporal 
changes in the requirements and priorities of the geotechnical response would progress. 
Initially, geotechnical professionals expected most residents to be returned to their homes in 
the Port Hills months after the earthquake, however, over time it became apparent that the 
earthquake had affected the long-term stability of the slopes in the Port Hills. 
The approach to the protection of life safety in the Port Hills changed after the 13
th
 June 2011 
earthquake, when it was decided that treatment at source areas alone was no longer solely 
sufficient to decrease the risk to life safety from earthquake-induced slope failure. Slopes that 
had been classed as low or medium risk after the 22
nd
 February 2011 event had released 
material subsequent to the 13
th
 June earthquake, indicating the complexity in assessing the 
behaviour of the Port Hills considering the high peak ground accelerations produced by 
close-proximity faulting. Until the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake, geotechnical professionals 
expected that with slope stabilisation and remediation work most residents would eventually 
re-occupy their homes. After the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake, CCC shifted from aiming to 
make homes in the Port Hills re-inhabitable to primarily focusing on lifeline and 
infrastructure protection. Area-wide rockfall protection was considered in detail by the CCC, 
but due to the cost and extent of protection required this was deemed not feasible as a single 
solution in June 2012. During this time CCC and CERA decided that avoidance would be the 
preferred options for residential dwellings in the Port Hills. 
3.4.3 Public communication 
Public communication was identified as a crucial theme in the geotechnical response 
throughout the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Because of the life safety risk posed by 
slope failures it was imperative that the public was made aware of the situation in the Port 
Hills. After the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake public communication regarding clean up of 
rockfall in the Port Hills was maintained through publication of information in newsletters, 
and on the Christchurch City Council (CCC) website. After the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake the large extent of residential area affected by coseismic slope failure meant that 
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public demand for information was significant, however, it took some weeks to coordinate 
communication with residents appropriately. Table 3.15 summarises the progression of 
changes within public communication after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. 
Table 3.15: Changes in public communication during the response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
Timeframe Method of public communication 
Immediately 
post-earthquake 
 Individual Communication between geotechnical professionals, USAR and 
residents 
Second week 
post-earthquake 
 CCC and CDEM started to organise community meetings in the Port Hills 
 Community meetings are attended by representatives from the PHGG, 
USAR, CDEM and the mayor of Christchurch.  
 Representatives from PHGG explain to residents what impact the 
earthquake had on the Port Hills and what risks were associated with the 
slope failures. 
From second 
week post-
earthquake 
 Port Hills Geotechnical email address established to update residents 
 During community meetings CDEM science liaison gathered email 
addresses of residents in the Port Hills 
 Management of the email address was initially overseen by CDEM Science 
liaison, and later CCC. Involvement of CCC took some time as there was 
an exhaustive need for communication within the response which 
overloaded their communication resources. 
  Fact sheets were developed by CDEM Science liaison from approximately 
one week post-earthquake to provide information regarding tsunami risk, 
earthquake risk, road closures, and the building safety evaluation process. 
 Fact sheets were uploaded to the Christchurch Earthquake Response Centre 
website and were distributed by hand to resource centres in suburbs 
throughout Christchurch. 
  From days after the earthquake residents contacted the CCC and CDEM 
Call Centres to seek information 
 Information gathered from call centre regarding slope failure locations 
became influential in the deployment of geotechnical professionals 
 
Although the demand for information from residents was high, residents were also a useful 
source of information concerning the location of slope failures within neighbourhoods. This 
influenced the deployment of geotechnical professionals. Public communication became a 
large constituent of the response from the PHGG, and over time the methods for public 
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communication increased from individual communication to community meetings. 
Approximately one week after the earthquake it started to become apparent that the residents 
were finding it difficult to discern when a Building Safety Evaluation notice had been placed 
on a house for structural reasons or geotechnical reasons as the existing system did not 
accommodate this distinction. Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Science 
liaison personnel from the emergency response centre noticed that there was a lack of 
detailed information regarding which houses had been deemed unsafe due to geotechnical 
reasons. This made it difficult to inform residents whether their houses were structurally 
unsafe or exposed to risk posed from earthquake-induced slope failures.  
For a period of time after the implementation of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 
(2011) community meetings in the Port Hills were deferred until further notice while strategic 
level organisations defined their roles and focussed on co-ordinating systems to facilitate 
consistency in public communication. Consequently it became difficult at times for residents 
to obtain the information. 
3.4.4 Accessibility and Liability 
Accessibility and liability were two elements of the response which were indentified 
intermittently throughout the interviews regarding the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake. These themes were less significant as they had a minor impact on 
the progression of the response. Examples of when accessibility and liability influenced the 
geotechnical response include: 
Accessibility  
 Immediately after the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, several geotechnical 
professionals were unable to access areas of the Port Hills due to damage to 
infrastructure and slope failure debris blocking roads. In the immediate aftermath of 
the earthquake this made the execution of slope assessments difficult in some areas 
until debris could be removed.  
 Immediately after the 22nd February 2011 earthquake, the local CDEM Emergency 
operations Centre (EoC), which was located at the Christchurch Art Gallery in the 
Central Business District, was easily accessible as the cordon in the central city was 
still forming. Geotechnical professionals could easily access the response centre 
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without requiring formalised access documentation. Days after the earthquake, as 
management of the cordon improved, geotechnical professionals were unable to gain 
access to the response centre. Consequently meetings for the geotechnical response 
group were relocated from the CDEM response centre to Opus International 
Consultants. 
Liability 
 Throughout the majority of the response, liability was addressed through contractual 
agreements between geotechnical professionals and CCC. Liability became a concern 
for some geotechnical professionals after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake that did 
not have the required insurance or contractual arrangement to limit their legal 
obligations if their involvement in the geotechnical response resulted in further loss. 
Once this issue was identified, protection from liability was provided to geotechnical 
professionals who did not have pre-existing liability cover. 
3.5 Summary 
The response to earthquake-induced slope failure in the Port Hills during the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence was an evolutionary process that has been the product of changing 
response priorities and requirements, and the lack of pre-existing systems to inform a 
geotechnical response. The objectives, themes and activities of the geotechnical response 
were adapted and modified with the occurrence of major earthquakes such as the 4
th
 
September 2010, 22
nd
 February and 13
th
 June 2011 earthquakes.  
Ground motions and slope failure experienced in the Port Hills after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake was unprecedented and did not conform to historical evidence of slope failure in 
the Port Hills, or the seismic hazard model for Christchurch. Ground motions experienced in 
the Port Hills during the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake significantly exceeded the New 
Zealand standard 500-year seismic design spectra. Consequently, planning and preparation 
for response to widespread slope failure was insubstantial and it took several weeks after the 
22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake for a coordinated geotechnical response to develop.  
Development in response coordination became important in the aftermath of the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake increase efficiency of slope assessment and enforcement of 
evacuations during the emergency response. Imminent risk from slope failures was addressed 
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through evacuations, building use restrictions and road use restrictions. Protection of life 
safety, lifelines and the continuation of public communication remained important in the 
response from days to years after the 22
nd
 February and 13
th
 June 2011 earthquakes.  
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Chapter Four: Historical and international earthquake case 
studies 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a review of literature detailing post-earthquake 
response to coseismic slope failure during the 2008 Wenchuan, China, earthquake; 1999 
Northridge, California, earthquake; and 1994 Chi-Chi, Taiwan, earthquake. Review of 
historical, international earthquakes has provided insight into response techniques, priorities, 
and requirements that have previously been implemented during management of life safety 
risk associated with earthquake-induced slope failure. Response techniques from historical 
earthquakes can be used to develop a framework for geotechnical response to landslides 
induced by earthquakes, which can inform comparison with the geotechnical response to the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Lessons learnt from past events have been used to develop 
methods for future response to earthquake-induced landslides, and are presented in 
subsequent chapters. 
4.2 The 1994 Northridge, California Earthquake 
On the 17
th
 January 1994 a Mw 6.7 earthquake struck California. The earthquake hypocentre 
was located 18km beneath Northridge city on a blind thrust fault in the San Fernando Valley 
(Parise and Jibson 2000). The area in which the earthquake struck is regarded as one of the 
most prepared and best engineered metropolitan areas in the United States (Norton et al. 
1994). Despite this, the earthquake caused the loss of 57 lives, and injured a further 9,000 
people (USGS 1996). The earthquake destroyed and damaged infrastructure such as 
buildings, main transportation routes, and gas lines. After rapid building inspection at least 
1,600 buildings were deemed unsafe with a further 7,300 buildings restricted to limited entry. 
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4.2.1 Overview of earthquake-induced landslides  
Coseismic landsliding was widespread throughout the San Fernando Valley. At the northwest 
end of the valley ground failure was the principal cause of destruction (Parise and Jibson 
2000). In general, damage from landslides induced by the 1994 Northridge earthquake was 
only described as moderate because the areas of greatest landslide activity were sparsely 
populated (Harp and Jibson 1996). Figure 4.1 shows the extent of landsliding that occurred 
relative to the earthquake epicentre.  
 
Coseismic landsliding included the following types (Parise and Jibson 1997): 
 Highly disrupted shallow falls and slides in rock and debris which were the most 
common type of landslide. 
 Coherent slumps and block slides which were less numerous compared to highly 
disrupted shallow falls and slides. 
Some residential dwellings in central and eastern Santa Monica were moderately to severely 
damaged from reactivated deep block slides. Rockfall damaged and destroyed some non 
residential buildings in the Santa Susana Mountains. Fill failures and shallow, disrupted 
slides were also responsible for damaging buildings (Harp and Jibson 1996). Many pipelines 
Figure 4.1: Location of 1994 Northridge earthquake, California and the extent of earthquake-
induced landslides (Harp and Jibson 1996). 
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and lifelines were damaged by rockfalls, slumps and block slides which either inundated 
services with debris, or undermined services (Harp and Jibson 1996). 
4.2.2 Geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides 
The progress of response to earthquake-induced landslides has been detailed in Table 4.1. 
Existing response capabilities within the United State Geological Survey (USGS) ensured 
that geotechnical experts were rapidly deployed hours after the earthquake to address the 
geotechnical hazards associated with the earthquake (USGS 1996). Procedures were in place 
for geotechnical assessment in relation to building safety evaluation; these were outlined by 
the guidelines ATC-20 Procedures for Post-Earthquake Building Safety Evaluation that had 
been developed prior to the Northridge earthquake (see Appendix I). 
Although the ATC-20 guidelines primarily detail procedures for structural assessment of 
earthquake-damaged buildings, emphasis is also placed on the inspection of geotechnical 
hazards that may compromise the structural capability of a dwelling or present a life safety 
risk. Response to geotechnical hazards detailed in ATC-20 includes: 
 Assessment of surface fault rupture with respect to: 
o Damage to buildings from ground displacement 
 Assessment of slope failures with respect to: 
o Foundation damage or loss of foundation support 
o Continuing slope movement under static conditions 
o Buildings in active slope failure zone 
o Building in path of falling debris or rock 
o Retaining wall leaning outward of 5° or more to vertical 
 Assessment of ‘Other’ differential ground movements with respect to: 
o Ground fissures and scarps > 4 inches wide near buildings 
o Buildings damaged by ground displacement (vertical or horizontal) 
 Assessment of earth dam or reservoir movement with respect to: 
o Cracks, increased seepage, or embankment failure of earth dams 
o Overtopping of dam by wave 
Appendix I presents section 11 of the ATC-20 guidelines which detail the procedures for 
post-earthquake inspection of geotechnical hazards and recommended actions for inspection 
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of the hazards listed above. The guidelines highlight the requirement for expert judgement 
during assessment, and inform on the appropriate professionals qualifications and experience 
required for assessors involved in the geotechnical response. The utilisation ATC-20 
guidelines after the 1994 Northridge earthquake suggests that there was no requirement for a 
response methodology to be developed post-earthquake. Furthermore, use of the ATC-20 
guidelines ensured that consistency within management of slope failures could be maintained 
through implementation of recommended actions provided. 
Table 4.1: Response to earthquake-induced landsliding after the 1994 Northridge earthquake 
Time after 
earthquake 
Response to Landslides 
Hours  Aerial photography was undertaken by the United State Air force hours after 
the earthquake. These photographs were to a scale of approximately 1:60,000 
and were used by scientists to create a post-earthquake landslide inventory 
(Harp and Jibson 1995). Although some of the smaller landslides were not able 
to be captured in the imagery, the photographs enabled identification of areas 
affected by larger landslides (Harp and Jibson 1995). 
 Scientists from USGS deployed to investigate the geological and engineering 
effects of the earthquake (USGS 1996) 
Days to 
weeks 
 Field investigations included general site inspections and also geophysical and 
geological investigations (USGS 1996).  
 Scientists drove out from the epicentral area of the earthquake until only small 
failures of minor rock or soil mass had been obviously dislodged. Up to 90% 
of the area was mapped for landslides which enabled a landslide inventory to 
be developed (Harp and Jibson 1995). 
 Debris clearing commenced, removal of rock from some roadways took 
several months (Harp and Jibson 1995). 
 Seismic instruments were deployed by a team of experts from universities, 
private companies and USGS. Approximately 80 Instruments were installed 
and relocated as needed to measure seismicity ground deformation (USGS 
1996). Information was used to produce GIS-based maps which showed areas 
of potential ground failure, shaking levels and local site amplification.  
 Data availability was a priority in the aftermath so that the public could be kept 
informed of hazards, and consequently collected data was distributed using the 
internet, fact sheets and magazines (USGS 1996).  
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Time after 
earthquake 
Response to Landslides 
Weeks to 
Months 
 The landslide inventory has become a tool for creating landslide susceptibly 
maps and seismic hazard maps for the area (Jibson et al. 2000). Several forms 
of susceptibility maps have been developed since the earthquake. Geological 
data for the maps is typically sourced from county geologists, private 
consulting firms and the California Division of Mines and Geology (USGS 
1996; Jibson et al. 2000). The intention of these maps is to provide emergency 
planners, infrastructure owners, and the public with an overview of where 
landslides are more likely to occur (Jibson et al. 2000) 
 GPS measurements of regional ground deformation were collected weeks after 
the earthquake (Parise and Jibson 2000). 
Months to 
Years 
 Analysis was undertaken to determine the susceptibility of geological units to 
landsliding. This was possible after the Northridge earthquake because of 
existing geological mapping, and because of the thorough mapping of 
landslides location and geometry in the area. The analysis assigns each 
geological unit with a landsliding susceptibility rating (Parise and Jibson 
2000). 
 Seismic hazard assessments for the area were updated to include new faults 
recognised as a result of the earthquake, and update estimated levels of ground 
shaking for future events. Updating seismic hazard maps primarily affected 
household or property insurance rates, recommended building design standards 
and refined allocation of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
assistance funding (USGS 1996). 
 In 2011, the Californian Geological Survey produced a map showing the 
susceptibility of deep-seated landslides in California. This map considers 
estimates of the level of rock mass strength and slope steepness to generate the 
susceptibility to deep-seated landslides (Wills et al. 2011). Research has also 
been undertaken to quantify the susceptibility of geologic units in the Los 
Angeles area based on the characteristics of the landslides induced by the 
Northridge earthquake (Parise and Jibson 2000). 
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4.2.3 Priorities during the geotechnical response  
The timeline of response activities in Table 4.1 provides insight into the progression of 
priorities throughout the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Northridge earthquake the initial priorities regarding the 
management of earthquake-induced slope failure included the following: 
 Execution of an impact assessment to identify the extent of slope failure, 
 Improvement of accessibility where infrastructure has been impacted by slope 
instabilities, 
 Protection of life safety through the implementation of building safety evaluation 
under the ATC-20 guidelines (Applied Technology Council 1995). 
From days after the earthquake, scientists were involved in data collection to inform the 
analysis of landslide susceptibility and the review of landslide hazard maps months post-
earthquake. It is likely that the occurrence of slope instabilities in less populated areas 
resulted in less requirement for protection of life safety from earthquake-induced slope 
failure. Reviewed literature in Table 4.1 suggests that transition of the response priority to 
assessment of long term risk associated with earthquake-induced landslide hazards took place 
weeks after the earthquake. Months after the earthquake the primary focus in the geotechnical 
response to Northridge was on improving scientific understanding of landslide hazard and 
risk subsequent to analysis of slopes affected by the earthquake.  
4.2.4 Challenges within the geotechnical response 
The impact of earthquake-induced landslides in the 1994 Northridge earthquake affected the 
response. Challenges in the geotechnical response were primarily related to accessibility. 
Earthquake-induced landsliding caused disruption to roadways which hindered relief efforts 
and exacerbated transportation problems. In some cases rockfall and rock slides closed 
alternate access routes, and it was several days before routes were cleared of debris (Harp and 
Jibson 1996). 
California was subject to a number of disasters and emergencies prior to the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake, and consequently emphasis had been placed on preparedness and response 
planning prior to the earthquake occurring (Norton et al. 1994). Overall, the response to the 
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1994 Northridge experienced few coordination concerns; one primary disruption to the 
response was temporary loss of computer systems in the City Police Department 
communication centre, and the malfunction of generators immediately post-earthquake 
(Norton et al. 1994).  
Engineering response to building safety evaluation in both structural and geotechnical 
assessments was strained in the assessment and management of damage to wood-frame 
dwellings. Inconsistent structural assessments and poor communication between engineers 
and clients was the product of a shortage of experienced engineers, and a lack of guidelines to 
inform building assessment, investigation and repair of buildings (Osteraas et al. 2000). This 
identified the need for further review of the execution of building safety evaluation post-
earthquake, despite the existence of guidelines. 
4.3 The 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan Earthquake 
On the 21
st
 September 1999 a MW 7.6 earthquake struck the central region of Taiwan near the 
town Chi-Chi (Figure 4.2). Rupture of the Chelungpu fault caused a surface rupture that 
extended for 105km with the greatest recorded vertical displacement of 11m (Loh and Tsay 
2001). The fault plane is nearly north-south trending and dips approximately 30° east (Shin 
and Teng 2001).  
The extensive surface rupture and large magnitude of the earthquake caused widespread 
damage in the western region of Taiwan which was previously considered less seismically 
active than the eastern region (Dong et al. 2000; Shin and Teng 2001). Approximately 2,470 
lives were lost during the earthquake, and a further 11,305 were injured, and at least 100,000 
structures were destroyed (Goltz et al. 2001; Shin and Teng 2001; Lin and Tung 2004). 
Approximately 10,000 landslides were induced by the earthquake, most of which occurred on 
the east side of the Chelungpu Fault (Sitar et al. 2001). 
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4.3.1 Overview of earthquake-induced landslides 
Earthquake-induced landslides caused the greatest loss to agriculture and tourism sectors in 
Taiwan, however, roads and infrastructure were also significantly damaged (Goltz et al. 
2001). Shallow failures caused the majority of landslide-related damage, and typically 
threatened mountain roads and structures located at the base of slopes (Sitar et al. 2001).  
Coseismic landsliding included the following types (Hung 2000; Sitar et al. 2001): 
 
 Shallow slides on steep slopes in stiff soils and jointed rock;  
 Rockfall; 
 Deep seated failures;  
Figure 4.2: Location of 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake (Shin and Teng 
2001) 
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 Very large catastrophic landslides, which appear to refer to slope failures with 
uncategorised failure mechanisms. 
Following the Chi-Chi earthquake one of the main geotechnical concerns was the 
development of landslide dams from debris blocking stream flow, and increased 
susceptibility of further slope failure post-earthquake (Hung 2000). The risk from landslide 
dams can often be significant because of the susceptibility of the debris embankments to 
over-topping from high rainfalls. Embankment materials can also become mobilised 
following rainfall, causing instability issues in the dam.  
4.3.2 General emergency response 
Hours after the Chi-Chi earthquake struck, government officials assembled at the National 
Fire Headquarters to commence the initiation of the response and communicate with local 
agencies. On the 25
th
 September, the National Government declared a six month State of 
Emergency for Taiwan to facilitate the emergency response and recovery in the nation (Goltz 
et al. 2001). Search and rescue commenced immediately after the event. Initially this was 
undertaken by residents and communities, however hours after the event organised search 
and rescue teams and trained volunteers responded. The response was enlarged by the 
mobilisation of armed forces to assist with the search and rescue and body recovery, and 
within 24 hours after the main earthquake international search and rescue teams were 
deployed to areas within Taiwan (Goltz et al. 2001). 
Building safety evaluations were undertaken using a similar system to the Californian 
Applied Technology Council “ATC-20 Procedures for Post-Earthquake Safety Evaluation of 
Buildings”, where buildings were assigned entry restrictions according to the degree of 
damage to the structure (Goltz et al. 2001). Later in the response, building damage data was 
fed to the data management centre and compared with fault rupture location to provide 
analysis of earthquake impact (Loh and Tsay 2001). 
4.3.3 Geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides 
The organisation of the geotechnical response to the Chi-Chi earthquake was derived from 
hazard mitigation strategies that have been developed in Taiwan over the past 30 years. In 
93 
 
1982 the National Science Council of Taiwan (NSC) launched a series of research programs 
to improve hazard mitigation, pre-disaster preparedness, and emergency response in Taiwan 
(Loh and Tsay 2001). Development in the research enabled response methodologies to be 
established which involved the following Taiwanese agencies: National Centre for Research 
on Earthquake Engineering (NCREE), the Office of the National Science and Technology 
Program for Hazards Mitigation (NAPHM) and NSC (Loh and Tsay 2001; Lin 2006). Days 
after the Chi-Chi earthquake reconnaissance teams were organised by the NSC, while 
NAPHM and NCREE provided technical support and data management. Figure 4.3 shows the 
framework for management of reconnaissance teams in response to the Chi-Chi earthquake. 
This framework presents a system for analysing the components of an earthquake event and 
outlines which organisations are responsible for aspects of the response. 
 
Before the earthquake struck, NAPHM had set up a GIS-based map for each county in 
Taiwan which allowed the timely integration of data collected during ground reconnaissance 
Figure 4.3: Framework for earthquake response (Loh and Tsay 2001) 
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to produce reports on the earthquake impact across Taiwan. Immediately after the earthquake 
GIS proved to be an asset in assisting emergency recovery and response teams making 
decisions (Loh and Tsay 2001). Spatial damage data analysis also helped identify areas worst 
hit by the earthquake and in most need of assistance (Loh and Tsay 2001; Lin 2006). Ground 
motion data integrated with the GPS coordinates of the fault location assisted the analysis of 
ground motion attenuation (Loh and Tsay 2001; Lin 2006). Table 4.2 details the response to 
earthquake-induced landslides after the Chi-Chi earthquake. 
Table 4.2: Response to earthquake-induced landslides after the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake 
Time after 
earthquake 
Response to Landslides 
Days to 
weeks 
 Aerial photographs and satellite images taken days after the earthquake were 
used by government agencies to locate landslides (Lin 2006). 
 NSC mobilised reconnaissance teams days after the earthquake event to 
assess damage and collect scientific data (Loh and Tsay 2001; Lin 2006). 
Teams were composed mainly of professors and graduate students from 
universities (Hung 2000). >1,200 scientists and engineers were required to 
conduct systematic field surveys to collect scientific data to analyse the effect 
of the earthquake (Loh and Tsay 2001). Each team developed an 
investigation format with the intention of incorporating the information into 
electronic databases (Loh and Tsay 2001). The NCREE provided technical 
support and the NAPHM provided information and assisted with data 
management (Loh and Tsay 2001). 
 Emergency spillways were constructed in landslide dams to prevent 
overtopping. Analysis of each landslide dam’s inundation potential was 
conducted immediately (Hung 2000). Analysis of upstream rainfall run off 
was incorporated in the analysis which allowed for a quantification of the 
risk that the dam created for people inhabiting areas downstream of the dam 
(Loh and Tsay 2001). 
 The fault rupture was mapped using GPS; this information was digitised into 
the GIS database to assist in earthquake analysis (Loh and Tsay 2001). 
 Once data had been collected it was uploaded to the Chi-Chi Earthquake 
Database Analysis and Management System (CEDAMS) GIS database for 
analysis. Information became accessible to the public, research institutes and 
investigation teams undertaking reconnaissance work (Loh and Tsay 2001; 
Khazai and Sitar 2004; Lin and Tung 2004). 
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Time after 
earthquake 
Response to Landslides 
Weeks to 
Months 
 Landslide assessment took place in two phases, in Phase One landslide 
locations were identified using satellite and aerial imaging of the area. Initial 
field investigations took place to confirm site locations (Hung 2000). 
 The initial assessment led to Phase Two in January 2000, where larger 
landslides were identified from the aerial imaging, subsequent investigations 
of landslides were undertaken to appreciate the mechanics of the site, slope 
stability and risk of failure. Further investigation was funded by NCREE and 
NAPHM (Hung 2000). 
Months to 
Years 
 In the years following the Chi-Chi earthquake a preliminary GIS-based 
analysis of landslide susceptibility was undertaken using the information 
collected by the reconnaissance teams. The aim of the analysis was to build a 
predictive model for landslide occurrence given a similar future earthquake 
in the same area (Lin and Tung 2004). 
 As a result of the earthquake, Taiwan re-evaluated the seismic design code 
for buildings immediately after the event. A seismic hazard analysis was also 
undertaken to appreciate the Chelungpu fault which previously was 
considered one of the least active faults in Taiwan. The results of the Seismic 
Hazard Analysis were used to revise the seismic zoning of Taiwan (Loh and 
Tsay 2001). Initially before the earthquake Taiwan was divided into four 
seismic zones based on the expected peak ground acceleration that would be 
experienced from a 1 in 475 year seismic event. Timely completion of 
updates for the seismic hazard of Taiwan was important for recovery and 
reconstruction (Loh and Tsay 2001). 
4.3.4 Priorities within geotechnical response  
Activities during the geotechnical response to the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan, earthquake provide 
insight into the priorities of the response. Similarly to the Northridge earthquake, the 
response to the Chi-Chi earthquake commenced with focus on conducting an initial impact 
assessment. Landslide dams were identified early in the response as high risk because of the 
consequences of further loss of life with dam-break. The emphasis on management of high 
risk coseismic hazards suggests that immediately after the earthquake one of the primary 
response priorities was the protection of life safety and quantification of the extent of impact 
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post-earthquake. Throughout the geotechnical response to the Chi-Chi earthquake, emphasis 
was placed on timely data management. As such, early in the response Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) databases became a predominant tool for data management and 
analysis to inform emergency response. 
Similarly to the Northridge and Wenchuan earthquakes, over time (approximately months 
post-earthquake) detailed investigation of earthquake-induced landslides took place to inform 
analysis of landslide susceptibility in the earthquake affected area. Furthermore, revision of 
the seismic design code suggests that the response to the Chi-Chi earthquake transitioned to 
assessment of long term seismic and landslide hazards for reconstruction.  
4.3.5 Challenges within the geotechnical response 
The primary disruption related to response to earthquake-induced landsliding was the 
continuing impact of weakened slopes on infrastructure such as highways. Subsequent 
aftershocks and heavy rainfalls mobilised further down slope movement of material and 
resulted in further damage, loss of life and disruption to reconstruction (Hung 2000). In the 
immediate response (days after the earthquake) temporary roads were constructed to gain 
access to remote mountain regions which has been isolated by damage to roads and highways 
from earthquake-induced landslides (Dong et al. 2000). 
The pre-earthquake research conducted to inform emergency response and pre-disaster 
preparedness guided the coordination of the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced 
landslides after the Chi-Chi earthquake (Loh and Tsay 2001). Reviewed literature has implied 
that further emergency response planning and preparation could be initiated to improve the 
future earthquake response, however, generally few deficiencies in emergency response 
coordination have been discussed. The use of GIS was considered a successful and important 
component of emergency management after the Chi-Chi because of the contribution that 
analysis and management of data through GIS provided to deployment and coordination of 
emergency relief to areas extensively impacted by the earthquake (Loh and Tsay 2001). 
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4.4 The 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake, Sichuan Province, China 
On the 12
th
 of May 2008 a Mw 7.9 earthquake occurred in the southern province of Sichuan, 
China (Huang and Fan 2013). The major shock was reported to have occurred on the 
Beichuan-Yingxiu fault, part of the Longmenshan fault zone (Cui et al. 2011). Aftershocks 
rapidly extended northeast-southeast along the Longmenshan fault located near the town of 
Wenchuan (Figure 4.4). The earthquake occurred in a densely populated mountainous region 
that has a history of frequent large magnitude earthquakes (Zifa 2008).  
 
At least 69,000 people died as a result of the earthquake and secondary earthquake-induced 
hazards (Brown et al. 2012). The earthquake also caused extensive damage to structures, 
infrastructure and dwellings. Typical buildings in the area had very low seismic resistance 
which resulted in extensive building collapse and damage (Zifa 2008). Many buildings were 
also damaged by slope failures induced by the earthquake, which contributed to the large 
number of deaths and injuries from the earthquake (Zifa 2008). 
Figure 4.4: Location of the Wenchuan Earthquake and aftershocks (Cui et al. 2011) 
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4.4.1 Overview of earthquake-induced landslides 
Slope failure initiated by the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake caused damage to infrastructure, 
such as telecommunications, railways, bridges and electricity networks (Jian and Li 2011). 
Several major landslide dams formed where landslide debris blocked streams and rivers (Cui 
et al. 2009). Not only did the landslide dams flood dwellings and infrastructure upstream, the 
dams created a life-safety issue for many towns downstream (Cui et al. 2009). 
Coseismic landsliding included the following types (Jian and Li 2011): 
 Rockfall,  
 Debris flow,  
 Cliff collapse,  
 Landslide, which appears to refer to large deep seated mass movements which 
does not directly conform to the definition of landslide in accordance with Cruden 
and Varnes (1996). 
Many of the slope failure hazards occurred in historically active slopes or in areas where the 
rock mass was easily weakened (Jian and Li 2011). Ground motion and topographic 
amplification from the main earthquake and subsequent aftershocks created new fractures and 
joints which weakened the rock mass on many mountain slopes and peaks. This weakened 
the rock mass and increased the frequency of rockfall (Jian and Li 2011). Loosened slope 
materials and weakened rock masses reduced the stability of slopes and increased the 
susceptibility of further landsliding, particularly debris flows, in the area (Huang 2011).  
4.4.2 General earthquake response and recovery 
In the initial phases of the response, search and rescue was undertaken primarily by local 
community and neighbourhood groups (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2008). 
Within hours after the earthquake the China International Search and Rescue team and 
approximately 130, 000 soldiers from the People’s Liberation Army were rapidly mobilised 
for search and rescue purposes and to restore primary access routes between towns 
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2008; Zifa 2008). Six response teams from the 
Institute of Engineering Mechanics and the China Earthquake Administration were also 
deployed days after the earthquake to assist with search and rescue, loss estimation, damage 
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surveys, and structural safety evaluations (Zifa 2008). As the search and rescue phase 
progressed, distributing aid and providing the basic needs such as water, food, and housing to 
those affected by the earthquake became a more predominant activity in the response (Zifa 
2008). 
Several weeks after the earthquake, the response focus shifted from search and rescue to 
relief and reconstruction (Zifa 2008). China’s State Council established an earthquake rescue 
and relief headquarters which developed strategic level goals every three months and 
focussed on recovery during the three years following the earthquake (Earthquake 
Engineering Research Institute 2008). Goals included the development of temporary housing, 
damage assessment, reconstruction planning, finance, and post-earthquake response 
management and implementation (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2008). 
In June 2008 the Wenchuan Earthquake disaster Recovery and Reconstruction Act was 
passed by the State council to establish a multi-government management strategy. The new 
legislation enabled a post-earthquake assessment to commence to quantify the extent of 
damage and impact of the earthquake, including a thorough investigation of the impact of 
slope failures (Brown et al. 2012). In September 2008 the Chinese State Council issued a plan 
for urban development and reconstruction for 51 worst affected counties in Sichuan, Gansu 
and Shaanxi provinces (Brown et al. 2012).  
The extensive damage and destruction of buildings also resulted in the need for 
reconsideration of the seismic design of buildings, particularly schools and hospitals (Zifa 
2008). Ground motions experienced in the main earthquake were larger than design values 
suggested by the 2001 Chinese Seismic Code Zonation. This established the need for revision 
of this guideline to reduce risk from future earthquakes in the light of the rebuild process 
(Free et al. 2008; Zifa 2008).  
4.4.3 Geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides 
The response to coseismic landslides and landslide dams was an evolutionary process where 
the degree of detail in the analysis increased over time. Table 4.3 details the response 
activities which took place hours, days, weeks and months after the earthquake. Response to 
landslide dams was prioritised in the aftermath of the earthquake because dam break could 
cause further loss of life and inundation of dwellings downstream or cause inundation 
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upstream of the dam if water level was to rise. One of the landslide dams that formed from 
the earthquake threatened Mianyang city, which had a population of 1.3 million at the time of 
the earthquake. The consequences of a potential dam break were significant, and as such, 
timely and affective emergency treatment of landslide dams was required to manage the risk 
of dam break (Zifa 2008). Engineering geology assessments of coseismic slope failure 
became crucial during proposals for relocation of towns impacted by secondary hazards such 
as rockfall and debris flow (Huang et al. 2009). 
Table 4.3: Response to coseismic landslides and landslide dams in the aftermath of the 2008 Wenchuan, China earthquake 
Time Post 
Earthquake 
Response to earthquake-induced slope failures 
Hours  Rescue work and disaster relief was focussed on Wenchuan city until satellite  
imagery was obtained to conduct an impact assessment (Huang 2011).  
Days to 
weeks 
 Aerial Photography of area affected commenced three days post-earthquake 
(Tang et al. 2009; Huang 2011). 
 Field investigations of earthquake-induced landslides commenced “immediately” 
to inform regional emergency assessment of landslide susceptibility to inform 
placement of refugees and future reconstruction (Tang et al. 2009). 
 Remote sensing and aerial imaging was used to give an initial assessment of the 
amount of water retained in landslide dams and the size of the landslide dams, as 
some were inaccessible in the early stages after the earthquake due to slope 
failures compromising access routes (Cui et al. 2009). 
 Statistical methods were used to quantify the associated risk threshold for each 
dam site based on the dam height, structure and lake capacity (Cui et al. 2009). 
Assessment of dam sites was critical as the likelihood of a potential breech 
needed to be quantified to gain an understanding of the risk to towns downstream 
(Cui et al. 2009).  
 Monitoring of landslide dams commenced after seven days; by 25th May 2008, 
12 of the 33 ‘high risk’ dams had failed due to overtopping (Cui et al. 2009). 
 Emergency treatment was undertaken e.g. channels cut in the embankment to 
mitigate potential dam breech (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2008; 
Chen et al. 2010). 
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Time Post 
Earthquake 
Response to earthquake-induced slope failures 
Weeks to 
Months 
 Engineering geological and geomorphological assessments were undertaken in 
severely damaged counties (Huang et al. 2009). Assessments aimed to examine 
the requirement for relocation of towns where existing sites were impractical for 
reconstruction (Huang et al. 2009). 
 Characteristics such as faulting, folding, rock mass condition and topography 
were considered in the site selection process. In addition to this the social and 
economic aspects of the site needed to be considered (Huang et al. 2009). 
 Long term slope monitoring equipment was installed at several landslide sites to 
gain information about the slope movements and assess the slope response to 
ongoing aftershocks (Wang et al. 2012). 
Months to 
Years 
 Susceptibility mapping was undertaken after a request from the Chinese 
government (Tang et al. 2009). 
 The development of susceptibility maps involved using 20m x 20m digital 
elevation models (DEM) and aerial photography taken days after the earthquake. 
Field investigations were undertaken where landslides were most densely 
populated which allowed the assessment of failure mechanisms and instability 
factors. With this information, areas which were highly susceptible to land 
sliding could be identified. For the Wenchuan earthquake, landslide susceptibility 
was derived from topography, tectonics, lithology and stream proximity (Tang et 
al. 2009).  
 
4.4.4 Priorities during geotechnical response 
The timeline of activities in Table 4.3 provides insight into a progression of priorities that 
occurred during the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure. Early in the 
response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the geotechnical response was focussed on 
immediate relief, protection of life safety from imminent risk, and conducting an impact 
assessment. Emergency management (treatment and monitoring) of landslide dams became 
imperative in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake (days to weeks post-earthquake) 
because of the scale of potential impact to the life safety of resident downstream in the event 
of a dam-break. Emphasis on the protection of life safety can also be seen in the emergency 
investigations of landslides to inform the placement of refugees. 
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Weeks to months after the earthquake, the focus of the response began to encompass detailed 
assessment of slope stability and development of susceptibility maps to inform the relocation 
of towns (Huang et al. 2009). As such, reviewed literature suggests that the priority of the 
geotechnical response shifted from management of imminent risk in the days to weeks after 
the response, to the management and assessment of life safety risk from long term exposure 
to slope instabilities. In some cases the increased susceptibility of slopes to fail post-
earthquake caused further loss of life and damage to infrastructure (Free et al. 2008; Huang 
2011; Cui et al. 2011). This was a continuing challenge in the management of slope failures, 
which in some cases led to hazard avoidance. An example of this is the Beichuan county 
town which was damaged by rockfall during the earthquake, over one year later further 
damage and loss of life occurred from a debris flow which buried parts of the town (Huang 
2011). The relocation of the population inhabiting Beichuan town emphasised the 
applicability of hazard avoidance where implementation of engineering protection or 
mitigation is insufficient in protection of life safety. 
4.4.5 Challenges within geotechnical response 
During the response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake there were a series of challenges that 
hindered the timely execution of the response. Challenges which occurred during the 
response included the following: 
 Accessibility: Many towns became isolated due to slope failures blocking access routes 
and interrupting transportation and communication, this hindered the search and rescue 
efforts and contributed to a large number of deaths and injuries from the earthquake (Zifa 
2008; Shi et al. 2009; Huang 2011). The extensive blockage of roads and access routes 
hindered the relocation of people as it became difficult to transit to other areas (Zifa 
2008). 
 Continuing slope instability: The increased susceptibility of slope failures after the 
earthquake created challenges for post-earthquake response and reconstruction as 
materials became easily loosened by rainfall which caused further loss of life, damage to 
infrastructure and created access problems throughout the region (Free et al. 2008; Huang 
2011; Cui et al. 2011).  
 Response coordination: The scale of the event and the extent of area impacted by the 
earthquake hindered coordination of the response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake (Shi 
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et al. 2009; Huang 2011). Communication disruption in Chengdu (the largest city in the 
area affected) during the first 24 hours after the earthquake delayed the execution of 
immediate response tasks such as impact assessment and disaster relief (Shi et al. 2009; 
Huang 2011). Although government departments in China were equipped with 
emergency response plans, the extent of disruption to infrastructure severely 
compromised the coordination between government agencies, which hindered the 
coordination of relief work and management of secondary hazards such as landslide dams 
(Earthquake Engineering Research Institute 2008; Huang 2011). The challenges 
identified in the coordination of the response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake 
emphasise the importance of establishing pragmatic emergency response plans which 
allow for the impacts of an earthquake. 
4.5 Comparison between international case studies 
Comparison between the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi, and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes 
has enabled significant requirements of post-earthquake response to earthquake-induced 
landslides to be identified. Although the management of slope failures after each earthquake 
varied, underlying similarities within the response structures have emphasised the value of 
the following: 
 Pre-earthquake planning 
For both the Northridge and Chi-Chi earthquakes, pre-planning and preparation of 
post-earthquake response to geotechnical hazards enabled rapid deployment of 
geotechnical professionals and scientists to implement assessment of coseismic 
landslides and management of risk to life safety. For the 1994 Northridge, California 
earthquake this was achieved through the development of the ATC-20 post-
earthquake building safety evaluation guidelines. The response to the 1999 Chi-Chi, 
Taiwan earthquake was improved through pre-earthquake research programs which 
developed pre-disaster preparedness, and enabled response methodologies to be 
established. Subsequently, processes were developed for the deployment of 
geotechnical professionals and the management of reconnaissance data using GIS. 
 National-level involvement in the geotechnical response 
For all three international earthquakes the geotechnical response to coseismic 
landslides was managed from a government level and executed through the utilisation 
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of geotechnical professionals and scientists. Emphasis of the importance of national 
level involvement in the response was highlighted after the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake 
through the development of a deployment structure managed by a government science 
agency (National Centre for Research on Earthquake Engineering and National 
Science Council of Taiwan). Similarly, the use of the ATC-20 post-earthquake 
response guidelines commissioned by government agencies in the United States of 
America and the state of California emphasised the role of higher level organisations 
in the management of geotechnical response to coseismic landslides. Furthermore, in 
response after the 2008 Wenchuan, China earthquake, the Chinese government 
deployed the immediate response, relief, and management of landslide dams post-
earthquake. In addition to this, decisions by the Chinese government to relocate towns 
also prompted the requirement for detailed post-earthquake engineering geological 
assessments of slope failure hazards. 
Further to these geotechnical response requirements, focus on the management of landslide 
dams during the response to the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake and the 2008 Wenchuan, 
China earthquake, emphasised the requirement for prioritisation of secondary hazards based 
on risk to life safety. 
Comparison between the Chi-Chi, Northridge, and Wenchuan earthquake has enabled 
recurrent issues or challenges to be identified within responses to earthquake-induced 
landslides. In the aftermath of all three earthquakes, accessibility became a significant 
concern which emphasised the issue of slope instabilities impacting on transportation routes. 
For all three earthquakes, this impeded emergency relief efforts and in some cases temporary 
access routes were required to gain access to areas isolated by slope failure. The increased 
susceptibility of slopes post-earthquake leading to further failure was an issue identified in all 
three earthquakes, which hindered the execution of emergency response and reconstruction 
by causing further damage and presented continuing life safety risk. Further slope failure 
post-earthquake caused further loss of life after the Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes. 
Each earthquake exhibited a varying extent of coordination within the response to 
earthquake-induced landslides which was dependant on the degree of pre-earthquake 
preparation and previous experience in disaster response. For both the Northridge and 
Wenchuan earthquakes the reviewed literature indicated that the scale of the earthquake 
exceeded the capacity of response resources and pre-earthquake response plans. Furthermore, 
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lack of pragmatic response plans and lack of communication between agencies involved in 
the response were significant recurring issues within the three historical earthquakes. 
Typically these deficiencies were not specific to the geotechnical component of the response, 
rather were implied for the wider emergency response to the earthquakes. The earthquake 
response deficiencies, priorities and tasks discussed in this chapter shed light on the common 
response requirements that can be addressed in future response preparation and planning.  
4.5.1 Progression of geotechnical response activities 
The similarities between the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi, and 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquakes have informed the development of a temporal framework for coseismic landslide 
response (Figure 4.5). The framework presents the critical tasks which took place during the 
response after the three international earthquakes, and informs of the timeframes in which 
these response mechanisms have occurred. The progression of critical tasks provides insight 
into the progression of common priorities during geotechnical response to earthquake-
induced landslides. Developing a framework for post-earthquake landslide response is 
constructive because it can inform future earthquake response planning and preparation. 
Timeframes of response activities have been developed from reviewed literature from the 
1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes. Time categories such as 
days, months and years have been used to present a generalised progression of response 
activities through time. The six key response mechanisms presented in Figure 4.5 have been 
identified through their occurrence in all three of the post-earthquake response, and the 
contribution to addressing the risk posed by earthquake-induced landslides. Descriptions of 
these response mechanisms, and the contribution that these activities make to the response as 
observed in the historical earthquake case studies have been detailed in Table 4.4. 
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Additional response techniques identified in the response to the Northridge, Chi-Chi, and 
Wenchuan earthquakes included the use of geological and geomorphological mapping and 
analysis of landslide material properties and slope stability. These techniques have not been 
included in the response framework because in reviewed literature, geological and 
geomorphological mapping and slope stability analysis was incorporated into the 
development of landslide susceptibility maps. For the basic response framework, these 
components have been included in Landslide susceptibility mapping.  
  
Figure 4.5: Interpretation of the temporal framework for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides 
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Table 4.4: Description and temporal structure of post-earthquake response activities to earthquake-induced landslides from international earthquakes 
Activity Timeframe Description of use in post-earthquake landslide response 
Aerial Imaging 
and remote 
sensing 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
 Took place three days post-earthquake (Huang 2011) 
 Information used by China Geological Survey to locate landslides 
(Cui et al. 2011) 
 Inform an initial impact assessment by assessing the extent of landsliding and provide information to develop landslide inventory and 
susceptibility mapping (Harp and Jibson 1995). 
 Comparing pre-disaster images to post-disaster images, provide insight into the extent of damage (Free et al. 2008). 
 Worst hit areas can be identified from aerial imaging  so that response resources can be focussed on areas that are more extensively 
damaged or isolated after the earthquake (Keaton and DeGraff 1996). 
 Photographs can also be used as base maps for geologic and geomorphic mapping (Keaton and DeGraff 1996). 
 Assess the size of landslides and landslide dams (Cui et al. 2009). 
 Historic aerial imaging can be useful to help identify areas where historic landsliding has occurred. This can be valuable for understanding 
the pre-earthquake slope conditions in the area (Keaton and DeGraff 1996). 
 Limitations: Smaller landslides are less likely to be visible in the images (Harp and Jibson 1995). 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
 Hours after earthquake (Harp and Jibson 1995) 
 Undertaken by U.S Air force, images used by USGS and 
emergency planners (USGS 1996) 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Four days post-earthquake (Lin and Tung 2004) 
 Information used by Bureau of Soil and Water Conservation, 
Council of Agriculture (2000) (Lin and Tung 2004) 
Ground 
Reconnaissance 
and field 
investigations 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
 Commenced “immediately” (Tang et al. 2009) 
 Initial field inspections are useful for identifying the failure mechanism and extent of movement (Turner and McGuffy 1996). 
 Field investigations enable the collection of data such as GPS co-ordinates of geological features so information can be recorded to a 
database (Loh and Tsay 2001). 
 Ground reconnaissance work also gives the opportunity for basic measurements and material descriptions to be taken which can’t be 
obtained from aerial reconnaissance. This can lead to assessment of the slope mechanics and risk of further failure (Hung 2000). 
 For landslide dams field observations of the height, width and composition of embankment materials could be obtained and used to quantify 
the associated risk threshold and recommend emergency treatment (Cui et al. 2009). 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
 Commenced “immediately” by USGS (USGS 1996) 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Commenced within one week under the direction of the National 
Centre for Research on Earthquake Engineering (Loh and Tsay 
2001) 
Landslide 
inventory 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
 Commenced “immediately” as part of emergency susceptibility 
mapping by (Tang et al. 2009) 
 Landslide inventories are built up from site location information gathered from aerial imaging and ground reconnaissance work, and they 
provide a database of information for further slope stability analysis or hazard analysis (Harp and Jibson 1996; Harp et al. 2011). 
 Landslide inventories can be a useful resource to refine our understanding of the factors influencing the distribution of earthquake-induced 
landslides (Gorum et al. 2011). 
 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
 Commenced several days post-earthquake for USGS (Harp and 
Jibson 1995) 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Data started to be collected days post-earthquake, continued years 
post-earthquake (Lin and Tung 2004) 
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Activity Timeframe Description of use in post-earthquake landslide response 
Landslide 
Monitoring 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
 Monitoring of landslide dams commenced days after earthquake 
and continued for months (Chen et al. 2010; Cui et al. 2011). 
 Monitoring of the larger landslide dams was under the auspices of 
the Chinese government (Chen et al. 2010). 
 Reconnaissance monitoring should be simple and easy to install so that immediate preliminary data on the mechanics and direction and 
rate of movement can be obtained (Keaton and DeGraff 1996). In the long term, instruments such as inclinometers, extensometers, and 
piezometers will be installed at a landslide site to measure movement and groundwater levels (Mikkelsen 1996). 
 Other examples of landslide monitoring can also include digital terrain modelling created from Light Detection and Ranging data 
(LIDAR). This can be useful for analysing the topography of the land (Townsend and Rosser 2012). Comparison of LIDAR data can also 
be used to give quantitative estimates of the amount of material that has moved during an event (Keaton and DeGraff 1996; Massey et al. 
2012b). 
 Limitations: May be limited by availability of equipment post-earthquake. In the initial aftermath of an earthquake monitoring can include 
the use of simple “string line” tools set up across a landslide scarps which can be measured regularly until more accurate equipment such 
as GPS stations can be installed (Dellow et al. 2011). 
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
 Weeks after earthquake regional ground deformation information 
(GPS measurements) collected (Parise and Jibson 2000) - Unclear 
if specific landslide monitoring took place. 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Ground motion information used in landslide analysis years after 
event (Lin and Tung 2004) - Unclear if specific landslide 
monitoring took place. 
Communication 
and data 
management 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
 Communication of monitoring information for landslide dams 
commenced days after earthquake (Cui et al. 2011), Media 
coverage played a big role in the communication of needs which 
directed response coordination (Earthquake Engineering Research 
Institute 2008) 
 Communication and distribution of information is an important component of disaster and hazard assessment particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of an earthquake event. Effective communication of information should enable timely assessment of hazard and risk, and ensure 
that people inhabiting the hazard areas have access to hazard information (Loh and Tsay 2001).  
 Communication was important after the earthquake because raw data collected from scientific findings can be distributed to researchers, 
the public, and authorities. Communications through fact sheets, magazines, and the internet is useful for this (USGS 1996).  
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
 Communication of impact assessment commenced hours to days 
after earthquake (USGS 1996). Existing communication systems 
facilitated this communication (USGS 1996) 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Communication and management of data collected in during field 
assessment commenced days after the earthquake using 
communication systems developed by NCREE (Loh and Tsay 
2001).  
Landslide 
Susceptibility 
Maps 
2008 Wenchuan Earthquake 
 Development of landslide susceptibility maps commenced days 
post-earthquake to assist in emergency management of refugees 
(Tang et al. 2009). 
 Susceptibility maps are useful for aiding planning development, emergency preparedness and predicting how disruptive an earthquake can 
be in a variety of earthquake scenarios of different magnitudes and locations (Harp and Jibson 1995; Tang et al. 2009). 
 Development of susceptibility maps involves combining information gathered from ground reconnaissance, aerial mapping, material 
properties, slope stability analysis, geological and geomorphological mapping and slope monitoring. A long term advantage of creating 
susceptibility maps is that for future events this resource may show where landslides are most likely to occur, which would be useful for 
land use planning and planning for future earthquake response (Wills et al. 2011). 
 Limitations: Some susceptibility maps do not include the landslide potential of higher frequency trigger events such as rainfall and 
earthquakes in the region (Wills et al. 2011).  
1994 Northridge Earthquake 
 Work to update existing susceptibility maps commenced months 
post-earthquake - estimation of timeframe based on Parise and 
Jibson (2000). Development of maps continued years post-
earthquake (Wills et al. 2011). 
1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake 
 Commenced months after earthquake and continued years after 
earthquake - estimation based on Lin and Tung (2004). 
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4.5.2 Progression of priorities during geotechnical response 
Comparison between the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes 
provides a general framework for geotechnical response priorities. The progression of 
activities presented in Figure 4.5 can be used to contextualise response priorities with 
response tasks. Figure 4.6 presents correlation between Northridge, Wenchuan and Chi-Chi 
earthquakes to inform a generic progression of geotechnical response priorities. 
For the response to Northridge, Wenchuan and Chi-Chi, the initial priority encompassed 
protection of life safety and execution of an impact assessment to inform emergency 
response. Over time, the priorities transitioned to the assessment of continuing risk (long term 
risk) associated with earthquake-induced landslides and landslide dams. Generally, this 
transition took place months after the earthquake and potentially reflected the transition from 
earthquake response to earthquake recovery. 
 
Time 
Days to months post-earthquake Months to years post-earthquake 
Figure 4.6: Transition of priorities during geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landsliding 
Recovery Priorities 
Assessment and 
management of continuing 
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susceptibility maps 
Response Priorities 
Rapid impact assessment 
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 Landslide monitoring 
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damaged lifelines 
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4.6 Summary 
Information from historical international earthquakes has been used to inform a basic 
temporal framework for geotechnical response to coseismic landslides. Six response 
requirements have been identified in the post-earthquake response to landslides induced by 
the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes. Temporal changes in 
response tasks provide insight into changes in priorities during response to earthquake-
induced landslides. Initially the geotechnical response commenced after each earthquake 
focussing on the protection of life safety from imminent risk, overtime this changed to 
analysis and management of continuing risk associated with landslides. 
Comparisons between international earthquakes has also enabled common issues in 
geotechnical response to be identified. Accessibility of transportation routes impacted by 
earthquake-induced landslides was a significant issue that was emphasised in the three 
international earthquakes. Furthermore, increased slope instability post-earthquake resulted in 
further loss of life and damage to infrastructure during response and recovery to the Chi-Chi 
and Wenchuan earthquakes. Continuing slope failure impeded post-earthquake response and 
hindered recovery and reconstruction.  
The response to the Chi-Chi, Taiwan and Northridge, California earthquakes highlight the 
value of implementing pre-event planning to guide post-earthquake response. After both 
earthquakes, the response to earthquake-induced landslides was encompassed in government 
response framework. This enabled the response to be executed rapidly post-earthquake, with 
the roles of governing organisations clearly defined. Comparison between the Chi-Chi, 
Wenchuan, and Northridge earthquakes can be used to contextualise response techniques 
implemented during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence with international response 
techniques. 
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Chapter Five: Analysis of geotechnical response following 
large earthquakes – comparison between the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence and international examples 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the post-earthquake geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES), as detailed in 
Chapter Three, to provide comparison with historical international earthquake discussed in 
Chapter Four.  
Comparison has been based on the response progression after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake because it was the first event in the CES which caused widespread co-seismic 
slope failure in the Port Hills. Furthermore, the widespread slope failure that occurred 
resulted in the requirement for a geotechnical response group to form. In comparison, 
response to the 4
th
 September 2010 and 13
th
 June 2011 earthquakes took place under 
contractual agreements between Christchurch City Council (CCC) and local geotechnical 
professionals. Furthermore, the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake resulted in significantly less 
land damage in the Port Hills. Rapid deployment and reassessment within sectors still took 
place after the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquakes, however the risk to life safety was less of an issue 
as the response to 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake as many houses had already been evacuated 
in the affected area. 
Comparison between the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake and international earthquakes was 
conducted in three stages: firstly, a conceptual model of the geotechnical response to the CES 
was developed to highlight the temporal progression of requirements for response to 
coseismic landslides. Secondly, significant themes from the CES were identified to outline 
the methodology for post-earthquake geotechnical response. Thirdly, the challenges and 
successes identified in the CES were critically evaluated through comparison to the 1994 
Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes.  
Results of the comparison between earthquakes provide insight into aspects of the 
geotechnical response that can be refined for future earthquakes in New Zealand. 
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5.2 Conceptual temporal model of geotechnical response 
5.2.1 Overview of geotechnical response phases 
The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) has 
provided insight into the progression of requirements, priorities, and hazard management 
techniques that are implemented during geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope 
failure. Based on the evolution of these components of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake, a temporal model has been developed. The purpose of the temporal model is to 
identify an expected progression of geotechnical response to assist pre-planning of 
emergency management (Figure 5.1).  
The model has been divided into three sequential phases based on temporal changes in 
priorities and requirements of the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. These phases are discussed in further detail in sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 5.2.4, 
with a brief overview provided below. Response to earthquake-induced slope failures after 
the Northridge, Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes (Chapter Four) have been used to inform 
the development of phases for geotechnical response. The three phases are: 
 Phase One - Immediate emergency response  
Timeframe: hours to approximately seven days post-earthquake 
Response requirements included the mobilisation of geotechnical resources to 
undertake rapid slope assessments which led to recommendations for evacuations and 
building use restrictions for the protection of life safety. At this stage in the response 
considerable effort was devoted to developing the coordination of the geotechnical 
response, and as such leadership roles emerged and systems for deployment and data 
collection were developed. 
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 Phase Two - Coordinated Geotechnical Response
Timeframe: One week to several months post-earthquake
From one week after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake the deployment coordination
and communication between geotechnical professionals had improved. Moreover, site
assessment and data collection methods became increasingly standardised. The focus
on protection of life safety continued with the execution of further slope assessment to
inform evacuations and building use restrictions. Towards the end of Phase Two,
focus started to shift onto the assessment of the long-term risk associated with
earthquake-induced slope failures. Assessment of long-term risk refers to the
evaluation of ongoing hazard presented by slopes that failed during the CES. For
example, the increased susceptibility of rockfall source areas resulted in ongoing
failure post-earthquake which necessitates continuing hazard assessment and
management.
 Phase Three - Geotechnical professional’s contribution to earthquake recovery
Timeframe: Commenced several months post-earthquake and continued for years
post-earthquake.
Several months following the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, the coordination
changed to include formal agreements between geotechnical professionals and local
authorities. During Phase Three, the focus of the geotechnical response shifted to the
assessment of long-term risk and the development of permanent risk management
strategies for areas affected by earthquake-induced slope failure, including slope
remediation and avoidance.
5.2.2 Emergency geotechnical response (Phase One) 
In the initial phase of the geotechnical response, up to one week after the 22
nd
 February 2011
earthquake, the first priority and main goal was to protect life safety by identifying 
geotechnical hazards and then evacuating areas affected by rockfall, cliff collapse and loess 
failures as quickly and as efficiently as possible. During the first week of the response, 
categorisation of the types of earthquake-induced landslides was developed based on ground 
reconnaissance and impact assessments. At this point there was little delineation between 
deep-seated slump failures in loess and tensile cracking in loess which was later interpreted 
as fissuring. Both required further investigation to derive the failure mechanisms. 
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Table 5.1 outlines the objectives and requirements of the geotechnical response during Phase 
One based on information presented in Chapter Three. Despite the lack of management 
structure to inform the geotechnical response coordination in the immediate aftermath of the 
22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, the geotechnical response was well executed. Furthermore, 
the requirements to develop efficiency within the geotechnical response were identified 
within the first week post-earthquake which enabled the Port Hills Geotechnical Group 
(PHGG) to form. Development of the PHGG led to improvement in the execution of 
deployment, slope assessment and enforcement of evacuations. 
Table 5.1: Phase one objectives and requirements during the immediate response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
Objectives Key tasks Requirements Organisation 
involvement 
Impact 
Assessment 
 Communication with Civil 
Defence 
 Ground Reconnaissance 
 Aerial Reconnaissance 
 Communication pathways 
with Civil Defence 
 Resources for ground 
reconnaissance and aerial 
reconnaissance (i.e. 
vehicles, aircraft) 
 Geotechnical 
professionals 
 GNS Science 
 Regional and local 
Civil Defence 
Assessment 
and 
management 
of imminent 
life safety 
risk 
 Mobilise geotechnical 
response 
 Assess imminent risk from 
rockfall, cliff collapse, 
landslide and loess failure 
 Communicate risk to 
Emergency Management 
entities 
 Remove residents from 
imminent risk exposure 
(evacuations and building 
safety notices by USAR 
and CDEM) 
 Group meetings 
 Basic landslide monitoring 
equipment 
 Meeting location for 
geotechnical group 
 Aerial images 
 GIS Database 
 Standardised data 
collection 
 Communication pathways 
with Civil Defence 
 USAR 
 Geotechnical 
professionals 
 GNS Science 
 Regional and local 
Civil Defence 
 Building 
Safety Evaluation 
Team 
 Christchurch City 
Council 
Rescue and 
body 
recovery 
 Temporary slope 
stabilisation for body 
recovery 
 Debris removal 
 USAR training  USAR 
 Regional and local 
Civil Defence 
Development 
of response 
coordination 
and 
management 
 Organise deployment  
 Standardise data collection 
and slope assessment 
 Categorise slope failures 
 Daily meetings 
 Communication between 
entities and individuals 
involved in response 
 Define assessment and data 
collection methodologies 
 USAR 
 Geotechnical 
professionals 
 GNS Science 
 Regional and local 
Civil Defence 
 Christchurch City 
Council 
 
During the same time frame similar tasks were undertaken during the response to the 1994 
Northridge, 2008 Wenchuan, and 1999 Chi-Chi earthquakes. These included: 
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 Aerial Reconnaissance, 
 Ground Reconnaissance, 
 Building safety evaluation, 
 Slope stability assessments, and 
 Slope monitoring. 
In comparison to the objectives outlined in Table 5.1, the immediate response to the 1999 
Chi-Chi and the 1994 Northridge earthquakes were guided by pre-existing geotechnical 
response frameworks and consequently there was less need to develop coordination in the 
first days of the response. Conversely, reviewed literature did not imply that the geotechnical 
response to the 2008 Wenchuan, China earthquake was guided by pre-developed response 
framework in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. However, the implementation of the 
Wenchuan Earthquake Disaster Recovery and Reconstruction Act one month after the 
earthquake did guide the execution of impact assessments and hazard assessments to inform 
the relocation of towns. The implementation of the recovery act in China occurred within a 
similar timeframe post-earthquake to the repeal of the Canterbury Earthquake Response and 
Recovery Act (2010) which was superseded by the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 
(2011) one month after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. 
A significant difference between the immediate response to the CES and the 1999 Chi-Chi 
and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes was the requirement for assessment and management of 
landslide dams. For both the Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes the focus on landslide dams 
was dominant in the aftermath of the earthquake due to the consequence of dam failure, and 
inundation of water and debris downstream of the hazard. Despite this difference, similarity 
can be identified in the prioritisation of hazards in the immediate aftermath of each 
earthquake based on the consequence to life safety. In the aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 
2011 earthquake during the CES, management of cliff collapse, rockfall, and loess failures 
that impacted roads or residential areas were prioritised according to their impact and threat 
to life safety. This emphasises the focus on imminent risk immediately post-earthquake. 
5.2.3 Coordinated geotechnical response (Phase Two) 
In Phase Two of the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, protection 
of life safety continued to be maintained as the response priority. The objectives and 
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requirements of Phase two are outlined in Table 5.2. During Phase Two a transition took 
place which resulted in the focus shifting from protection of life safety from imminent risk, to 
the development of risk models to evaluate the ongoing (or long-term) risk associated with 
coseismic landslides. Phase Two commenced one week after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake, and continued until the state of national emergency ceased two months later (30
th
 
April 2011). 
Table 5.2: Phase two objectives and requirements during the response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
Objectives Key activities/tasks Requirements Organisation involvement 
Protection of 
life safety 
 Mobilise geotechnical 
response 
 Ground Reconnaissance 
 Assess slope failures 
 Communicate risk to 
Emergency Management 
entities 
 Remove residents from 
imminent risk exposure 
(evacuations and 
building safety notices) 
 Group meetings 
 Slope stabilisation – 
scaling, bolting, mesh 
 Basic landslide 
monitoring equipment 
 Meeting location for 
geotechnical group 
 Aerial images 
 Communication 
pathways with Civil 
Defence 
 Involvement of local 
construction 
contractors 
 USAR (Start to lessen in 
involvement, by end of 
phase no longer 
involved) 
 Geotechnical 
professionals (PHGG) 
 GNS Science (technical 
support) 
 Regional and local Civil 
Defence 
 Building Safety 
Evaluation Team 
 CCC 
 Local Contractors 
Data collection 
and 
management 
 Data collection 
 Transfer of data to 
database 
 Development of maps to 
inform further response 
 GIS Database 
 Standardised data 
collection 
 Geotechnical 
Professionals with 
GIS experience 
 GNS Science 
 Geotechnical 
professionals 
Assessment of 
on-going risk 
associated with 
earthquake-
induced slope 
failure 
 Data collection 
 Methodology for risk 
assessment 
 Reassessment of slope 
failures following 
aftershocks 
 Data 
 Client supporting 
analysis 
 GNS Science 
 CCC 
 PHGG 
Public 
communication 
 Community Meetings 
 Port Hills Geotechnical 
email address 
 Fact Sheets 
 Meeting location 
 Deliver fact sheets 
 Acquire email 
addresses of residents 
 USAR 
 PHGG 
 GNS Science 
 Regional and local Civil 
Defence 
 CCC 
 
Phase Two is also differentiated from Phase One through the following changes: 
 Fewer requirements to develop coordination within the geotechnical response. By this 
stage deployment was facilitated through the development of the Port Hills sectors, 
daily meetings, and through the CDEM and CCC Call Centre. These developments 
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were established within the first week of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. 
 The requirement for slope assessments to provide recommendations for evacuation 
and the application of Building Safety Evaluation notices decreased throughout the 
three weeks post-earthquake. As such the involvement of organisations such as USAR 
also decreased.  
 Mapping of tension cracks, boulders, and debris deposits increased during the three 
weeks post-earthquake as the requirement for evacuations decreased. Mapping 
enabled a hazard database to be developed to prepare for longer term detailed risk 
assessment or further research after the emergency period had ended.  
 The Christchurch City Council (CCC) started to increase its involvement to prepare 
for continuation of the involvement of geotechnical professionals once the state of 
national emergency ended (30
th
 April 2011).  
 Communication with the public became a central part of Phase Two of the 
geotechnical response as it became apparent during Phase One that there was a high 
demand for technical information from the public. 
 More sophisticated slope monitoring equipment such as continuous GPS and survey 
systems were deployed to monitor slope movements.  
During the same time frame for the response to the 1994 Northridge, 2008 Wenchuan, and 
1999 Chi-Chi earthquakes the following tasks were undertaken: 
 Ground Reconnaissance, 
 Development of a landslide inventory, 
 Development of landslide susceptibility maps, 
 Building safety evaluation, 
 Slope stability assessments, and 
 Slope monitoring. 
These tasks indicate a similar focus on assessment of life safety risk, however also emphases 
transition to assessment of long term risk. As discussed in Chapter Four, the development of 
landslide susceptibility maps generally commenced months after the earthquake and 
consequently did not initiate immediately in Phase Two. Typically the development of 
landslide susceptibility maps and landslide inventories start to address the analysis of long-
term risk associated with earthquake-induced slope failures (Harp and Jibson 1996). As such, 
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the response to the three historical earthquake case studies supports the conclusion that 
during phase two (weeks to months post-earthquake) the response starts to focus on the 
assessment and management of on-going risk from earthquake-induced landslides. 
Further supporting evidence of the transition to assessment of on-going risk can been seen 
after the 2008 Wenchuan, China, earthquake where approximately one month post-
earthquake engineering geology hazard assessments were conducted to identify locations for 
the relocation of towns impacted by coseismic slope failures. The implementation of these 
assessments emphasises the transition from post-earthquake response to recovery, and 
highlights the importance of evaluating long term risk associated with slopes that had 
undergone failure during the earthquake. 
5.2.4 Geotechnical contribution to earthquake recovery (Phase Three) 
Phase Three describes the geotechnical involvement during the recovery period which 
commenced at the end of the state of national emergency (30
th
 April 2011) after the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake. The objectives for Phase Three of the geotechnical response are 
detailed in Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3: Phase Three objectives in the geotechnical response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake 
Objectives Key activities/tasks Requirements Organisation 
involvement 
Management 
of on-going 
risk associated 
with 
earthquake-
induced 
landslides 
 
 Gather information to 
inform assessment of long 
term risk 
 Reassessment of slopes to 
inform application of S124 
Notices under the Building 
Act 
 Provide advice for 
mitigation measures 
 Inform strategic decisions 
regarding land use and 
engineering protection  
 Formal contract 
between geotechnical 
professionals and 
governing authority 
 Development of Risk 
Model 
 Quantification of cost in 
relation to solutions 
 PHGG 
 Christchurch City 
Council 
 GNS Science (Risk 
model) 
 
Although protection of life safety continued to be a priority, the requirement for residents to 
be returned to their homes, or permanently evacuated, also becomes important. With this in 
mind the assessment of long term risk from coseismic slope failures induced by the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake became a significant priority. Geotechnical professionals also 
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continued to provide their services for rapid slope assessments after major aftershocks such 
as the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake. 
During the recovery phase the level of detail and investigation of rockfall and cliff collapse 
increased during the development of the GNS risk model. Furthermore, characterisation of 
slope failures in loess was further addressed. To inform the analysis of rockfall, cliff collapse 
and loess failures, activities such as subsurface investigations, monitoring, and 
geomorphological and geological mapping were undertaken to provide detailed information 
of slope failures. Comparably, the response to the 1994 Northridge, 2008 Wenchuan, and 
1999 Chi-Chi earthquakes also presented a similar focus where analysis of landslide 
susceptibility became increasingly thorough in each region. Landslide inventories were 
developed after each of the three international earthquakes with the aim to inform 
susceptibility analysis.  
During the recovery from both the Chi-Chi and Northridge earthquake, the seismic hazard 
model for each region was updated to integrate the latest understanding of seismic hazard. 
The extensive damage and destruction of buildings after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake 
emphasised the requirement to reconsider the seismic design and construction of buildings, 
particularly schools and hospitals (Zifa 2008). Furthermore, ground motions experienced 
during the earthquake exceeded design values outlined in the 2001 Chinese Seismic Code, 
which necessitated revision of the guidelines to inform the rebuild process (Free et al. 2008; 
Zifa 2008). Similarly, significant updates were made to the national seismic hazard model 
(NSHM) for the Christchurch region after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, based on the 
understanding that the seismic hazard had increased due to the ongoing earthquake sequence 
(Mcverry 2012). Because seismic codes such as the New Zealand NSHM influence building 
design and construction, development of seismic codes post-earthquake reflects the 
requirement to continually improve understanding of seismic hazard and thus aiming to 
improve resilience in the area impacted. 
5.3 Identification of geotechnical response themes 
Development of the conceptual model of the geotechnical response to the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence (CES) has enabled the identification of significant themes which 
contributed to the execution of management and assessment of coseismic landslides. Based 
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on the information presented in section 3.4 of Chapter Three, and the interpretation of the 
response progression into phases in section 5.2, the following themes have been identified: 
1. Geotechnical response coordination and management, including internal 
communication within the geotechnical response group 
2. Protection of life safety, includes the assessment of hazards and the enforcement of 
evacuations 
3. Public communication 
Figure 5.2 presents an interpretation of how the themes of coordination, life safety, and 
public communication relate based within the structure of the geotechnical response after the 
22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake.  
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(Slope assessments) 
Protection of Life safety 
(Evacuations, building safety 
notices) 
Public 
Communication 
Life Safety 
Requirement to 
inform residents of 
life safety risks 
associated with slope 
failures 
Coordination is required 
for the efficient 
implementation of life 
safety assessment and 
protection 
Coordination of response 
e.g. Port Hills sectors, daily 
meetings 
Communication 
improves 
coordination 
within response 
Internal 
communication 
between geotechnical 
professionals 
Coordination improves 
development in public 
communications 
Figure 5.2: Interaction between main themes in geotechnical response to the 22nd February 2011 earthquake during the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
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The themes listed above have been divided into three aspects based on the overarching 
structure of the geotechnical response to the earthquake. Aspects of the geotechnical response 
include following: 
 Geotechnical response priority:  
The priority describes the primary focus of the response which was the underlying 
motive behind the response tasks and the development of an organisational strategy. 
From the CES case study and the international earthquake case studies, the protection 
of life safety was maintained as the priority. This can be identified from the focus on 
management of rockfall, cliff collapse, and loess failure hazards during the response 
to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. For the 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquakes, the emphasis on protection of life safety could be observed in the 
prioritisation of landslide dams. Similarly for the 1994 Northridge earthquake this 
could be seen in the use of the ATC-20 guidelines for post-earthquake building safety 
evaluation to restrict use of structures affected by land damage.  
Although the protection of life safety has been maintained as the priority during the 
responses to the case study earthquakes, the context in which it is addressed changed 
throughout time. Immediately after each earthquake (hours to days post-earthquake) 
protection of life safety is required from imminent risk. Conversely, months after an 
earthquake, protection of life safety from long term risk or on-going slope hazards 
becomes the focus.  
 
 Geotechnical response strategy:  
The strategy for geotechnical response refers to the tasks implemented to protect life 
safety. During the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake tasks such as slope 
assessments informed building use restrictions and evacuations. Public 
communication such as community meetings and the distribution of fact sheets 
contributed to informing residents of the hazards, and thus communicating the 
requirements for risk management techniques such evacuations and building use 
restrictions that were implemented to protect life safety from imminent risk. 
Similarly, strategies to protect life safety from imminent were implemented after the 
Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes with particular emphasis on the management of 
landslide dams through the excavation of spillways and implementation or 
monitoring. Furthermore, the strategy for protection of life safety during the response 
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to Northridge was conducted through the implementation of the ATC-20 guidelines 
(Appendix I). 
When the response priority shifts to address protection of life safety from long term 
risk associated with earthquake-induced landslides, permanent protection measures 
such as engineered protection structures or changes in land use are required to address 
the continuing risk. This was observed after the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake with the 
relocation of towns based on assessment of geological hazards present at the previous 
town location.  
 
 Geotechnical response management and coordination: 
The management of the geotechnical response refers to organisational techniques 
which were implemented to coordinate geotechnical professionals and scientists 
during the response. The division of the Port Hills into sectors, and the development 
of the Port Hills Geotechnical Group, provide examples of management techniques 
that were implemented during the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake in the CES. To encourage the development of coordination, daily group 
meetings were established 48 hours after the earthquake which facilitated 
communication internally between geotechnical professionals within the PHGG and 
externally between PHGG and CDEM or CCC. 
The format for geotechnical response to the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake provides an 
example of a management technique whereby reconnaissance teams were deployed to 
conduct specific tasks, and subsequently report the information collected to a 
centralised GIS database coordinator. The purpose of the management strategy was to 
ensure that post-earthquake reconnaissance was conducted in efficiently, and 
scientists and professionals involved in the response were coordinated. Less is known 
about the management techniques implemented during the response to the Northridge 
earthquake, however the timely deployment of the geotechnical scientists from United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) implies that procedures for coordination of 
earthquake response was present at a national level in advance of the event.  
Based on the case study analysis of the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake (CES), interactions between the “response priority”, “response strategy” and 
“response coordination” can be derived. Figure 5.2 presents the interaction between the three 
aspects to the geotechnical response, and indicates the influence of communication on 
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developments in coordination. Information gathered from interviews (Chapter Three) implies 
that where improvements in communication occurred internally within the geotechnical 
response group (PHGG), there were improvements in the coordination of the response. For 
example, once daily meetings were established 48 hours after the earthquake, the 
coordination within the group improved and subsequently the development of sectors and a 
standard slope assessment and data collection methodology was established. 
5.4 Synthesis of geotechnical response themes  
To provide further detail of the response themes identified in section 5.3, the challenges and 
successes within the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) have been examined. Examination of the challenges 
and successes has enabled the specific requirements of each of the themes to be identified 
while providing insight into underlying issues within the response management. Comparison 
between the CES case study and the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquakes has provided evidence to discuss the similarities and differences within the 
geotechnical responses. Subsequently, conclusions have been drawn regarding the specific 
requirements of geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landslides. Table 5.4 provides a 
synthesis of challenges identified in the CES which accentuate fundamental underlying 
management and operational issues during the post-earthquake geotechnical response to the 
CES. Boxes shaded blue in Table 5.4 represent correlations between fundamental issues and 
challenges identified in the geotechnical response. 
Examination of the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during CES 
with comparison with international earthquakes has provided confirmation around the 
importance of pre-planned frameworks for emergency response, and the significance of 
transparent linkage between Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) and 
geotechnical professionals (Table 5.4). The deficiency of these two response requirements in 
the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake has been highlighted through the 
challenges in the geotechnical response management and public communication. 
Furthermore, lack of internal communication between geotechnical professionals and Urban 
Search and Rescue also hindered developments in coordination, and caused uncertainly in the 
definition of roles within the response. Challenges within slope assessments and protection of 
life safety (tactical level tasks) were heightened by the lack of response framework and 
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reliance on rapid qualitative risk assessment. Further detail of these fundamental issues in 
light of the challenges identified in the case study earthquakes is presented in sections 5.4, 5.6 
and 5.7. 
Table 5.4: Correlation between challenges and fundamental issues in geotechnical response to 22nd February 2011 
earthquake during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
  Fundamental issues 
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Concurrently, pragmatic techniques for geotechnical response have been identified through 
activities or developments which improved coordination and efficiency. Table 5.5 presents a 
summary of the influences from techniques listed in section 5.1.2. Boxes shaded blue in 
Table 5.5 represent correlations between successful response techniques and subsequent 
improvements recognised in the geotechnical response. Developments such as the Port Hills 
sectors and the PHGG became essential to the protection of life safety because of their 
influence on improvements within response coordination. Internal communication within the 
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geotechnical response group has been identified as a catalyst for the development of 
improvements within the response. Further detail of the successful techniques identified in 
the case study earthquakes are presented in section 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Correlation between successful techniques and improvements in the geotechnical response to Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence 
  Improvements in geotechnical response 
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Development of geotechnical 
response group  
5.5.1     
Geographic sectors of 
impacted area 
5.5.2     
Daily meetings within 
geotechnical response 
5.5.3     
Development of GIS 
Database 
5.5.4     
 
5.5 Challenges within post-earthquake coordination of geotechnical 
response 
5.5.1 Developing coordination post-earthquake 
Based on the case study analysis of the geotechnical response to the Canterbury Earthquake 
Sequence (CES) and historical earthquakes, post-earthquake coordination was identified as a 
main theme in section 5.3. Examples of the importance of coordination during the CES can 
be identified in the aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, which also emphasised 
the challenge of developing coordination post-earthquake without the guidance of pre-
planning. Duplication of slope assessments by geotechnical professionals, and the lack of 
communication between responding agencies within the first week of the response to the 22
nd
 
127 
 
February 2011 earthquake emphasised that the existing coordination, or lack thereof, was 
insufficient to execute the response efficiently, and inevitably management systems were 
required to develop during the emergency response. The lack of guidelines detailing how to 
assess risk associated with earthquake-induced slope failures in an urbanised area augmented 
this issue, and resulted in variation within slope assessment methodologies in the early stages 
of the response. Consequently, the development of centralised coordination became critical 
however was a gradual process because of the lack of pre-planning by the tactical and 
strategic level organisations involved.. Furthermore, ground motions experienced during the 
22
nd
 February 2011 exceeded the probabilistic seismic hazard for Canterbury region and 
caused land damage in the Port Hills that could not be foreseen. 
Development of coordination within the response group after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake was further complicated in that many local geotechnical professionals involved in 
the geotechnical response were also involved with managing damage to their own homes and 
supporting families who had experienced trauma from the earthquake. As such, family 
commitments, personnel stress and exhaustion influenced the involvement of some local 
geotechnical professionals in the response. Moreover, the lack of pre-planning for an 
earthquake of this scale resulted in the capabilities of local geotechnical scientists and 
professionals being overwhelmed by the extent of land damage in the Port Hills. 
Development in coordination was emphasised by the modification of relationships between 
organisations throughout the response until the end of the state of national emergency (30
th
 
April 2011). The progression of these interactions shows the use of iterative learning to 
develop a framework which addresses the response requirements. Changes within 
organisation interactions also highlight the initial lack of role definition, and further 
emphasises the absence of pre-planning leading to the requirement of coordination 
development post-earthquake. 
In comparison to the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, the response to the 1994 Northridge 
and 1999 Chichi earthquakes were guided by pre-developed coordination frameworks at a 
government level. The framework for post-earthquake geotechnical reconnaissance for the 
Chi-Chi earthquake defined the interactions between government organisations such as the 
National Science Council (NSC) and reconnaissance teams by providing a reporting structure 
within the response. The structure implemented during the response to the Chi-Chi, Taiwan 
earthquake is described further in section 4.3.3, of Chapter Four. The implementation of the 
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response structure meant that organisational roles were clearly delineated pre-earthquake, and 
information gathered during the response could be easily communicated and integrated 
within emergency planning.  
Similarly, the ATC-20 guidelines and the response capabilities of United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) ensured that post-earthquake coordination was maintained at a national level 
in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. USGS scientists were deployed rapidly to 
undertake an impact assessment to identify the extent of earthquake-induced landslides. 
Information collected post-earthquake could then be communicated to emergency managers. 
Comparison between the CES, Chi-Chi and Northridge earthquakes provide evidence of the 
importance of pre-planning for post-earthquake response. Furthermore, the implementation of 
a management structure for geotechnical response from a government level has been 
conducted in historical earthquakes such as the Chi-Chi and Northridge earthquakes. 
Considering that both Taiwan and California both are historically seismically active regions 
and consequently have developed post-earthquake geotechnical response structures, their 
example implies that for future earthquakes in New Zealand geotechnical response should be 
integrated with national level emergency management. 
5.5.2 Role definition within geotechnical response 
Case study analysis of the CES has emphasised the importance or role definition immediately 
post-earthquake. Role definition was an issue which evolved primarily from the lack pre-
planning and thus lack of identified roles during the first week of the response to the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake during the CES. Geotechnical professionals who were involved 
immediately post-earthquake identified that Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) 
was the managing organisation for the response, however found it difficult to identify 
individuals within the Emergency Operation Centre (EoC) who were overseeing the 
geotechnical component of the response. The following issues may have contributed to this: 
 The integration of local and regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(CDEM) response centres within the first three days of the response to the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake. Refer to Appendix F for further detail. 
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 The predominant focus of CDEM in the first week of the response was assessment 
and management of building damage in Christchurch City and surrounding suburbs, 
including damage associated with liquefaction and lateral spreading. 
The execution and management of the geotechnical response to earthquake-induced 
landslides was not included within the existing CDEM framework and planning, and 
consequently was detached from CDEM response days after the earthquake. Linkage was 
formed through the involvement of CDEM science liaison personnel who intuitively 
identified the requirement to include the geotechnical response to landslides in the Port Hills 
into the wider CDEM response and emergency management. Increasing communication 
between geotechnical professionals, Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), and CDEM was 
essential for progressively developing coordination between organisations involved with the 
Port Hills. For example, when communication between geotechnical professionals and USAR 
increased days after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, a system was developed for 
informing the execution of evacuations based on slope assessments. Consequently the roles 
of each group became increasingly defined. Section 3.4.1, Chapter Three, provides a 
description of the development of the system.  
Role definition was also a challenge for USAR, who were unrecognised by some 
geotechnical professionals to have the authority to enforce evacuations. This issue highlights 
a lack of knowledge around New Zealand emergency response capabilities, and emphasises 
the lack of integration between engineering professionals and CDEM.  
The benefits of integrating the geotechnical response with the CDEM planning pre-
earthquake would include: 
 Information for impact assessment post-earthquake - geotechnical professionals who 
were responding in the Port Hills were a useful source of information for emergency 
managers regarding the impact of the earthquake in the hilly suburbs, 
 Subsequent integration between assessments of slope failure hazards and building 
safety evaluation. Prior to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake geotechnical hazards 
such as rockfall had not been included in the structure for building safety evaluation, 
and consequently this was required to develop post-earthquake. 
Comparatively, as discussed in section 5.5.1 the framework for post-earthquake response 
after the 1999 Chichi, Taiwan earthquake provided clear delineation of emergency response 
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roles and organisational responsibility which informed role definition. Government science 
agencies such as National Science Council (NSC) were clearly defined as the managing 
organisations for geotechnical science response. As such, information collected during 
ground reconnaissance was communicated to the governing organisation to inform further 
emergency management. The examples of the response to the CES and Chi-Chi earthquakes 
indicate that for a well executed response to initiate immediately post-earthquake, 
organisations involved should be aware of the capabilities and authorities of other 
organisations involved prior to the event. Furthermore, pre-planning of post-earthquake 
response would address the issue of role definition. 
5.5.3 Deficiencies within post-earthquake formal reporting 
The importance of reporting information post-earthquake has been identified in the case study 
analysis of the CES, and has been further supported by the response to the Chi-Chi and 
Wenchuan earthquakes. Establishing balance between formalised reporting and meeting the 
tactical requirements of the response was a challenge after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake 
during the CES. Local government and the geotechnical community were unprepared for the 
scale of earthquake and subsequent widespread landsliding which occurred during the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake. No formal data collection system was utilised during the 
immediate geotechnical response and as such observations were recorded as brief notations or 
verbally communicated to other personnel involved in the response. Although this can be an 
unreliable form of correspondence, in the immediate response there was little time for 
formalised reporting systems because of the extensive requirement for rapid life safety 
protection.  
The response to the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake demonstrates that reporting of information 
gathered during slope assessments is important so that the impact of the earthquake can be 
appreciated and emergency responders can plan further response (Tang et al. 2009; Huang 
2011). After the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake, rapid slope susceptibility analysis was 
imperative for informing the placement of refugees and temporary housing. As such, timely 
reporting of susceptibility information was crucial to emergency management. This example 
highlights the requirement for balance between reporting requirements and the execution of 
assessments so that the demands for reporting are achievable.  
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5.5.4 Database development 
Analysis of the geotechnical response to the CES and the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake has 
indicated that GIS database development is a crucial component of the post-earthquake 
response and emergency management. Although the development of a GIS database became 
a successful component of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, the process of 
forming the database was challenging as there was no pre-existing platform which was 
suitable for post-earthquake response. For this reason, the development of a centralised 
database became imperative during the immediate response. Initially development of the GIS 
database was slowed due to restricted access to computers and buildings, and further by the 
requirement to obtain GIS datasets from local authorities in Christchurch. This hindered the 
timely integration of collected data early on in the response and further affected the ability of 
the geotechnical response group to use aerial images as base maps for recording field 
observations.  
In contrast, the response to the 1999 Chichi, Taiwan earthquake was supported by a GIS 
platform that had been established prior to the earthquake occurring. GIS maps of each 
county had been developed as part of research programs to improve hazard mitigation, pre-
disaster preparedness, and emergency response in Taiwan. Utilisation of a pre-developed 
database allowed for timely integration of information for analysis which informed 
emergency management decisions by enabling areas worst hit by the earthquake to be 
identified. Indicatively this aspect of the Chichi response was well integrated with the 
responding organisations and based on the requirement for GIS databases after the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake, provides an example of what may be useful for New Zealand. 
5.6 Successes within post-earthquake coordination of geotechnical 
response 
5.6.1 Development of a formalised geotechnical response group 
The geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the CES has 
emphasised the value of a coordinated response group composed of geotechnical 
professionals and scientists to execute slope assessments. The development of the Port Hills 
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Geotechnical Group (PHGG) was an influential and successful component of the post-
earthquake response, despite group formation occurring in a high pressure emergency 
situation where geotechnical response had not been incorporated into the emergency 
management planning. PHGG was involved in the protection of life safety through the 
assessment of slope failures, and the provision of recommendations for evacuation and 
building use restrictions.  
The PHGG consistently progressed towards improvement of coordination with the 
development of geographic sectors in the Port Hills, the establishment of regular meetings, 
and development of a reporting structure within one week post-earthquake. Group 
cooperation facilitated discussion regarding site assessment decisions, and provided a support 
system between group members that became invaluable. In a post disaster situation it is 
recognised that altruistic values and unity within the communities often prevail over conflict 
and competitiveness (Goltz et al. 2001). Interviews with participants from PHGG indicated 
that the group exhibited this same unity within the response capability, whereby geotechnical 
professionals from a variety of consultancies were able to work towards a common priority of 
protecting of life safety in the Port Hills.  
Less is known about how the geotechnical professionals and scientists interacted in the 
response to the Northridge, Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes. Reconnaissance groups that 
were developed after the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan, earthquake were required to develop an 
internal structure for data collection. This implies that internal group coordination existed, 
however reviewed literature has not provided further detail on this. 
5.6.2 Post-earthquake division of geographic sectors 
The response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake has highlighted the benefit of dividing the 
area impacted by coseismic slope failure into geographic sectors to improve coordination of 
the geotechnical response. The Port Hills sectors were identified by interview participants as 
a successful component of the response because they facilitated uniform and systematic 
deployment and organisation of geotechnical assessment teams. Macfarlane and Yetton 
(2013) also identified sectoring as a key lesson learnt from the emergency response to 
earthquake-induced landslides after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. The development of 
geographic sectors within the Port Hills occurred in the first week post-earthquake and 
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became a fundamental component of the geotechnical group coordination which continued to 
guide the deployment of geotechnical professionals years after the event. 
Coordination through sectors meant that geotechnical engineers or engineering geologists 
were not responding on an individual basis, rather within consultancies, and ensured that all 
areas of the Port Hills were included in the assessment. The development of sectors also 
facilitated the communication with the Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) 
response centre because it enabled information gathered from the call centre to be 
communicated directly to the geotechnical professional responsible for a particular area and 
vice versa. Based on reviewed literature, it is unclear whether similar methods were 
conducted after the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes.  
5.6.3 Regular meetings within geotechnical response group 
Geotechnical professionals who were involved in the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during 
the CES, and who participated in interviews, indicated that daily meetings were important for 
forming contacts and receiving information about the situation outside of their own sector. As 
discussed in section 5.4.1, daily meetings were initiated approximately 48 hours post-
earthquake and were imperative to the development of coordination within the geotechnical 
response. The meetings also enabled geotechnical professionals to meet with representatives 
from USAR, CCC, CDEM and EQC. Macfarlane and Yetton (2013) identified daily meetings 
as a crucial component of the organisation of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake, which enabled lessons and observations to be shared within the group. Less is 
known about the implementation of regular meetings during geotechnical response to the 
1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes. Furthermore, reviewed 
literature did not indicate whether meetings were an imperative component of response 
coordination. 
5.6.4 Development of a centralised GIS database 
As highlighted in section 5.4.4, the development of a GIS database was a successful 
component of the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the 
CES. The development of a centralised database became an important component of PHGG 
response as it enabled data collection and analysis to take place in a central location. Data 
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analysis was enabled spatial appreciation of the extent of impact in the Port Hills which 
facilitated discussions around the coordination of the emergency response and evacuation 
planning. The database was a useful resource for hazard communication through the 
production of base maps for recording information during field investigations and emergency 
response. A similar technique was used in the response to the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan 
earthquake which has been further discussed in section 5.4.4. 
5.7 Challenges within protection of life safety during post-earthquake 
response 
5.7.1 Consistency within qualitative hazard and risk assessment 
Case study analysis of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the CES indicated that 
reliance on expert opinion, and the lack of prepared methods for assessing earthquake-
induced slope failures presented an issue with consistency of slope assessments. Maintaining 
consistency of qualitative risk assessment can be difficult due to the subjective nature of this 
type of assessment. Qualitative assessment can also lend itself to diverse interpretation 
depending on the scope of the problem and cultural elements associated with the assessment 
(Crozier and Glade 2004).  
The lack of pre-existing assessment procedures meant that a standard slope assessment 
format was not utilised in the immediate aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, 
which resulted in variation in the assessments. To address this issue the following tactics 
were implemented to improve consistency within the first week of the response:  
 Regular communication through daily morning meetings of Port Hills Geotechnical 
Group. 
 Communication between geotechnical professionals during slope assessment, i.e. 
geotechnical professionals used discussion as a form of peer review before a hazard 
management strategy implemented. This method of peer review was useful, 
particularly when there was uncertainty regarding the mechanism of failure, 
likelihood of failure, and consequences of failure which contributed to the assessment 
of risk. 
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 A standard assessment format for data collection was developed (Appendix G). The 
purpose of the format was to record consistent information and standardised the 
qualitative risk assessment procedure. 
Case study information from the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquakes did not indicate whether consistency in assessment of secondary geological 
hazards was an issue during post-earthquake response. The use of the ATC-20 guidelines 
during the response to the Northridge earthquake indicates that this issue may have been 
addressed through pre-planning. 
5.7.2 Uncertainty during post-earthquake hazard and risk assessment  
During the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, uncertainty within hazard 
assessment was present because of the reliance on expert judgement and visual observations 
in the absence of detailed information and time for thorough assessment. Uncertainty in the 
assessment of environmental hazards is unavoidable, however it does not necessarily result in 
the prevention of a pragmatic assessment provided allowance is made for the consequences 
relating to the degree of uncertainty in the assessment (Ramsey 2009). Furthermore, the 
influences of individual beliefs, circumstances, and complexity within society is inescapable 
in the assessment and management of risk (Smith and Petley 2009). As such, uncertainty is 
an issue that is commonly required to be addressed in both quantitative and qualitative risk 
assessment (Ramsey 2009). Post-earthquake risk assessment is no exception to this. 
During the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, there were several factors which 
contributed to uncertainty in post-earthquake risk assessment of earthquake-induced 
landslides. Firstly, uncertainty in hazard assessment varied depending on the failure 
mechanism. For example, rockfall and cliff collapse could be characterised by the rapid 
release of material from a slope of which the debris could be observed during assessment. 
However, complication arose in the assessment of rockfall and cliff collapse when source 
areas were assessed to estimate a likelihood of further failure, and provide an approximation 
of the area potentially exposed to further failure. Furthermore, cliff collapse areas were 
isolated by the evacuation of residents in proximity to the failure; however, evacuating 
residents from rockfall affected areas was complicated by the requirement to estimate a 
probable rockfall run out and delineate a likely impact area.  
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Rockfall run out became difficult to estimate immediately post-earthquake because of the 
requirement to consider factors such as topography, vegetation, boulder size, and likelihood 
of further failure. This often led to a conservative hazard management approach in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake. The requirement to delineate areas exposed to 
rockfall was maintained a priority throughout the response and recovery to the 22
nd
 February 
2011 earthquake. Subsequent to the emergency response, further detailed analysis such as 
rockfall modelling was conducted to remove uncertainty from the qualitative rockfall 
assessment in the days to weeks after the earthquake.  
Rapid hazard characterisation of failure in loess was complex in the days after the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake. Geotechnical professionals were required to characterise the 
failure mechanism based on visual observation of the prevalence and distribution of tensile 
cracking and compression features. Tensile cracking in loess, which was later interpreted as 
“fissures in loess” (refer to section 1.4.2.3, Chapter One for description), was not conducive 
to typical slump failure behaviour based on post-earthquake observations by geotechnical 
professionals. As such, it was difficult to estimate the risk posed by the hazard as the failure 
mechanism was not immediately obvious. As discussed in section 1.4.2.3 of Chapter One, the 
characterisation of some slope failures in loess in ongoing at the time of writing this thesis. 
Conversely, loess failures that were noticeably characterised as deep seated slump failure in 
the days after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake were maintained a priority for weeks post-
earthquake because of the consequences of further failure i.e. large residential area could 
have been impacted. Survey networks and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) monitoring 
equipment were installed days after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake to collect information 
regarding the direction of movement and amount of displacement to further inform the 
characterisation of hazards. Over time, monitoring equipment indicated that limited down 
slope movement had occurred despite aftershocks, and the deep seated slump failures were no 
longer considered high risk. This example emphasises the uncertainty within hazard 
assessment of earthquake-induced slope failures in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake 
and provides insight into changes in perception of risk throughout time. The example also 
highlights the importance of evaluating the rate of failure and consequences of failure for 
deep-seated slump hazards in the aftermath of an earthquake. 
Uncertainty in hazard assessment can result in a non-conservative estimation of the likelihood 
of further failure. This was highlighted after the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake when rockfall 
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source areas that were considered to be low risk after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake 
released further material. Despite this, generally geotechnical professionals were confident 
that their decisions regarding rockfall risk after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake were 
defendable as no further deaths occurred. However, when the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake 
occurred many of the areas affected by earthquake-induced slope failure had already been 
evacuated. 
Uncertainty is also present in the quantification of imminent risk from earthquake-induced 
landslides where external factors can influence the suitability of hazard management 
techniques. For example, in the aftermath of the 22
nd
 February 2011 in some extreme cases, 
some residents were not able to be removed from their homes in the conditions and in doing 
so would run the risk of loss of life. With this mind, the question arises whether is it 
appropriate to evacuate based on risk of slope failure if evacuation itself could cause loss of 
life. In this context balance between risk from further slope failures and risk from external 
factors needs to be considered. Furthermore, this emphasises the requirement for involvement 
of agencies such as Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) who are trained in dealing with risk in 
this context. It also emphasises that it would be appropriate to assess how imminent the risk 
is on a case by case basis bearing in mind external components.  
Based on the case study analysis of the CES, uncertainty within risk assessment was a 
common issue post-earthquake, and was in most cases unavoidable particularly in the context 
of hazard characterisation which was based on visual observations and limited monitoring 
data. Development of pre-planned recommendations for post-earthquake slope failure risk 
assessment would have been helpful, however it could be limited by estimating the likely 
types of slope failures pre-earthquake. Conversely, the ATC-20 guidelines have addressed 
this by outlining probable post-earthquake slope failure hazards and detailing 
recommendations for hazard management. Aside from this, risk assessment uncertainty was 
not a concept that was discussed in the reviewed literature for the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-
Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes. 
5.7.3 Integration of geotechnical hazard and building safety evaluation 
Case study analysis of the CES indicated that post-earthquake building safety evaluation 
conducted by structural engineers was a component of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
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earthquake which was not integrated with geotechnical assessment of geotechnical hazards. 
Despite operational procedures being established within the first week of the response to 
improve this, it would have been useful to have established guidelines prior to the event. The 
Californian Applied Technology Council guidelines “ATC-20 Procedures for Post-
Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Buildings” (Appendix I) provide an example of integration 
between geotechnical assessment and the application of building safety notices. Aside from 
the ATC-20 guidelines, it is unclear from reviewed literature whether this integration was 
present during the response to the 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes. 
Advantages of providing a framework where the assessment of earthquake-induced slope 
failure hazard is incorporated into building safety evaluation include: 
 Rapid building safety evaluation teams with a structural focus would be aware that a 
building use restriction notices may be applied where no structural damage is present, 
only geotechnical hazard such as rockfall (NZSEE 2011), 
 Consistency in slope assessments and recommendations for building safety 
evaluation would improve if geotechnical professionals were trained under the basis 
of the CDEM building safety evaluation framework. 
A developed framework should address the assessment of property exposure to geotechnical 
hazard. Furthermore, presumably if a building/structure is exposed to slope failure hazard, it 
may be that the property boundary in which the structure is situated may be exposed to the 
same hazard. This poses a question regarding the applicability of building use restrictions for 
geotechnical hazard, where restrictions to property access may be required. These are issues 
that should be addressed within the integration of geotechnical hazard assessment with 
building safety evaluation. It is obvious from the case study analysis of the CES and the 1994 
Northridge earthquake that integration between geotechnical hazard assessment and building 
safety evaluation is required.  
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5.8 Challenges within post-earthquake public communication between 
geotechnical response groups and residents 
5.8.1 Public communication 
The response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake indicates that communication with the 
public affected by geotechnical hazards was imperative for informing residents of the post-
earthquake life safety risk. Due to the lack of integration with Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (CDEM) during the first week of the response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake, dissemination of information to the public regarding the emergency response was 
poorly addressed and heavily reliant on individual communication between geotechnical 
professionals and Port Hills residents. The high demand for information from Port Hills 
residents regarding enforcement of evacuations, building use restrictions and risk from slope 
failure hazards indicates that a strategy for public communication should be implemented 
immediately post-earthquake. The requirement for communication with residents was 
identified by the CDEM science liaison who became highly involved in the coordination of 
pubic communication, despite this being outside the scope of their role. Because of the 
involvement of the science liaison, geotechnical hazard fact sheets were distributed and 
public meetings were established approximately two weeks after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. Although these methods were well received, the task of public communication 
should have been managed within the Public Information Management (PIM) sector of 
CDEM in accordance with the Christchurch City local civil defence emergency management 
arrangements (Sinclair 2008). 
Interview information indicated that meeting the demand for information from the public 
during community meetings was often an exhaustive task for geotechnical professionals who 
were highly involved with communication with residents at community meetings and on an 
individual basis. Public communication was important because residents needed to 
understand the risks associated with each of the slope failure hazards. Communicating this 
risk through geotechnical professionals who were involved with slope failure risk 
management was a transparent and efficient method however many geotechnical 
professionals found the responsibility of communicating information to the public difficult 
because they had had no previous experience or training in presenting information to the 
public. It would be effective to develop a framework where specific geotechnical 
140 
 
professionals were assigned the task of public communication during post-earthquake 
response. This may result in less involvement with slope assessment, however will ensure 
that public communication is informed by an experience geotechnical professional. This 
would be useful because the example of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake indicates that the 
task of communication should be addressed as a priority during the emergency response and 
executed consistently and efficiently. 
Public data availability was a priority after the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake to 
ensure residents were informed of post-earthquake hazards. The techniques for public 
communication used in the Northridge earthquake highlight the need for timely dissemination 
of hazard information which is communicated in a format familiar to residents. Information 
availability commenced days after the earthquake through the implementation of fact sheets, 
internet and magazines (USGS 1996). This emphasises the importance of establishing a 
framework for reporting of ground reconnaissance information to inform the public. 
Reviewed literature for the 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes does not 
specifically indicate the methodologies used for public communication. 
5.8.2 Involvement of territorial authorities 
The geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the CES has provided 
an example of how territorial authorities can influence post-earthquake public communication 
where no pre-earthquake planning has delineated a strategy. Towards the end of the state of 
national emergency (30
th
 April 2011), organisations such as Christchurch City Council 
(CCC) and the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) became increasingly 
involved in the management of earthquake-induced landslides from the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. As these organisations became more involved issues arose around the release of 
information based on the requirement for consistency from territorial authorities.  
At this point, public demand for information was high, and the strain in public 
communication from higher level organisations made it difficult for geotechnical 
professionals to meet the demands of both the public and the local authorities. Because the 
welfare of residents was affected by the release of information around the response in the 
Port Hills, it was obstructive to allow political coordination or lack thereof to influence the 
disclosure of information. Residents were heavily reliant on the response capability of 
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governing organisations, and as such required transparent communication during the 
development of a management strategy.  
Although reviewed literature from the Northridge, Chi-Chi and Wenchuan earthquakes did 
not indicate the same issue, disruption of public communications post-earthquake during the 
CES provides a local example of the necessity for a pre-planned response framework which 
delineates organisational roles and provides objectives for public communication. Pre-
earthquake preparation and emergency response should ensure that an appropriate public 
communication methodology is developed and executed post-earthquake.  
5.9 Summary 
The 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) has 
provided a local case study for the evaluation of post-earthquake geotechnical response to 
coseismic landslides. Based on the information presented in Chapter Three, a progression of 
requirements for geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake has been 
identified. Subsequently the geotechnical response has been divided up into three post-
earthquake phases which represent temporal changes in response priorities, requirements and 
task. The three phases include: 
Phase One - Emergency geotechnical response, 
Phase Two - Coordinated geotechnical response, 
Phase Three - Geotechnical involvement with earthquake recovery. 
The geotechnical responses to the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquakes have provided discussion around the applicability of the proposed phased 
geotechnical response model. This analysis has been used to inform recommendations to 
refine future post-earthquake response to coseismic slope failure. Temporal changes in 
response requirements can be used to inform emergency managers for pre-earthquake 
response planning.  
Analysis of the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake during the CES 
has enabled several themes to be identified. These themes are: coordination, life safety and 
public communication. The interaction between these themes presents an overview of the 
geotechnical response methodology and the importance of conducting management strategies 
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to pursue protection life safety. Further examination of the main themes and issues during the 
CES with comparison to the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan 
earthquakes has emphasised the importance of the following requirements for executing 
geotechnical response: 
 A pre-planned framework for post-earthquake geotechnical response, 
 Integration of geotechnical response with national level emergency management such 
as Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM), and 
 Internal communication between geotechnical professionals and scientists involved in 
the response to earthquake-induced landslides. 
The lack of these requirements in the CES hindered the implementation of slope assessments 
which required for informing the protection of life safety, and slowed the progression to 
Phase Two of the response. Furthermore, internal communication contributed to significant 
improvements in the response coordination. Four successful strategies that improved the 
coordination of the geotechnical response in the CES were: 
 The development of the a formalised geotechnical response group, 
 The division of the area impacted by coseismic landslides into geographic sectors, 
 Regular meetings within the geotechnical response group, and 
 The development of a centralised GIS database. 
One of the major issues identified in the geotechnical response to the CES was the absence of 
pre-planned guidelines. As such, recommendations for future planning for post-earthquake 
geotechnical response to coseismic landslides should consider the successes and issues 
highlighted in this Chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Future geotechnical response to earthquake-
induced landslides 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present discussion concerning recommendations for pre-
earthquake preparation and post-earthquake management of geotechnical response. 
Comparison between the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) and historical earthquakes 
such as the 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes in Chapter Five 
has highlighted the necessity for planning of post-earthquake response. Significant 
requirements, issues and successes identified within the response to the CES and international 
earthquakes have provided foundation for recommendations for geotechnical response. The 
outcomes of this Chapter can be used to inform planning for future post-earthquake response 
to coseismic landslides. 
6.2 Requirements of geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope 
failure 
Based on the analysis of the CES and historical earthquakes, the priority of geotechnical 
response to earthquake-induced slope failure is the protection of life safety. The 
organisational requirements to address the protection of life safety include: 
 Early implementation of a coordination strategy for response management of 
geotechnical hazards, so that minimal emphasis is required on the development of a 
management structure during the emergency response. 
 Clear integration between geotechnical professionals and national emergency 
management operations such as Civil Defence and Emergency Management. 
 Internal communication within the geotechnical response group, with the provision of 
regular meetings, and internal group structure. 
 A framework which provides a methodology for post-earthquake risk assessment and 
risk management. 
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Based on the requirements for post-earthquake geotechnical response outlined in Chapter 
Five, recommendations have been made to provide guidance for future earthquakes. 
Guidance is required for the management of the response and for tactical tasks such as risk 
assessment and risk management. The development of national guidelines for geotechnical 
response would be an effective method for supplementing the need for guidance by providing 
a clear methodology for management and execution of the response. 
Planning for future earthquakes needs to be adaptable to a variety of co-seismic geotechnical 
hazards and applications. Seismicity and slope instability in the Christchurch area prior to the 
CES did not provide insight into the extent of slope failure which occurred after the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake. Furthermore, the cliff collapse failure mechanism had not 
previously been considered as a hazard in the Port Hills. Intuitively, with the example of the 
CES in mind, guidelines or recommendations developed for post-earthquake response must 
remain flexible so that unanticipated circumstances can be easily incorporated into the 
geotechnical response. Furthermore, processes developed for post-earthquake geotechnical 
response should be documented so that the recommended methodology for response can be 
easily communicated. Territorial authorities may develop a geotechnical response 
methodology specific to their area; however the response format should be recorded and 
distributed to parties contributing to the response. 
6.3 Pre-earthquake planning for geotechnical response 
6.3.1 Define a management structure for the geotechnical response 
Establishing an adaptive management structure for response to large earthquakes prior to an 
earthquake occurring would be constructive so that post-earthquake protection of life safety is 
not hindered or delayed by the requirement to develop a management strategy. A 
management strategy would also improve the uniform application of life safety assessments 
and aim to coordinate immediate deployment of geotechnical professionals. Macfarlane and 
Yetton (2013) also identified that the immediate response post-earthquake can be haphazard 
if there is no guidance from pre-prepared management strategies.  
The 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake and 1994 Northridge, California earthquakes provide 
examples of how a pre-developed management structure could assist the geotechnical 
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response. For example, the geotechnical response to the Northridge earthquake was managed 
through the integration of geotechnical hazard assessment with ATC-20 Procedures for Post-
earthquake safety evaluation and the rapid execution of regional slope failure impact 
assessment by the United State Geological Survey (USGS). The deployment of 
reconnaissance teams in the aftermath of the Chi-Chi earthquake (Chapter Two) was assisted 
by the development of an earthquake response framework which was overseen by 
government organisations. 
Based on the information gathered in Chapter Four and Five a suggested management 
structure is shown in Figure 6.1. The following conclusions support the proposed structure: 
 Group leadership is essential for centralising the coordination of the response and 
providing a conduit for communication between CDEM and the tactical geotechnical 
response contingent.  
 Integration with CDEM has been identified as a crucial component of incorperating 
the geotechnical response with the wider earthquake response and is further discussed 
in section 6.3.2. The proposed structure (Figure 6.1) has detailed the CDEM 
controller, however; depending on the framework of CDEM reporting from the 
geotechnical response group it may be directed elsewhere within the leadership team.  
 Sector leaders have been included in the proposed management structure because the 
role was developed through iterations of the coordination framework to the CES and 
remained until the PHGG ceased in 2013. Sector leaders are important because they 
oversee the hazard assessment and response requirements within their sector area.  
 Assessment teams were required for risk assessments and to inform the evacuation of 
residents. 
Within the final iteration of the PHGG coordination framework during the CES, an 
engineering team was developed to provide technical advice to the group. This has not been 
included in the suggested operating structure because technical capabilities may be 
supplemented through requirements within leadership roles. Furthermore, technical support is 
required less in the immediate aftermath of an earthquake due to the management of risk 
through evacuations rather than engineering structures or protection works. As such, if the 
requirement for technical support is present post-earthquake, a team with technical expertise 
may be required to form. 
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6.3.2 Designate key personnel within geotechnical response structure 
In preparation for an earthquake, for urbanised areas of high seismicity and known landslide 
susceptibility it may be advantageous to designate key roles within the proposed geotechnical 
response operating structure. The requirement for this may be judged on the basis of regional 
risk assessment by local and regional authorities, and could include management of 
additional geotechnical hazards such as liquefaction and lateral spreading. With training 
conducive to the role requirements, the benefits of designating key personnel may include: 
 Geotechnical professionals designated into roles prior to an earthquake will be aware 
of the emergency management strategies and CDEM communication requirements. 
 Geotechnical professionals will be aware of roles within the response e.g. the role of 
USAR. 
 In the event of an earthquake the geotechnical response can be activated immediately. 
A similar framework is used for the Dam Safety Assurance Programme for medium and high 
risk Potential Impact Category (PIC) dams throughout New Zealand. To ensure the 
availability of a geotechnical group leader, two or three geotechnical professionals from each 
CDEM Controller 
Geotechnical Group Leader or 
leadership team 
Data Base Coordinator 
Sector Leader Sector Leader Sector Leader 
Assessment Teams 
Figure 6.1: Suggested operating structure for geotechncial response 
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region should be trained in the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System 
(CIMS) to inform of existing emergency management systems used by emergency services 
and CDEM. Training should also include informing professionals and scientists of the 
geotechnical response operational structure. Sector leaders may be designated in the 
aftermath of the event depending on the number of sectors that are developed and the 
resources available. 
Table 6.1 and 6.2 detail the proposed key roles involved in the geotechnical response based 
on the requirements of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence and historical case study 
earthquakes i.e. 1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes. To avoid 
the issue of role definition as described in Chapter Four and Five it is imperative that 
Geotechnical professionals involved in key roles such as Geotechnical group leader are aware 
of the response methods and practices of CDEM and USAR.  
Table 6.1: Proposed roles in the geotechncial response 
Title Role  Skills 
Geotechnical 
Group 
Leader 
 Volunteered geotechnical expert with 
training in geotechnical response systems 
 Report to Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Controller and provide 
advice where appropriate 
 Responsible for dividing affected area 
into sectors and appointing sector leaders 
 Provide Technical Leadership, set 
inspection priorities and liaise with other 
agencies 
 Oversee group coordination and induction 
of volunteer inspectors  
 Experienced in the geotechnical 
profession and management 
 Knowledgeable about Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management 
processes and systems.  
 Aware of the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management legislation 
and understand the place of 
geotechnical assessment in the 
response process.  
 The Geotechnical Group Leader must 
be prepared to speak with the public 
at community meetings.  
Database 
Coordinator 
 Report to the Geotechnical Group Leader  
 Report directly to the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management staff if spatial 
damage and risk information is required.  
 Responsible for developing the database, 
requesting information when required and 
passing on information from the database 
to CDEM.  
 Experienced in the geotechnical 
profession and GIS. 
 Capable of leading a team if required 
(depending on the scale of the event) 
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Table 6.2: Proposed roles in the geotechncial response continued 
Title Role Skills 
Sector 
Leaders 
 Manage the deployment of assessment 
teams within their sectors.  
 Ensure that the information flows from 
assessment teams to the database 
coordinator. 
 Report to the group leader regularly and 
meet regularly with other sector leaders 
 Maintain contact details of inspection team 
members and next of kin should be kept by 
sector leaders. 
 Track deployment locations and 
movements of assessment teams. 
 Experienced in the geotechnical 
profession and have experience in 
management.  
 Sector leaders need to be prepared to 
be involved at community meetings 
within their sectors 
Rapid 
Assessment 
teams  
 Conduct rapid assessments as required  
 Report back to sector leader.  
 Make recommendations to USAR and 
CDEM for evacuation and Building Safety 
Notices based on the observations they 
have made regarding the slope failure.  
 Inspectors should work in pairs or 
assessment teams.  
 Assessment teams must comprise of 
geotechnical professionals who have 
experience in the geotechnical 
profession 
 Assessments teams must be 
confident in their ability to make 
recommendations to USAR and 
CDEM based on the observations 
they have made regarding the slope 
failure.  
 The assessment teams must be 
prepared to communicate with the 
public on an individual basis or at 
community meetings. 
 
6.3.3 Integration of geotechnical response with Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management 
As recorded in Chapters Four and Five, the detachment of the geotechnical response from the 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) response hindered the integration of the 
geotechnical response within the wider emergency management. Due to the lack of linkage 
with CDEM the following challenges arose: 
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 Development in coordination was hindered by lack of integration with CDEM, 
 Inconsistency in the integration of geotechnical hazard assessment with building 
safety evaluation, 
 Delay in establishing effective public communication systems, 
 Issues with role definition arose immediately post-earthquake, and 
 No formal reporting system was present between CDEM and geotechnical 
professionals which led to prolonged acknowledgement of the issue within the Port 
Hills by CDEM Managers. 
Pre-earthquake integration of geotechnical response capabilities in the CDEM response 
system would improve communication systems, role awareness and ensure that response 
methodologies conform to the requirements of CDEM. Coordination and agreement between 
geotechnical professionals, geotechnical scientists, USAR and Building Safety Evaluation 
teams must be developed so that there is integration of geotechnical hazard evaluation within 
Building Safety Assessments.  
Since the CES occurred, the lack of linkage between CDEM and professional engineers 
within rapid building assessment in the response has also been highlighted as a major issue in 
the response to the event sequence despite guidance from ‘Guidelines for Building Safety 
Evaluation during a State of Emergency’ developed by the New Zealand Society for 
Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE) (Brunsdon 2012; Brunsdon et al. 2012). It is clear that for 
the interface between CDEM and professional engineers to progress in New Zealand, systems 
need to be developed at a national level with the encouragement of legislative drivers. Due to 
these conditions previous attempts at developing response arrangements have not led to a 
conclusive result (Brunsdon 2012).  
Despite the requirement for further integration at a national level, the NZSEE guidelines 
provided fundamental recommendations for building safety evaluation which aided the 
coordination of the response from structural engineers and building inspectors and ensured 
the Building Safety Evaluation process was under the direction of the Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Controller. As such liability was addressed under Section 110 of the 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (NZSEE 2011). Because the 
geotechnical response was not initially managed under the CDEM arrangements, initially 
liability became a concern for some volunteering geotechnical professionals. In comparison 
to the geotechnical response, the response from structural engineers and building inspectors 
150 
 
was managed more effectively and as such provides a pragmatic example of the advantage of 
establishing response guidelines. Addressing liability issues prior to an earthquake occurring 
may also increase the number of willing volunteers in the aftermath of an emergency 
(NZSEE 2009).  
6.3.4 Develop a register of geotechnical professionals 
After a major earthquake or geotechnical hazard event such as the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake where large scale slope failure occurred, local resources may be inadequate to 
execute the required assessment of life safety risk. Preparation of a register of geotechnical 
professionals who are able to assist in the event of an earthquake may reduce deficiency in 
local resourcing and enable efficient mobilisation for emergency response. By 2013 the 
Christchurch City Council (CCC) established a list of geotechnical consultancies that could 
provide geotechnical engineering advice which highlights the ongoing requirement for 
geotechnical professionals in the response to earthquake-induced slope failures.  
The development of a pre-earthquake network would encourage awareness within the 
geotechnical community of emergency response procedures for geotechnical professionals 
and Civil Defence and Emergency Management. The network could be used to maintain 
communication and keep geotechnical professionals informed of geological hazards in the 
region. Prior awareness of landslide hazards and response procedures would aim to increase 
the efficiency of the emergency response.  For the network to be successful, governing 
agencies such as CDEM, and territorial and regional authorities would need to agree to 
provide information updates on geotechnical hazards and emergency management strategies. 
An organisation such as the Institute of Professional Engineers New Zealand (IPENZ) may 
be required to oversee the network. Input from local universities and research institutes may 
also provide information around geotechnical hazard and local seismicity.  
In a review of the integration of professional engineers in emergency response in New 
Zealand by Brunsdon (2012) it was noted that a similar register of professional engineers who 
can assist in civil defence emergency had been developed by IPENZ prior to the 4
th
 
September 2010 earthquake. Unfortunately the establishment of the register had only 
progressed to a preliminary stage at the time of the earthquake sequence (Brunsdon 2012). 
Noting the specialisation of engineers within the register of professional engineers would be 
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beneficial, so that structural or geotechnical engineers can be extracted from the database. 
Contact information on the register should be updated regularly to ensure that in the event of 
an emergency the contacts are up to date. 
The similar register established for the California Emergency Management Agency has been 
developed where over 6,000 professional who have been trained in either rapid safety 
evaluations or coordination are listed on the database (Brunsdon 2012). Specific credentials 
are required to be eligible for the database. This is useful information to include in a database 
due to the qualitative nature of rapid post-earthquake risk assessment and the reliance on 
expert judgement. Inconsistencies in knowledge, skill level and confidence between 
professionals have the potential to result in inconsistent evaluations of risk (NZSEE 2011). 
Without further research it is difficult to delineate to what extent professional registration or 
experience would be required for geotechnical professionals to be included in a database.  
Where extensive coseismic slope failure has occurred the geotechnical response may need to 
be supplemented by additional volunteered geotechnical professionals that have not been 
previously informed of the response systems prior to the event occurring. This should not be 
considered a hindrance to the geotechnical response, so long as there are sufficient numbers 
of the response contingent who are aware of the organised procedures in the emergency 
response. To minimise this issue, debriefing of external geotechnical professionals should be 
included in the management format of the emergency response so that the incorporation of 
these resources is considered prior to the event occurring. The development of guidance 
document(s) which explain the framework for geotechnical response would improve the 
communication of operating procedures to geotechnical professionals with limited exposure 
to the response systems. A concise post-earthquake debrief outlining the response structure 
will also inform geotechnical professionals with limited knowledge around geotechnical 
response.  
6.3.5 Development of data collection documents 
Collection of consistent and methodical data is required during the immediate geotechnical 
response to support qualitative slope assessments. This could be supplemented through the 
use of a standard template for rapid slope assessment and data collection. A rapid safety 
assessment form has been developed in the Guidelines for Building Safety Evaluation 
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(NZSEE 2009) for collection of data such as the building type, location and occupancy. The 
assessment form also requires the inspector to notate observations made during the 
assessment and decisions regarding the safety of the building relative to the observations 
made. A similar template would be useful for post-earthquake site assessments of earthquake-
induced slope failure, however, it is unlikely that the form for earthquake-induced landslide 
assessments could be as comprehensive as the rapid building evaluation forms. This is 
because it is unlikely that predefining options for the types of slope failure would assist the 
evaluation as there is likely to be a high variability of the types of slope failure that could 
occur (Chapter Two). Although definition of failure types is likely to take place in the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake the hazard associated with the slope failure impact 
could be included in the template (i.e. inundation of material). 
Due to the variability in expert judgement, the use of qualitative assessment of the risk should 
be noted and recorded. Where possible, it is important that qualitative assessment is 
explained and supported by ample reason (Crozier and Glade, 2004). For the assessment to be 
transferable and credible it would be useful for information contributing to qualitative 
assessment is adequately recorded. This also has the potential to inform further detailed 
assessment of the site at a later date. Table 6.3 provides suggestions for a data collection 
template. 
To inform the database and supplement the spatial arrangement of landslide features at a site 
it would be useful to ensure that a notated aerial photograph or site diagram is recorded. The 
collection of spatial information in this manner assists the communication of observations 
and ensures that the information is more transferable. Along with this spatial information it 
would be useful to record the street location or GPS location of the site so that the 
information can be easily integrated into a GIS database. Timely integration of collected 
information into a centralised database enables maps to be developed to present the 
distribution of landslide features and identify and prioritise the worst hit areas.  
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Table 6.3: Suggested data collection for assessment forms 
Information Justification 
Administration information 
Assessment location  Identify where assessment took place 
Name and contact details of geotechnical 
professionals involved in assessments  
 Enables the assessment to be traced back to 
the assessor 
Hazard Characterisation 
Slope failure type  Characterisation of the slope failure to 
identify the associated hazards Notes of observations (rate of failure, area 
affected, evacuation status of area) 
Estimate likely reactivation or type of movement 
(creep, rainfall, large seismic event) 
 This information contributes to the analysis 
of slope behaviour and likelihood of failure to 
establish how imminent the risk is Measurements of displacement and size of slope 
failure features i.e. crack aperture 
Location and type of installed slope monitoring 
equipment, including measurements taken 
 Monitoring equipment can be easily located 
by other geotechnical professionals, and 
record of measurements is provided for 
further comparison 
Consequence Analysis 
Diagram/sketch of slope failure and elements at 
risk (photographs may be attached at a later date 
but photo name/number could be listed) 
 Provide visual information of the extent of 
area impacted by the slope failure or could be 
impacted with further failure – could allow 
comparison with later observations 
Likely impact/consequences associated with 
further movement of reactivation (i.e. inundation 
of material on to dwelling) 
 Provides analysis of the likely consequence to 
inform risk management decisions. 
Risk Management 
Recommendations for hazard treatment and/or 
evacuations 
 Provides a record and allows peer review of 
decision later in response. 
Note reasons for evacuation recommendations 
Further Assessment 
Recommendations for further review of the site  Enables record of further site assessment that 
may be required during the response. 
 
6.3.6 Assemble geotechnical response resources pre-event 
In the aftermath of a large scale earthquake it is often difficult to obtain the resources 
required to inform a geotechnical response. This issue was observed in the response to the 
Canterbury Earthquake Sequence particularly in regards to aerial photography and the 
development of a GIS database. In preparation of an earthquake, resources can be assembled 
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to support the efficient execution of a geotechnical response. It is recommended that the 
following resources are obtained prior to an event: 
 Maps of lifeline routes, critical buildings and infrastructure in hilly terrain, 
 Aerial photographs and historical information of known slope instabilities, 
 Hard copies and electronic copies of assessment forms for immediate reproduction, 
 A pre-prepared contact list of details for territorial authorities, Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (CDEM) contacts and Urban Search and Rescue contacts 
should be ready to distribute to all volunteering geotechnical professionals to reduce 
the requirement for contacts to form immediately post-earthquake. The prepared list 
should be updated regularly to ensure contact details are recent. 
 A building should be identified to be used as the coordination centre for the 
geotechnical response. Ideally internal geotechnical group meetings will take place at 
the coordination centre. It would be appropriate to locate the geotechnical 
coordination centre within or adjacent to the CDEM Emergency Coordination Centre, 
Emergency Operations Centre or Building Safety Evaluation Coordination Centre so 
that communication can be maintained within the response. 
Providing a location for meetings is crucial because they facilitate internal communication 
within the geotechnical response group. Ideally the geotechnical response should begin with a 
meeting to coordinate initial deployment. In the immediate aftermath of an earthquake 
information that needs to be communicated include: 
 Information collected during aerial and ground reconnaissance to inform decisions 
around which areas should be prioritised for assessment, 
 Resource requirements i.e. monitoring equipment, involvement of USAR or further 
geotechnical professionals, 
 Accessibility issues i.e. transportation routes that have been damaged and prevent 
access to locations impacted by slope failures, 
 Assessment teams should be briefed regarding the lines of communication, 
procedures, and responsibilities prior to deployment from the coordination centre. 
155 
 
6.3.7 Pre-earthquake geotechnical response training 
Basic training in civil defence and emergency management response systems would be useful 
for geotechnical professionals to understand their role within existing emergency 
management systems. Training in the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management 
System (CIMS) would provide knowledge around existing emergency management systems 
used by emergency services and CDEM. This will encourage understanding of role 
requirements, communication requirements and structure of emergency response prior to an 
earthquake occurring. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, this was an issue within the 
geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake.  
Basic training in public communication for geotechnical professionals in leadership roles 
would be useful to encourage clear and consistent communication with residents. To 
supplement the demand for information from residents several geotechnical experts may be 
required to specifically address public communication. This was observed in the Canterbury 
Earthquake Sequence when public communications were a large component of the 
geotechnical response. 
6.4 Post-earthquake management of geotechnical response 
Pre-earthquake preparation can include the development of management structures and data 
collection documents to meet the requirements for post-earthquake response, however, the 
following response requirements may be difficult to address through pre-earthquake 
planning: 
 A deployment regime – deployment is typically informed through information 
obtained from the initial impact assessment. The development of geographic sectors 
to guide deployment worked well during the CES, however, information concerning 
the extent of area impacted was needed to inform this strategy, 
 A data management platform to allow data synthesis and analysis – a pre-developed 
flexible geospatial platform may be difficult to maintain due to constant changes in 
technology. 
Based on the response tasks observed during the CES, a proposed response sequence 
outlining the requirements for data analysis and deployment has been displayed in Figure 6.2. 
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6.4.1 Development of geographic sectors within areas affected by earthquake 
The development of geographic sectors within the Port Hills was a successful technique used 
during the CES, and has been used during the response to the 2011 Nelson floods where 
rainfall-induced slope failure occurred. Division of the affected area into sectors in the 
immediate response phase would be useful for the coordination of initial mobilisation and 
deployment. Information from aerial reconnaissance and ground reconnaissance should 
inform the development of sectors in the area affected. Factors that may influence the number 
of sectors required include: 
 The severity of the event;  
 Extent of earthquake-induced landsliding;  
 Placement of vulnerable elements within the area affected; and 
 Availability of response resources. 
EARTHQUAKE 
Meeting of geotechnical professionals 
at pre-designated location 
Develop Sectors/confirm predefined 
sectors 
Ground Reconnaissance Aerial Reconnaissance 
(impact assessment) 
Deployment of geotechnical 
Professionals 
Rapid Risk Assessment 
Recommendations for 
evacuations 
Redefine sectors Redefine sectors 
Figure 6.2: Proposed format for activation of geotechnical response 
Development of a data 
management platform 
(GIS) 
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For cities or regions that are known to be susceptible to earthquake-induced landsliding it 
would be useful to divide the area into sectors as part of the CDEM emergency response plan. 
For cities such as Wellington, New Zealand, this system could be beneficial as there is a 
known landslide risk in this area and a known seismic hazard (Greater Wellington Regional 
Council 1996). For some cities this may be inappropriate or excessive if the area susceptible 
to coseismic slope failure is relatively minor, or areas susceptible are not extensively 
populated. Sectors established prior to an earthquake should remain adaptable to the extent of 
area impacted. 
Geomorphological and geological mapping prior to an earthquake event could be used to 
contribute to sector division and susceptibility mapping. Susceptibility mapping contributed 
to the ongoing response to the 1999 Chi-Chi Earthquake and 1994 Northridge Earthquake 
described in Chapter Two which aided the deployment of geotechnical professionals to areas 
of high risk. 
6.4.2 GIS database or data management platform 
Analysis of the response to the CES and historical earthquakes has provided insight into the 
importance of a post-earthquake data management system. The benefits of utilising a data 
management system, such as a GIS platform, include the following: 
 Spatial data analysis of hazard locations to inform emergency management decisions 
i.e. prioritisation of areas, 
 Comparison between hazard location and the location of critical infrastructure or 
residential areas to inform deployment, 
 Provide spatial information of areas where assessment is complete or assessment is 
required 
A Geospatial database may be established in the aftermath of an earthquake using 
information obtained from local and regional authorities. The integration of historical slope 
failure locations or previous landslide susceptibility mapping within the data management 
platform may be useful to aid initial deployment. The response to the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake and the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake indicated that landslide inventories and 
susceptibility mapping are useful for understanding the mechanical response of a slope to 
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seismic shaking and can inform emergency responders of where to centralise response efforts 
in the aftermath of an earthquake or aftershock.  
6.5 Summary 
Case study analysis of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) and international 
earthquakes (1994 Northridge, 1999 Chi-Chi and 2008 Wenchuan earthquakes) which 
produced significant co-seismic slope failure managed by geotechnical professionals, has 
provided insight into the requirements of post-earthquake geotechnical response to 
earthquake-induced slope failure. Information from the case study analysis indicates that the 
priority of the response is the protection of life safety. To address this priority the following 
recommendations have been made for pre-earthquake planning: 
1. Develop a management structure within the geotechnical response: 
2. Designate key personnel within the management structure; 
3. Establish integration between CDEM and geotechnical professionals; 
4. Develop a register of geotechnical professionals to resource post-earthquake response; 
5. Develop a data collection document to provide consistent data collection; 
6. Assemble resources prior to an earthquake; 
7. Provide geotechnical professionals with training in Emergency Management 
principles and public communication. 
Despite implementation of pre-planning the following requirements are likely to be addressed 
in the aftermath of an earthquake: 
1. The development of geographic sectors to inform deployment within the impacted 
area;  
2. The development of a GIS database. 
Discussion around these recommendations can be used to inform the development of national 
guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure. 
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Chapter Seven: Summary, conclusions and 
Recommendations 
7.1 Thesis scope and methodology 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the response to earthquake-induced landsliding 
during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) and to inform preparation for future 
earthquake response. The initiating earthquake in the CES occurred on the 4
th
 September 
2011 and caused minor localised rockfall and slope failure in loess which conformed to 
historical slope failures recorded in the Port Hills. However, extensive slope failure induced 
by the 22
nd
 February 200 earthquake was unprecedented, and ground motions experienced 
significantly exceeded the 500-year event in the then current probabilistic seismic hazard 
model for Canterbury.  
Semi-structured interviews with geotechnical professionals, scientists, and representatives 
from local and regional authorities were conducted to collect information regarding the 
coordination and management of the response to earthquake-induced landsliding during the 
CES. Because the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake was the first event in the CES to cause 
widespread co-seismic rockfall, cliff collapse and loess failure, rapid deployment of 
geotechnical professionals was required to undertake life safety risk assessments and inform 
on hazard management. Processes for coordinating this response developed post-earthquake 
because there was no pre existing framework for large-scale slope assessment during a state 
of emergency. Analysis of the geotechnical response to the CES indicated that the response 
by the geotechnical community to coseismic slope failure was well executed but would have 
been improved with pre-planning. 
A temporal progression of response priorities, tasks and requirements was developed as a 
phased conceptual model based on the geotechnical response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake. Literature review of the 1994 Northridge (California), 1999 Chi-Chi (Taiwan), 
and 2008 Wenchuan (China), earthquakes was conducted to allow comparison with the CES. 
This enabled three response phases: emergency geotechnical response (Phase One), 
coordinated geotechnical response (Phase Two), and Recovery (Phase Three), to be identified 
after each of the international earthquakes and the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. 
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7.2 Principal conclusion 
The primary conclusion for post-earthquake geotechnical response to coseismic landslides is 
that development of national guidelines is required to prepare for future earthquakes. 
Furthermore, current building safety evaluation practice in New Zealand should incorporate 
geotechnical assessment alongside structural assessment, similar to section 11 of the ATC-20 
guidelines for post-earthquake building safety evaluation used after the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake. The ATC-20 guidelines outlined the types of geotechnical hazards likely to be 
induced co-seismically, and provided recommendations for management of high risk hazards. 
Challenges and success identified in Canterbury Earthquake Sequence (CES) have enabled 
comparison between the New Zealand geotechnical response methodology and international 
response methodologies. The absence of pre-existing guidelines for geotechnical response 
during the CES was the most significant difference to the 1994 Northridge and 1999 Chi-Chi 
earthquakes, which were both guided by pre-event preparation which informed response and 
management strategies for geotechnical hazards. Pre-earthquake planning in these two cases 
enabled early implementation of a coordinated slope assessment post-earthquake, and in the 
case of Northridge informed transparent integration between building safety evaluation and 
assessment of geotechnical hazard.  
Examination of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake indicated that challenges in the response 
to earthquake-induced landsliding in the Port Hills arose primarily from the lack of 
integration of geotechnical hazards into Civil Defence and Emergency Management response 
strategies. Furthermore, deficiencies in consistency of slope assessment and deployment of 
resources hindered an efficient execution of response capabilities in the first two weeks post-
earthquake. These challenges were addressed through the development of management 
strategies within the geotechnical response group during the first two weeks post-earthquake.  
Despite New Zealand’s history of earthquake-induced landsliding (Hancox et al. 2002) the 
CES was the first to induce widespread slope failure in an urban area. Several other major 
cities in New Zealand, such as Wellington, Dunedin and Nelson, are situated on terrain 
similar to that of the Port Hills and consequently have the potential to exhibit similar 
coseismic slope failure. As such, the experience of the CES indicates that it is imperative that 
guidelines for geotechnical response to earthquake-induced landsliding are developed. To 
inform further planning of post-earthquake geotechnical response, a series of 
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recommendations have been developed based on the CES case study analysis with 
comparison to historical earthquakes.  
7.3 Recommendations 
Recommendations to inform future guidelines were developed based on the case study 
analysis of the CES and historical international earthquakes which provided insight into the 
requirements for response to earthquake-induced landsliding. Recommendations include: 
Pre-earthquake preparation 
1. Integrate geotechnical response with Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
(CDEM) to ensure management of earthquake-induced landslides is incorporated 
within wider emergency management systems. 
2. Develop an adaptable management structure for geotechnical response pre-
earthquake, including a hierarchical framework for roles within the response group. 
3. Designate significant roles within the geotechnical response framework pre-
earthquake in anticipation of geotechnical response. 
4. Prepare a register of geotechnical professionals pre-earthquake who are capable of 
assisting in rapid post-earthquake geotechnical response. 
5. Response resources, such as maps of critical infrastructure, lifeline routes or areas of 
historic landslide movement, should be gathered pre-earthquake so that information is 
readily available. 
6. A standard data collection sheet capable of site specific adaption should be developed 
pre-earthquake to improve consistency in data collection and slope assessments in 
various terrains. 
7. Geotechnical professionals involved in geotechnical response should undertake basic 
Civil Defence and Emergency Management training, such as familiarity with 
Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS). 
8. Training in public communication should be made available to geotechnical 
professionals who are likely to be involved in leadership roles in the response. 
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Post-earthquake management recommendations 
1. Geographic sectors of the area affected by earthquake-induced landslides should be 
distinguished as part of the post-earthquake response management to ensure all areas 
affected by coseismic landslides are incorporated into the response. 
2. A GIS database should be established immediately post-earthquake for timely data 
management and analysis. 
Based on these recommendations, further work will be required to develop these 
recommendations into national guidelines for post-earthquake geotechnical response. The 
success of these guidelines will require the commitment of government level organisations 
and professional groups to contribute and agree on the development of sustainable and 
practical methods for geotechnical response. Furthermore, pre-earthquake planning must 
remain adaptable to a variety of earthquake scenarios and terrains, and support a flexible 
management system for a range of landslide types. 
7.4 Further work 
The analysis of post-earthquake geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure 
during the CES has highlighted the need for pre-earthquake planning. The aim of this thesis 
has been to inform the development of national guidelines or guidance notes around post-
earthquake geotechnical response. To support this outcome, further research is necessary in 
the following areas: 
 Further research to inform the integration of response to liquefaction and lateral 
spreading into the post-earthquake geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope 
failures which a separate series of mechanisms geotechncially.  
 Further research to establish specific techniques for emergency response to various 
failure mechanisms, including scenario developments to inform CDEM response. 
 Further research and review of additional historical earthquakes case studies to 
supplement current understanding of geotechnical response conducted internationally. 
Review of historical earthquakes in this thesis was limited to published literature; it 
would be useful to review post-earthquake reports specifically developed for 
government organisations that may have not been published. 
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 Further interviews with local, regional, and national government to research the 
influence of legislation and current emergency management strategies on the 
development of geotechnical guidelines, particularly in the involvement of building 
safety evaluation formats and their adaption to include geotechnical aspects. 
 Conduct further interviews to gauge the willingness of the geotechnical community, 
CDEM and local and national government to implement response preparation through 
development of response guidelines. 
 Conduct further interviews with Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) to inform the 
development of strategies to incorporate the capabilities of USAR into national 
guidelines for post-earthquake geotechnical response. 
This thesis and further research will inform the development of national guidelines for 
geotechnical response to earthquake-induced slope failure, and ensure that New Zealand 
follows international best practice. 
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Appendix A – Landslide hazard characterisation 
The term landslide is broadly defined as “the movement of a mass of rock, debris or earth 
down a slope” (Cruden and Varnes 1996). The term can be used to describe a wide range of 
phenomena which can occur in various materials, vary in scale, and type and rate of 
movement (Hincks et al. 2013). Landslide classification is important because it is one of the 
first steps of hazard analysis in the assessment and management of landslide hazard and risk. 
Landslides are typically classed according to the mode of failure and the type of material 
undergoing movement. Classification systems have been discussed by Hutchinson (1988); 
Crozier (1989); Cruden and Varnes (1996); Dikau and European Commission (1996). The 
classification system outlined by Cruden and Varnes, (Table A.7.1) is a commonly used for 
landslide characterisation and has been used in world-wide research of earthquake-induced 
slope failure (Keefer 1984; Rodriguez et al. 1999). 
Table A.7.1: Cruden and Varnes (1996) clasification of slope movements. Fine material is defined as >80% of material is 
comprised of particles smaller than 2mm 
  Material 
   Engineering Soils 
Movement Bedrock Coarse Fine 
Fall  Rock fall Debris Fall Earth Fall 
Topple  Rock Topple Debris topple Earth topple 
Slide Rotational 
Translational 
Rock Slump, block 
slide, slide 
Debris slump, 
block slide, slide 
Earth slump, block 
slide, slide 
Lateral Spread  Rock Spread Debris Spread Earth spread 
Flow  Rock flow (deep 
creep) 
Debris flow Earth flow 
   Soil Creep 
Complex  Combination of two of more principle types of movement 
 
The rate of failure is also used to classify landslides. The landslide velocity scale proposed by 
Cruden and Varnes (1996), Table A.7.2, is a widely used velocity classification system that 
presents a correlation between the movement velocity and a description of the rate of 
movement. Assessment of the rate of movement is important because the velocity of a 
landslide affects the impact potential and consequently affects landslide risk management 
techniques (Crozier and Glade 2004). 
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Table A.7.2: Classification of velocity of movement according to Cruden and Varnes (1996) 
Velocity Class Description Velocity (mm/s) Typical Velocity 
7 Extremely Fast 
  
5 x 10
3 
5 m/s 
6 Very Fast 
5 x 10
1 
3 m/min 
5 Fast 
5 x 10
-1 
1.8 m/hr 
4 Moderate 
5 x 10
-3 
13 m/month 
3 Slow 
5 x 10
-5 
1.6 m/year 
2 Very Slow 
5 x 10
-7 
16 mm/year 
1 Extremely Slow 
 
A review of worldwide studies of earthquake-induced slope failure undertaken by Keefer 
(1984) and Rodriguez et al. (1999) has been used to collate characteristics of coseismic 
landslides with typical landslide classification principles outlined by Cruden and Varnes 
(1996) (Table A.7.3). Based on reviewed literature, Table A.7.3 provides a synthesis of 
proposed thresholds for slope angle, minimum shaking intensity, and minimum magnitude 
events required to induce each type of landslide. Characterisation of earthquake-induced 
landslides to determine such thresholds can contribute to hazard and risk analysis and 
management. Information from research into New Zealand earthquake-induced landsliding 
by Hancox et al. (2002) has been included to provide local comparison of landslide 
characteristics. Site specific variability in material composition, local ground water 
conditions, pre-earthquake static slope stability, additional trigger events (e.g. rainfall prior to 
earthquake occurring), and influence from peak ground acceleration are some of the limiting 
factors that have not been appreciated in these thresholds and are limitations to the generic 
application of these characteristics.  
Review of the classification system used by Keefer (1984) and Rodriguez et al. (1999) in 
Table A.7.3 highlights the distinction between disrupted and coherent slides and falls used for 
characterisation of earthquake-induced landslides. This distinguishes an additional 
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development in classification of earthquake-induced slope failure in comparison to typical 
landslide classification outlined by Cruden and Varnes (1996). According to Keefer (1984) 
disrupted landslides refer to a material not moving as a coherent mass. Disturbance of 
‘disrupted’ material occurs when it is released from the slope, as such most mass movements 
of material will have some degree of internal disruption (Keefer 2002).  
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Table A.7.3: Characteristics of earthquake-induced landslides (Modified from Keefer 1984; Keefer 2002) 
Name Type of Movement Typical Material type Slope angle 
threshold 
Minimum 
Shaking Intensity 
Minimum Magnitude 
Earthquake 
LANDSLIDES IN ROCK 
Disrupted slides and Falls 
Rockfall  Bouncing, rolling, free fall (Keefer 1994; Cruden and Varnes 1996;
Keefer 2002; Massey et al. 2012a)
 Descends very rapidly to extremely rapidly (>5m/sec) and travels in
unpredictable path down slope (Massey et al. 2012a)
 Individual block of rock or small number of boulders (Keefer 1984)
 Fractured or weakly cemented rock slopes with a wide range of rock
types (Keefer 1984; Rodriguez et al. 1999)
 Depth of failure dependant on spacing of discontinuities (Rodriguez et al.
1999) 
>40° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
>40° (Hancox et al. 
2002) 
MMI IV (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=4.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=5.5, MS = 5.4 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Rockslide  Translational sliding (Keefer 1984; Cruden and Varnes 1996;
Rodriguez et al. 1999; Keefer 2002)
 Slide refers to down slope movement of material on planar or curved
dominant failure surface such as a shear zone, bedding plane or other
discontinuity dipping out of slope (Cruden and Varnes 1996)
 Can occur as shallow or deep movement (between 3-100m)
(Rodriguez et al. 1999)
 Mass of rock which have been disordered during movement into
fragments and blocks. Materials variable however typically failure occurs
on shear surface or outward dipping discontinuity or plane of weakness
(Keefer 1984)
 Preferential poorly cemented sedimentary material (Rodriguez et al. 1999)
> 35° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
>55° (Rodriguez et al. 
1999) 
>25°-35° (Hancox et 
al. 2002) 
MMI IV (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=4.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=5.5, MS = 5.4 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Rock 
avalanche 
 Sliding and/or flow movement with occasional free fall (Keefer 1984;
Keefer 2002)
 Rock avalanches can travel several kilometres at high velocities
usually greater than 3m/sec (Keefer 1984).
 Highly disrupted and fragmented rock that moves as stream of rock
fragments (Keefer 1984)
> 25° (Keefer 1984; 
Hancox et al. 2002; 
Keefer 2002) 
Source area >150m 
high (Keefer 1984) 
MMI IV (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
MS=6.0 (Keefer 1984) 
MS = 6.5 (Rodriguez et al. 
1999) 
Coherent Slides 
Rock slumps  Rotational sliding. Sliding typically on basal shear surface with 
component of head ward rotation (Keefer 1984; Keefer 2002) 
 Keefer 1984 suggested movement was typically slow to rapid
(0.3m/sec - 1.5m/yr ) on Varnes landslide movement scale (Varnes
1978) 
 Variable rock types. Often weak rock, poorly cemented, closely jointed,
weathered or sheared rock (Keefer 1984)
>15° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=5.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=6.5, MS = 5.9 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Rock block 
slides 
 Translational sliding movement on basal shear surface or discontinuity
dipping out of slope, minimal rotational movement (Keefer 1984).
 Depth of slide controlled by geological features or plains of weakness
in rock mass (Rodriguez et al. 1999).
 Variable material where basal shear surface is present (Keefer 1984)
 Typical materials can include: tuff, andesite, weakly cemented pumice,
closely jointed or weakly cemented shale, sandstone, siltstone, mudstone
(Keefer 1984)
 Volcanic deposits such as tuff, pumice tephra, basalt; also sedimentary
and metamorphic deposits (Rodriguez et al. 1999)
 Weakening of soil material may also be attributed to contributing factors
such as a high water table which could cause saturation at the failure
surface
>15° (Rodriguez et al. 
1999) 
>15° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
>15° (Hancox et al. 
2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=5.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=6.5, MS = 5.9 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
LANDSLIDES IN SOIL 
Disrupted slides and Falls 
Soil Falls  Free fall, rolling, bounding (Keefer 1984; Keefer 2002)
 Typically mass may disintegrate upon decent and impact,
consequently run out length may be less than rockfall (Keefer 1984)
 Block or disrupted mass of soil (Keefer 1984) >63° measured, >40° 
predicted (Keefer 
1984; Keefer 2002) 
MMI IV (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=4.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=5.5, MS = 5.4 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Disrupted 
soil slides 
 Translational slide (Keefer 1984; Cruden and Varnes 1996; Keefer
2002) 
 See slide definition in “rockslides”
 Variable materials that move on soil-bedrock contacts or boundaries
between soil layers, typically loose, unsaturated residual or colluvial
sand (Keefer 1984)
>15° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI IV (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=4.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=5.5, MS = 5.4 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
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Soil 
Avalanches 
 Complex, involving translational sliding with subsidiary flow, and
occasional free fall (Keefer 1984; Keefer 2002)
 Disintegrated, disrupted soil. Soil avalanche consists of streams of
grains and small blocks of soils (Keefer 1984)
>25° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI IV (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
MS=6.5 (Keefer 1984) 
MS = 6.0 (Rodriguez et al. 
1999) 
Coherent Slides 
Soil Slumps  Rotational sliding on basal shear surface (Keefer 1984; Keefer
2002). 
 Keefer 1984 suggested movement was typically slow to rapid
(0.3m/sec - 1.5m/yr ) on Varnes landslide movement scale (Varnes
1978) 
 Materials variable, including manmade fill, flood-plain alluvium (Keefer
1984) 
>7° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=4.5 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=5.5, MS = 5.4 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Soil block 
slides 
 Translational sliding, minimal rotational movement (Keefer 1984;
Keefer 2002)
 Materials variable, including manmade fill, flood-plain alluvium most
commonly (Keefer 1984)
 Weakening of soil material may also be attributed to contributing factors
such as a high water table which could cause saturation at the failure
surface
>5° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=4.5 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=5.5, MS = 5.4 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Slow earth 
flows 
 Translational sliding on saturated basal shear surface with minor
internal flow (Keefer 1984; Keefer 2002)
 Materials variable, including clayey residual soil, clayey loam, till,
volcanic ash, colluviums. Typically can occur where basal shear surface
is saturated (Keefer 1984)
>10° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
>10° (Hancox et al. 
2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
 MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=5.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=6.5, MS = 5.9 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Lateral Spreads and Flows 
Soil lateral 
spreads 
 Translation on basal zone of liquefied gravel, sand or silt or
weakened sensitive clay (Keefer 1984).
 Materials variable, including alluvium and manmade fill primarily
(Keefer 1984)
>0.3° (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=5.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=6.5, MS = 5.9 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
Rapid soil 
flows 
 Flow  similar to a liquid and at high velocities(Keefer 1984)  Stream of soil grains, usually but not always mixed with water (Keefer
2002) 
>2.3 (Keefer 1984; 
Keefer 2002) 
MMI V (Keefer 1984) 
MMI V (Rodriguez et 
al. 1999) 
ML=5.0 (Keefer 1984) 
ML=6.5, MS = 5.9 
(Rodriguez et al. 1999) 
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Appendix B – Manuscript for New Zealand Geotechnical Society Conference, 
2013 
This appendix presents a paper that was presented at the New Zealand Geotechnical Society 
Conference in Queenstown, New Zealand, November 2013. The manuscript details the 
research methodology as at May 2013. The principle difference between the research 
methodology in the manuscript, and the research methodology in Chapter Two of this thesis, 
is the examination of four case study slope failure sites in the Port Hills, Christchurch that 
was not included in the final research due to confidentiality requirements from Christchurch 
City Council.  
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ABSTRACT 
The 2010-2012 Canterbury Earthquake sequence has highlighted and identified the value of 
standardised, practical and co-ordinated guidelines for geotechnical risk assessment for 
inhabited areas in the aftermath of a natural disaster. The lack of guidelines and provisions to 
manage the assessment of geotechnical hazards hindered co-ordinated, timely and transparent 
management of geotechnical risk in the hilly suburbs of Christchurch. 
The earthquake sequence triggered rockfall, landslide and cliff collapse events throughout the 
Port Hills. This damaged thousands of houses and critical infrastructure, and created a life risk 
issue for people inhabiting the area. Given the high seismic hazard in New Zealand and the 
location of significant active faults near populated centres, it is beneficial to learn from the 
response undertaken following the Christchurch Earthquake sequence to inform geotechnical 
risk assessment guidelines for future events. 
This paper examines our proposal for research into how the geotechnical risk assessment 
approach evolved throughout the earthquake sequence and in the apparent post-sequence period. 
This research will aim to establish the evolution of information needed as the response 
progressed, and identification of lessons learnt. The basis for geotechnical risk assessment 
guidelines has been derived from the analysis of experiences from key municipal, management 
and operational stakeholders who were involved in the geotechnical risk assessment during the 
Canterbury earthquake sequence. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Christchurch Earthquake sequence that initiated on the 4
th
 September 2010 has been a 
learning curve for most geotechnical professionals involved in the post earthquake response. 
Over the past 70 years, New Zealand has had limited exposure to widespread earthquake 
induced slope failure in largely urbanised and populated areas such as the Port Hills, 
Christchurch. Because of this, the majority of the response and risk assessment methodologies 
were developed reactively after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. Geotechnical Engineers and 
Engineering Geologists were deployed to areas of Christchurch to assess the landscape response 
and subsequent damage to slopes from the earthquake sequence. This assessment of the 
landscape led Geotechnical Engineers and Engineering Geologists to then examine the risk to 
life safety of residents exposed to slope failures induced by the earthquake sequence. The lack 
of guidelines for assessing this risk hindered a co-ordinated and timely response. Because of this 
it became clear that it would be beneficial to New Zealand to have a framework which outlines 
how to respond to earthquake induced slope failures.  
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New Zealand has a high level of earthquake risk due to a number of highly active faults that 
feature throughout the country. This partnered with growing urbanisation in areas of steep 
terrain can present a life risk issue from earthquake induced slope failures. Since 1840 there 
have been at least 22 recorded earthquakes in various locations through New Zealand that have 
resulted in widespread earthquake induced landsliding (Hancox et al 2002). Examples include 
the 1929 Murchison earthquake and the 1968 Inangahua earthquake which resulted in some loss 
of life from extensive landsliding induced by ground shaking. However, most of the 22 
earthquakes have occurred in sparsely populated areas, minimising loss of life and damage to 
infrastructure. Because of this, the experiences, management strategies and lessons learnt by 
those responding to slope failures induced by the Canterbury earthquake sequence offer a rare, 
valuable and perishable opportunity for documentation of this information in order to prepare 
for future earthquake events. Ideally, the systematic investigation and documentation of these 
lessons will provide a foundation for New Zealand to develop a planned response in the form of 
guidelines for future earthquake events. 
This paper outlines a methodology proposed for developing guidelines for geotechnical risk 
assessment in the aftermath of an earthquake. The development of these guidelines is primarily 
focussed on the response and management systems that originated and were refined during the 
Christchurch earthquake sequence. Details of the Christchurch earthquake sequence and the 
response to the earthquake sequence will be presented as a case study to support the 
development of such guidelines. The use of terminology in this paper is consistent with 
ISSMGE Glossary of Risk Assessment Terms (listed on TC304 web page: 
http://140.112.12.21/issmge/2004Glossary_Draft1.pdf) where “risk” is described as the measure 
of the probability and severity of an adverse effect to life, health, property or environment. 
2 METHODOLOGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR 
GEOTECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
As part of the proposed research methodology, guidelines for post earthquake geotechnical risk 
assessment will be developed through examination of a combination of response techniques 
from an international and a local level that addresses the geotechnical issues particular to New 
Zealand. The proposed research has been divided into two phases, currently the first phase of 
the research has been completed and the second research phase is due to commence. The first 
phase of the research aimed to examine the response systems performed by other countries 
during international earthquakes which have induced slope failure. During the second phase, 
geotechnical experts who responded to the Christchurch earthquake sequence will be 
interviewed in an effort to record the local level response methods and lessons learnt from the 
Christchurch earthquake sequence. Information gathered during these two phases of research 
will be used to make recommendations for guidelines for geotechnical risk assessment.  
2.1 Phase One -Review of international case-studies 
At an international level, methods of geotechnical response used during the 1994 Northridge 
earthquake, the 1999 Chi-Chi earthquake and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake have been 
identified to show an outline of practised response methodologies. Review of published 
literature was used to identify relevant information from these international events. The 
individual aspects of response identified provide suggestions for typical components of 
geotechnical response. The majority of these methods are comparable to the geotechnical 
response to the Christchurch earthquake and are therefore applicable to the New Zealand 
context. 
2.2 Phase Two - Analysis of the geotechnical response on the Port Hills during and 
following the Canterbury earthquake sequence  
At a local level, review of the response to earthquake-induced slope failure in the Port Hills 
during the Christchurch earthquake sequence has been helpful for understanding how 
geotechnical response developed in New Zealand. This information has been obtained through a 
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Figure 1 - Framework for interviews 
series of interviews with key municipal, management and geotechnical experts who participated 
in the response to earthquake induced slope failure initiated by the Christchurch earthquake 
sequence. This approach has been taken because little information regarding the mechanisms of 
response has been recorded since the earthquake sequence commenced. It would be useful to 
collaborate experiences and lessons learnt from these individuals who responded in order to 
prepare for future events. 
As part of the proposed research, participants involved in the interview process will be divided 
into three groups: strategic level response, tactical level response and case study participants 
(Figure 1). Tactical level response refers to the geotechnical engineers or engineering geologists 
who were involved in observing and assessing slope failures and making decisions about the 
associated risk on site. Strategic level response refers to the management operatives who were 
involved in making large scale decisions and took part in organising and managing the 
overarching approach to geotechnical risk assessment. In some cases individual participants can 
be categorised in to both or neither of these roles, and in this circumstance the question set was 
tailored to their specific role.  
Up to four case study sites will be examined to gain an understanding of the requirements of 
geotechnical response for site specific failure mechanisms. This will be achieved by 
interviewing the tactical level geotechnical experts who responded to each of the sites. The 
question set will focus on the failure mechanisms and geotechnical response efforts for each of 
the sites. Methods of practically assessing the geotechnical risk in post earthquake environment 
will be identified from interviewing participants from the tactical response group and the case 
study level group. This will form the basis of ‘on the ground’ response methodologies in the 
guidelines for geotechnical risk assessment. 
Interviews with strategic level participants will seek to shed light on the management of 
geotechnical response which developed after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. This is 
important for identifying what information is required for finalisation of higher level decisions 
such as zones of evacuation. These interviews will also focus on the reporting system that 
developed within management level organisations during the response to earthquake induced 
slope failure. Interviews will be semi-structured and will be guided by a question set. Additional 
questions may be added throughout the interview to follow up and explore key statements and 
themes conveyed by the participants. Participants will be asked questions that aim to walk them 
thought the disaster sequence from the 4
th
 September 2010 to December 2011. Depending on 
their level of involvement this timeframe may be shortened.  
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A representative timeline of key events during this period will be presented to each of the 
participants to act as a visual aid to prompt memories and experiences during that time. Key 
events include government level decisions such as states of emergency and introduction of 
legislation regarding the Christchurch earthquake sequence. Large rainfall and snowfall events 
have also been included because these had the potential to affect the geotechnical response. 
Participants will also be presented with a topographic map of the Port Hills as a spatial aid to 
discern where in the area they were active during the response. 
These tactical, strategic and case study level interviews will highlight which approaches 
hindered and which aided a timely and coordinated response in the initial days to weeks after 
the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake. These will be combined with successful response 
approaches used in international examples to generate guidelines for geotechnical risk 
assessment in a post-earthquake environment. 
3 INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES FOR GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND 
RESEARCH 
Analysis of international case studies such as the 1994 Northridge earthquake, the 1999 Chi-Chi 
earthquake and the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake has been useful for identifying components and 
organisational aspects of response used internationally. For example, during the 1999 Chi-Chi 
earthquake the seismic hazard was managed by a collaboration of several government level 
organisations and the mobilisation of engineers and scientists who undertook ground 
reconnaissance. Technical support and information and data management was divided between 
two national science organisations with the National Science Council acting as the over-arching 
organisation responsible for the management of seismic hazard (Loh & Tsay 2001). This 
organised approach to disaster response enabled a systematic post earthquake reconnaissance of 
earthquake induced hazards. 
After the 1994 Northridge earthquake in California as part of the response plan government 
level organisations collected and analysed reconnaissance information commencing hours after 
the earthquake (USGS 1996). Using this information, probabilistic seismic landslide hazard 
maps and spatial mapping of earthquake induced landslides enabled a growth of knowledge 
regarding the susceptibility of slopes in the area to failure (Jibson et al 2000, Parise & Jibson 
2000). This research has enabled geotechnical experts in California to learn from the event by 
the identification of higher risk areas that are likely to fail again from further seismic events. 
This could aid post-disaster decisions such as the deployment of geotechnical experts because 
areas that are likely to have failed can be easily located. 
4 THE CHRISTCHURCH EARTHQUAKE SEQUENCE AS A CASE STUDY FOR 
GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 
The initial earthquake in the Christchurch earthquake sequence (MW 7.1) took place at 4:35am 
on the 4
th
 September 2010. The earthquake initiated from rupture on the previously unknown 
Greendale fault, southwest of the city (Berryman 2012). Although there was no loss of life and 
widespread damage in the Central Business District (CBD), the earthquake caused only minor 
rockfall in the Port Hills. Less than 6 months after the first earthquake a smaller earthquake (MW 
6.2) ruptured at 12:51pm on the 22
nd
 February 2011. The earthquake was located on the 
Christchurch fault directly southeast of the city and caused the loss of 185 lives, damage to 
infrastructure, life lines and residential areas (Berryman 2012).  
Extensive earthquake induced slope failure was initiated in the Port Hills by the 22
nd
 February 
earthquake. These features were widespread in the hilly suburbs and were responsible for the 
loss of five lives. Earthquake induced landslides became an umbrella term for four categories of 
slope failure: rockfall, cliff collapse, landslides and retaining wall failure. From accelerometers 
located near the Port Hills measured peak ground accelerations (PGA) in the vertical direction 
reached up to 2.21g, while PGA in the horizontal direction reached 1.41g at Heathcote Valley 
Primary School (Wood et al 2011). Scientists have attributed the strong ground shaking felt in 
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the Port Hills area to these high PGA values. This is likely to have been the cause for the extent 
of geotechnical failure in the Port Hills (Massey et al 2012b). Following the 22
nd
 February 
earthquakes several large aftershocks triggered further slope failure in the Port Hills. These 
included earthquakes on the 13
th
 June 2011 (Mw 6.0) and 23
rd
 December 2011 (Mw 5.9). The
worst of these was the 13
th
 June 2011 earthquake which initiated similar maximum horizontal 
peak ground accelerations to that of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake (Berryman 2012). 
Further slope failure from these earthquakes required many sites to be re-evaluated by 
geotechnical experts. 
4.1 Response to earthquake induced slope failures in the Port Hills 
Understanding the geotechnical response to the Christchurch Earthquake sequence is important 
for the development of guidelines for New Zealand as it presents a recent example of 
geotechnical risk management. At the current stage in the research, the response to earthquake 
induced slope failures in the Port Hills can be divided up into four components: Organisation 
and mobilisation, slope failure assessment and evacuation, monitoring, and mitigation. The 
response to the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake in particular is likely to form the majority of the 
information for guidelines for geotechnical risk assessment primarily because it was the most 
significant event in the sequence for the development of the response. The geotechnical 
response to life safety risk was significant after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake because it 
was the first earthquake in the sequence to cause extensive slope failure in urban areas.  
4.1.1 Organisation and Mobilisation 
The majority of the response after the 4
th
 September 2010 earthquake was organised by local 
council. This included minor rockfall induced by the earthquake that was cleaned up by local 
contractors. Because earthquake induced slope failure was minor there was no need for an 
extensive organised geotechnical response. 
Hours after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake geotechnical experts responded to the situation 
often by their own self-mobilisation or mobilisation by their employer, rather than as a 
coordinated response initiated by a pre-formed national response framework. Days after the 22
nd
 
February 2011 earthquake geotechnical experts responding to the earthquake began meeting 
together.  This aided the development of organised deployment of geotechnical experts in the 
Port Hills. Because this was still in the developmental stages days after the earthquake some 
sites were still assessed several times by multiple geotechnical response teams. Within days 
after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, as more geotechnical experts became involved the Port 
Hills Geotechnical Group formed. The Port Hills area was divided up into several sectors which 
were then assigned to various geotechnical engineering companies or research institutes within 
the group. 
4.1.2 Slope failure Assessment and Evacuation 
Evacuation of properties commenced hours after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake and 
continued months to year after the event. As geotechnical experts assessed the slope failures 
mandatory evacuation was enforced for properties that could be exposed to inundation by 
further boulder release or cliff collapse, or could be damaged from further ground deformation 
from tensile cracking or compression features (Dellow et al 2011). Often the basis of the 
evacuation decisions was formed from information collected by geotechnical experts assessing 
the evidence for slope failures that had or could affect a property; however, the final decisions 
to enforce evacuations were made by the Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) contingent. Days to 
weeks after the 22
nd
 February earthquake empirical data from field mapping became available. 
This enhanced the assessment of risk for particular areas where data had been collected (Dellow 
et al 2011). 
4.1.3 Slope Monitoring 
Within days of the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake, evaluation of slope failures induced by the 
earthquake consisted mainly of visual observations of the features of each failure mechanism. 
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Visual inspections of cracks for both landslide and cliff collapse failures were important to 
understand the mechanics of movement. Measurements of crack widths were taken regularly to 
monitor rates of movement. Rockfall that had been located in residential areas was often traced 
back to the source area. The rock mass of the source area was examined visually to identify 
loose material that could be released by subsequent aftershocks.  
Monitoring systems were installed on landslides that were identified immediately after the 
earthquake. Days after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake these monitoring systems mainly 
consisted of string lines and pins installed across cracks at the head-scarp of the landslide. As 
equipment became available continuous global positioning systems (cGPS) and strong motion 
instruments were installed. Many of these devices are still in use in order to gather further 
information regarding slope movements. Approximately two weeks after the 22
nd
 February 2011 
earthquake terrestrial light detecting and ranging (LIDAR) data was used to analyse cliff faces 
and identify areas of loose material (Massey et al 2012). This was used to calculate the volume 
of mass released from a cliff face during aftershocks and establish the movement patterns of the 
slope failures (Dellow et al 2011). Generally slope movements were either initiated from 
aftershock activity, or were creeping continuously. The nature of the landslide movements could 
also be observed by the deformation of buildings which straddled tension cracks or compression 
features (Dellow et al 2011).  
4.1.4 Mitigation 
Days after the 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquake evacuation was the most common form of 
mitigation against rockfall and cliff collapse until other measures could be achieved. Mitigation 
of the effects of cliff collapse included the installation of barriers such as ballasted containers 
along the base of the cliff to limit the extent at which the material could travel. Loose material 
was removed from slopes to mitigate the risk of inundation via further cliff collapse or rockfall. 
5 DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDELINES FOR GEOTECHNICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
Developing guidelines for geotechnical risk assessment enables New Zealand to move forward 
and prepare for future earthquake events. Because New Zealand is such a seismically active 
country with a history of earthquake induced slope failure it is likely that a similar large-scale 
earthquake event could occur in a highly populated area with similar resulting geotechnical 
hazards. Capturing lessons learnt from the Christchurch earthquake sequence will assist in 
identification of response to earthquake induced slope failures and in developing a methodology 
for effective response. This will ensure that geotechnical experts involved in future response 
will have the tools necessary to undertake geotechnical risk assessment.  
The development of guidelines will standardise the approach taken to risk assessment and 
ensure that all tactical and strategic level personnel have a consistent response to the situation. 
This will ensure that assessments of geotechnical hazards completed during the response phase 
will be uniform and comparable. Having a framework in place will enable a coordinated 
response by which the geotechnical hazard can be assessed more efficiently and life risk issues 
can be addressed promptly. Achieving coordination between response teams will eliminate or 
reduce communication frustrations and ensure timely analysis and processing of data. This 
should also minimise the amount of ‘lost time’ in effort to coordinate the response and enable a 
more timely mitigation of slope failures. 
Guidelines for post disaster geotechnical risk assessment will be developed as a series of 
recommendations aimed at advising the geotechnical community and government level 
organisations. These recommendations will aim to illustrate methods for the management and 
practice of assessment of geotechnical risk in a post disaster context. Recommendations will be 
developed from processes and information needs that were reflected upon during the interview 
process. Examples of historical earthquake events will be used to guide and support these 
recommendations. 
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Guidelines will be initially divided into management or organisational recommendations and 
tactical level recommendations. Management level recommendations will refer to key 
operational aspects of geotechnical risk assessment such as critical path communication 
between organisations involved. Within this division of the guidelines it would also be helpful 
to develop a schematic framework of the responsibilities, interaction and requirements of and 
between each organisation active during the post-disaster response period. This would include 
government and municipal organisations, geotechnical organisations and research institutes. It 
would be useful within this framework to outline the information needs for each organisation to 
participate in the response.  
Tactical level recommendations will refer to key aspects of geotechnical risk assessment that 
provide the fundamental analysis of risk associated with earthquake induced slope failure. Key 
aspects of tactical level recommendations should include logistical requirements for 
reconnaissance work, data documentation and analysis, methods for assessing earthquake 
induced slope failures, and spatial distribution of geotechnical experts. The focus of this tactical 
division of the guidelines will be to emphasise practical methods for assessing geotechnical risk 
“on the ground” and then progress to recommendations for centralisation of data and 
information collected during reconnaissance work.  
Logistical requirements during reconnaissance should include a framework for reporting 
observations and analysis. In addition to this it would be prudent to suggest the use of a pro 
forma to be used as a method for ensuring consistency of assessing earthquake induced slope 
failures. Centralisation of data immediately after the earthquake will enable processing of 
information to commence soon after it is recorded. It would also be useful for providing 
organisations involved in the response with information collated from ground reconnaissance.  
Tactical recommendations could also encompass suggestions for data analysis. This initially 
will be derived mainly from examples of data analysis from international earthquake events 
such as the 1999 Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake, and the 1994 Northridge earthquake in 
California. After both of these earthquakes data such as ground motion information and 
landslide location information was displayed spatially in order to present a visual representation 
of the distribution of these two data sets. Similar spatial analysis was also undertaken during the 
Christchurch earthquake sequence. 
It will also be an important part of the guideline development to suggest relevant skill criteria 
and training requirements for geotechnical experts who are involved in the post disaster 
geotechnical risk assessment process. This is important because for the risk to be assessed 
adequately the assessor must exhibit competence in the geotechnical field. It is likely that this 
recommendation of skill criteria will be one of the founding components of the guidelines. 
It is also likely that recommendations for pre-earthquake components of geotechnical risk 
assessment will be included in the guidelines. This is likely to include suggestions for slope 
stability analysis and identification of slopes with potential risk of failure triggered by 
earthquakes. This information regarding the stability of slopes would be useful particularly for 
hilly areas that are urbanised or populated. Prior knowledge of slope stability would enable 
geotechnical experts to assess slopes with a background knowledge regarding the risk of failure. 
It is possible that this information would also be useful for distinguishing which areas post-
earthquake will have experienced the most slope failure and which areas are required to be 
examined first by geotechnical experts. 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
The Christchurch earthquake sequence has highlighted the need for guidelines for risk 
assessment of seismically induced slope failures. As part of ongoing research, guidelines will be 
developed from documentation of experiences and events that took place in the aftermath of the 
Christchurch earthquake sequence. This information will be captured from a series of tactical, 
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strategic and case study level interviews with geotechnical experts who were involved in the 
response.  
Because New Zealand is a seismically active country and has a history of earthquake induced 
slope failures, it is important that as a country we learn from the Christchurch earthquake 
sequence so that preparation can be made for future inevitable events. 
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Appendix C – Visual resources for interviews 
Visual resources used for research interviews include: 
C1 Two year timeline commencing September 2010 to September 2012 
C2 Ten week timeline commencing February 2011 to April 2011 
C3 Two week timeline commencing February 2011 
C4 Topographic map of Port Hills, Christchurch 
Information included on the visual timelines was collected from the following references: 
CERA (2013). Port Hills community meetings. http://cera.govt.nz/port-hills/community-
meetings. Accessed 24 Jan 2013. 
CERA (2013) Port Hills geotechnical information and updates. http://cera.govt.nz/port-
hills/geotech#slope-stability. Accessed 24 Jan 2013. 
CCC (2013) General information on Port Hills land damage. http://www.ccc.govt.nz 
/homeliving/civildefence/chchearthquake/porthillsgeotech/porthillsgeneralinfo.aspx#jumplin
k18. Accessed 11 Jan 2013. 
NIWA (2013) Cliflo: The National Climate Database. http://cliflo.niwa.co.nz/. Accessed 4 
March 2013. 
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C2: 22nd Feb – 30th April 2011 Port Hills Geotechnical Response Timeline (10 week timeline) 
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C3: 22nd Feb – 7th March 2011 Port Hills Geotechnical Response Timeline (2 week timeline) 
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Appendix D – University of Canterbury Human Ethics application 
Appendix D provides documentation of the low risk University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
application, and associated amendments to the application conducted throughout the research. 
The following documents are included: 
D1 Low risk human ethics application 
D1 Amendment 1 to ethics application and approval 
D3 Amendment 2 to ethics application and approval 
D4 Amendment 3 to ethics application and approval 
D5 Amendment 4 to ethics application and approval 
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HUMAN ETHICS COMMITTEE 
 
Secretary, Lynda Griffioen 
Email: human-ethics@canterbury.ac.nz  
 
Ref:  HEC 2013/05/LR  
 
 
8 March 2013 
 
 
 
Katherine Yates 
Department of Geological Sciences 
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY 
 
 
 
 
Dear Katherine  
 
Thank you for forwarding your Human Ethics Committee Low Risk application for your research 
proposal “Post-disaster assessment for hilly terrain exposed to seismic loading”.   
 
I am pleased to advise that this application has been reviewed and I confirm support of the 
Department’s approval for this project. 
 
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have provided 
in your email of 4 March 2013. 
 
With best wishes for your project.  
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
 
Lindsey MacDonald 
Chair, Human Ethics Committee 
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Appendix E – Hazard zone maps for Port Hills 
Hazard zone map from (Centre for Advanced Engineering 1997). 
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Appendix F – Overview of New Zealand Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management framework 
This Appendix aims to provide an overview of the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (CDEM) framework, and presents a brief overview regarding components of 
the CDEM response after the 4
th
 September 2010 and 22
nd
 February 2011 earthquakes that 
were discussed during research interviews.  
The Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group 
The Canterbury Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group is a partnership between 
emergency services, local authorities and other organisations in the Canterbury Region. The 
aim of the group is to facilitate effective emergency management in the Canterbury Region 
under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 and the National Civil 
Defence and Emergency Management Plan 2006 (Sinclair 2008; Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Group 2014).  
In the event of an emergency which requires Civil Defence response, the Canterbury 
Regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group is responsible for understanding 
the impact of the event at a regional scale by gathering information from response 
organisations and communities in order to develop an action to support the local response. 
This could include obtaining external resources, providing information, coordinating 
resources and communicating with communities and the media (Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management Group 2014). 
Although the Canterbury Regional CDEM is funded through Environment Canterbury (Ecan) 
and daily tasks and reporting are communicated to ECan, the group is accountable to a joint 
committee of local council Mayors and below this a joint committee of senior executives of 
local authorities and organisations involved in the CDEM group. Both groups are consulted 
when decisions regarding the functions and activities of the Canterbury CDEM Group are to 
be made (Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group 2014). 
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Levels of Civil defence and Emergency Management 
In a typical Civil Defence and Emergency Management framework there are four layers to 
the response model. These are National level, regional level, local level and emergency 
services. Generally when a local or national state of emergency is declared each level of the 
emergency management framework is involved in the response to varying extents. Figure F1 
shows the levels of the Civil Defence and Emergency Management contingent 
 
National Level CDEM 
At the national level the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), which is situated in 
the basement of the Parliament buildings in Wellington, facilitates national and international 
Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management 
 
NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTRE 
(NCMC) 
Regional Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Group 
 
EMERGENCY COORDINATION CENTRE 
(ECC) 
Local Authority Emergency Management 
 
EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTRE (EOC) 
Emergency Services 
 
EMERGENCY SERVICES RESPONSE 
CENTRE 
Figure F.1: Typical four tiered emergency mangement framework 
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coordination in the event of a national-scale emergency. The NCMC operates under the 
Central Government crisis management arrangements and is maintained in a constant state of 
readiness for activation. When the NCMC is activated it is staffed by personnel and liaison 
officers from the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) and 
other supporting government agencies. Depending on the size of the emergency and the level 
of activation of the NCMC the involvement of the centre varies. In a national state of 
emergency the NCMC manages and controls the response to the event, however in a local 
scale emergency the NCMC will monitor and oversee the CDEM response. This can involve 
the collection of information and provide operational and logistical support where required 
(The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 2014). 
Regional Level CDEM 
Beneath the National level response is the regional level civil defence response groups. In 
New Zealand there are sixteen regional level civil defence and emergency management 
response groups. Each of these groups oversees civil defence and emergency response within 
their region to a varying degree depending on the scale of the emergency. The regional level 
CDEM facilitates coordination and communication between local authorities involved in the 
group and aims to coordinate panning activities related to hazard and emergency 
management. Generally each Regional Civil Defence and Emergency Management Group 
will have their own Regional CDEM group plan in accordance with the CDEM act 2002 and 
the National CDEM plan 2006. The Regional Level CDEM will typically be based at their 
Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) within the region. 
Local Level CDEM 
Each local authority or local council that is a member of the regional CDEM group will have 
their own emergency management capabilities. Typically each of the local councils will have 
staff that have been trained in civil defence response. When a local state of emergency is 
declared an Emergency Operations Centre (EoC) is set up. The EoC is used to coordinate the 
local level response and correspond with emergency services, the regional level CDEM and 
national level CDEM when required. 
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Emergency Services 
The final level of the CDEM framework is the emergency services such as the Fire 
department, St Johns Ambulance and Police. These organisations deal with quotidian 
emergency incidents often without the coordination of high level CDEM response. However, 
in the event of a state of emergency the emergency services group set up their own 
coordination centre to coordinate the emergency services response, and communicate with 
local level and regional level CDEM. 
Science and Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) 
The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan (2006) outlines the role of science 
organisations such as GNS in emergency response. The capabilities of GNS are included in 
CDEM through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Ministry of Civil Defence 
and Emergency Management (MCDEM). The MOU details the basis in which the GNS is to 
assist MCDEM in a crisis situation (The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management 2009). Part of the role of GNS in the National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Plan (2006) is to provide monitoring information and notifications for 
earthquake and volcano hazards.  
Professional engineers are included in the national civil defence plan through Institute of 
Professional Engineers (IPENZ) who maintain a register of professional able to provide their 
assistance during emergency response (The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management 2009).  
Declaration of a state of emergency 
The Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 has two levels of declaration of 
state of emergency; local and national. Declaration of a state of emergency enables the 
CDEM group controller to obtain the powers of the Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management Act 2002 in order to provide the necessary authority for protecting life and 
property in extraordinary emergency events (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management 2006). The benefits of this are increased coordination and ability to obtain 
resources when required.  
Underpinning local and national level state of emergency declarations are five CDEM 
response levels that are detailed in the National CDEM Plan. This framework has been 
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applied by most CDEM groups in New Zealand. Table F.1 has been adapted from the 
Declaration: Directors Guidelines for CDEM Sector [DGL 05/06] to show the five levels of 
CDEM response. 
Table F.1: Levels of response for a CDEM Group – modified from (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management 
2006) 
Level Description Declaration Status 
1 Single agency incidents with on-site coordination. Incidents generally maintained at a 
day-to-day level under the New Zealand Coordinated Incident Management System 
and statutory powers of the fire, police and ambulance 
No Declaration 
2 Multi-agency incidents with on-site, local coordination; these are managed by the 
incident controller of the relevant lead agency. Level 2 incidents involving CDEM 
groups do not require the coordination or powers resourced from the CDEM Act 2002. 
No Declaration 
3 A multi agency emergency led by an agency other that a CDEM group, or a state of 
local emergency at below CDEM Group-level (district or ward); at this level. CDEM 
Group support and coordination will be required and may be monitored by the 
National Controller.  
Declaration of state of 
local emergency for a 
ward, part of a district or 
one or more local 
authorities within the 
CDEM Group 
4 A multi-agency emergency with more significant consequences than in level 3; 
coordination may be required between agencies or areas or both; CDEM Group-level 
support and coordination is required; the actual or potential need for a declaration of a 
state of emergency by a CDEM Group requires consideration; national monitoring 
will occur and national support is available. 
Declaration of state of 
local emergency for 
whole group area 
5 A state of national emergency exists or the civil defence emergency is of national 
significance; at this level, coordination by the National Controller will be required.  
Declaration of state of  
national emergency 
 
Typically when a National State of Emergency is declared the required response to the 
emergency is outside the scope of local CDEM Group resources, and national resources are 
required to be drawn upon in the response and recovery phase. 
CDEM response to the 4th September 2010 and 22nd February 2011 earthquakes 
during the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 
4
th
 September 2010 earthquake 
This local level CDEM response was overseen by the Canterbury Regional Civil Defence 
Group within the ECC. With the support of the Ministry for Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management (MCDEM) the Canterbury Regional CDEM Group took a role of coordination 
of resources across the Canterbury Region to support the local council responses and 
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coordinated emergency welfare for communities. A research coordination office was set up at 
the Canterbury Regional ECC to coordinate daily research activities by scientists interested in 
studying the Greendale fault rupture and associated affects. This research coordination office 
provided an interface between emergency responders and researchers (Berryman 2012). 
Communication was a crucial component for the coordination of the response between the 
local and regional level emergency response groups. During the response, local CDEM 
response was required to communicate their response activities through situation reports and 
participation in meetings at the ECC. Immediately after the earthquake the fluidity of the 
response was restrained by the lack of communication between local and regional CDEM, 
however, this improved as the response continued. 
22
nd
 February 2011 Earthquake 
After the declaration of the National State of Emergency an Emergency Operation Centre 
(EoC) and an Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC) were established. In the immediate 
aftermath of the earthquake, communication between the ECC and the EoC was relatively 
strained despite the facilitation of communication through regular meetings and situation 
reports. At these meetings the EoC controller would provide situation reports which would 
detail the situations that the Emergency Operations Centre was dealing with, and present 
plans for dealing with the situation. Communication between the ECC and the EoC was also 
maintained through the presence of an Emergency Management Officer from a local 
authority which was placed within the EoC in an effort to encourage communication flow to 
the ECC.  
The CDEM response coordination continued in accordance with the four tiered response 
model for the first two to three days after the earthquake (Figure F1). The four tiered 
response included emergency services, the Christchurch City Council EoC, the Canterbury 
Regional CDEM ECC and the NCMC and MCDEM. Days after the earthquake this response 
frame work was then altered by the National Controller who combined the local level and 
regional level CDEM groups at the Christchurch Art Gallery. This formed the Christchurch 
Earthquake Response Centre. Integration of local and regional CDEM took place because of 
the scale of the event, and because only one local authority had been affected. The composite 
CDEM response framework was divided into Operations and Planning and Intelligence 
(Figure F2). 
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Figure F.2: Organisational structure for combined Christchurch Response Centre (Mclean et al. 2012). 
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Appendix G – Standard data collection spreadsheet 
Christchurch City Council Civil Defence - 22 Feb 2011 Earthquake, Port Hills Geotechnical Hazard Management Steering Group  
  
Prepared by       Comments    
Reviewed by       Comments   
Compilation Date Phase: Response   Enterted in database by   Date   GIS mapping updated by     
                          
No. Location  
Description of Affected 
Area, Lifeline, or Critical 
Infrastructure 
Type of 
Mechanism 
Potential Effect or Consequence Likelihood or Time Frame 
Hazard 
Exposure 
Scores Treatment Plan Summary 
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Legend 
     
        
   
Extreme Hazard ≥ 300 
  
L  Localised failure of retaining walls or 
fill slopes with no evidence of large scale 
landslide instability. I Inundation; including debris  run out 
and boulder impact 
100 Extreme loss of life or exceptional safety / 
reliability required; e.g. nuclear reactor. PAR 
>100 
5 Imminent; likely to occur very soon 
under static conditions 
  
  
Very High Hazard ≥ 150 
R  Rockslides, Rockfalls, and Boulder 
Rolls. 
E Evacuation; slumping, loss of 
support, lateral spreading etc 
50 Very high loss of life consequences or 
reliable post distaster functionality required. 
PAR =31-100 
4 Llikely to occur soon or after 
moderate rainfall or moderate after 
shock loading 
High Hazard ≥ 80 
  
T  Renting; i.e. tension cracking and/or 
relaxation colinear to topographyy 
  
20  High loss of life consequences or very great 
community impact. Resident PAR =6-30 
3 Expected to progress to failure 
following progressive relaxation / 
strain  
Moderate Hazard ≥ 30 
  
C  Complex large scale deformation, 
possibly consistent with structurally 
controlled landsliding (e.g horizontal and 
vertical displacement, or you’re not sure). 
  
10  Medium loss of life consequences; normal 
individual buildings. Resident PAR =1-5 
2 Expected to occur after severe EQ 
or storm event 
Low Hazard ≥ 10 
  
    
1           Low - Not likely to endager life.  
1 Unlikely to progress to failure within 
6 months 
Negligible Hazard <10 
  
Resident Population at risk (PAR) =0 
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Appendix H – Rockfall hazard assessment flowchart 
The s124 notice assessment flow chart has been referenced from (Macfarlane and Yetton 
2013). 
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Appendix I – Section 11 from ATC-20 guidelines 
Guideline Development 
The requirement for post-earthquake building safety evaluation guidelines was identified 
following the 1971 San Fernando, California earthquake by the California Governor’s Office 
of Emergency Services and the Structural Engineers Association of California (NZSEE 
2011). This led to the establishment of the United States Applied Technology Council (ATC) 
who in 1989 developed the first edition of ATC-20 Procedures for Post-Earthquake Building 
Safety Evaluation (Applied Technology Council 1995). The development of the guidelines 
was commissioned by government agencies and were first used after the 1989 Loma Prieta, 
California earthquake three weeks after the guidelines were published (NZSEE 2011).  
The following pages are referenced from section 11 of the ATC-20 Procedures for 
Post-Earthquake Building Safety Evaluation. 
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Appendix J– Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) 
Some of the information collected for this thesis was obtained from geotechnical 
consultancies in the Port Hills Geotechnical Group (PHGG). Because consultancies within 
the PHGG were under contractual agreement with the Christchurch City Council (CCC) 
during the time of their involvement in the response in the Port Hills, CCC requested a non-
disclosure agreement with the University of Canterbury and Environment Canterbury to 
maintain confidentiality of source data. The NDA is attached in Appendix J as a record. 
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Appendix K – Glossary 
 
Annual Individual Fatality Risk -  The probability (likelihood) that a particular individual 
will be killed in any year at their place of residence as a result of rockfall or cliff collapse 
(Massey et al. 2012a; Massey et al. 2012b). 
Elements at risk -  the people, buildings and structures, infrastructures, economic activities, 
public services, or any other defined values exposed to hazards in a given area (Glade et al. 
2004). 
Exposure - as the length or proportion of time that a person, building or other entity runs a 
risk (Alexander 2002). 
Landslide inventory – An inventory of the location, classification, volume, activity and date 
of occurrence of landsliding 
Landslide susceptibility– a quantitative or qualitative assessment of the classification, 
volume, a spatial distribution of landslides which exist or potentially may occur in an area 
Qualitative risk analysis – an analysis which uses word form, descriptive or numeric rating 
scales to describe the magnitude of potential consequences and the likelihood that those 
consequences will occur (Fell et al. 2005) 
Quantitative risk analysis – an analysis based on numerical values of the probability, 
vulnerability and consequences, and resulting in numerical value of risk (Fell et al. 2005) 
Risk - as the measure of probability and severity of an adverse affect to life, health, property, 
or the environment (ISSMGE 2004) 
Risk Avoidance  - An informed decision not to become involved in a risk situation (AGS 
2000) 
Risk Reduction - A selective application of appropriate techniques and management 
principles to reduce either likelihood of an occurrence or its consequences, or both (AGS 
2000) 
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Risk Transfer  - Shifting the responsibility or burden for loss to another party through 
legislation, contract, or other means. Risk transfer can also refer to shifting a physical risk or 
part thereof elsewhere (AGS 2000). 
Vulnerability - the degree of loss to a given element or se of elements at risk resulting from 
the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude (Glade et al. 2004) 
 
